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Many services that people use daily require computation that depends on the private data of
multiple parties. While the utility of the final result of such interactions outweighs the privacy
concerns related to output release, the inputs for such computations are much more sensitive and
need to be protected. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) considers the question of constructing
computation protocols that reveal nothing more about their inputs than what is inherently leaked
by the output. There have been strong theoretical results that demonstrate that every functionality
can be computed securely. However, these protocols remain unused in practical solutions since they
introduce efficiency overhead prohibitive for most applications.
Generic multiparty computation techniques address homogeneous setups with respect to the
resources available to the participants and the adversarial model. On the other hand, realistic
scenarios present a wide diversity of heterogeneous environments where different participants have
different available resources and different incentives to misbehave and collude. In this thesis we
introduce techniques for multiparty computation that focus on heterogeneous settings. We present
solutions tailored to address different types of asymmetric constraints and improve the efficiency
of existing approaches in these scenarios. We tackle the question from three main directions:
• New Computational Models for MPC – We explore different computational models that enable
us to overcome inherent inefficiencies of generic MPC solutions using circuit representation
for the evaluated functionality. First, we show how we can use random access machines to
construct MPC protocols that add only polylogarithmic overhead to the running time of the
insecure version of the underlying functionality. This allows to achieve MPC constructions
with computational complexity sublinear in the size for their inputs, which is very important
for computations that use large databases.
We also consider multivariate polynomials which yield more succinct representations for the
functionalities they implement than circuits, and at the same time a large collection of prob-
lems are naturally and efficiently expressed as multivariate polynomials. We construct an
MPC protocol for multivariate polynomials, which improves the communication complex-
ity of corresponding circuit solutions, and provides currently the most efficient solution for
multiparty set intersection in the fully malicious case.
• Outsourcing Computation – The goal in this setting is to utilize the resources of a single
powerful service provider for the work that computationally weak clients need to perform
on their data. We present a new paradigm for constructing verifiable computation (VC)
schemes, which enables a computationally limited client to verify efficiently the result of
a large computation. Our construction is based on attribute-based encryption and avoids
expensive primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption and probabilistically checkable
proofs underlying existing VC schemes. Additionally our solution enjoys two new useful
properties: public delegation and verification.
We further introduce the model of server-aided computation where we utilize the computa-
tional power of an outsourcing party to assist the execution and improve the efficiency of
MPC protocols. For this purpose we define a new adversarial model of non-collusion, which
provides room for more efficient constructions that rely almost completely only on symmetric
key operations, and at the same time captures realistic settings for adversarial behavior. In
this model we propose protocols for generic secure computation that oﬄoad the work of most
of the parties to the computation server. We also construct a specialized server-aided two
party set intersection protocol that achieves better efficiencies for the two participants than
existing solutions.
Outsourcing in many cases concerns only data storage and while outsourcing the data of a
single party is useful, providing a way for data sharing among different clients of the service is
the more interesting and useful setup. However, this scenario brings new challenges for access
control since the access control rules and data accesses become private data for the clients
with respect to the service provide. We propose an approach that offers trade-offs between
the privacy provided for the clients and the communication overhead incurred for each data
access.
• Efficient Private Search in Practice – We consider the question of private search from a
different perspective compared to traditional settings for MPC. We start with strict efficiency
requirements motivated by speeds of available hardware and what is considered acceptable
overhead from practical point of view. Then we adopt relaxed definitions of privacy, which still
provide meaningful security guarantees while allowing us to meet the efficiency requirements.
In this setting we design a security architecture and implement a system for data sharing based
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We engage daily in numerous electronic interactions that have become an integral part of almost
every aspect of our life; whether it is shopping online, managing finances, maintaining social con-
nections, checking medical test results, we conduct many of our activities using the Internet. Often
these interactions involve private sensitive information the unwanted exposure of which may have
various negative consequences such as putting at material disadvantage, stigmatizing with social
prejudice or causing other subjective personal damage. That is why providing security guarantees
for such information is an important requirement for the corresponding applications. However, the
question of security is often much more complicated than keeping private information isolated and
protected from everyone else. Most often the value of the services that people use comes from
the fact that they combine and process private data from different resources. Some scenarios that
exemplify the importance of bringing together such information are the following: conducting ex-
periments for the effectiveness of newly developed medicine that involves analysis of the results on
many patients, finding places of interest near your current location, realizing business transactions
such as an auction sale, receiving recommendations based on the preferences and the relevant ac-
tivities of your friends in a social networking site. In these settings the security goal is to protect
information privacy optimally while achieving the desired utility for the service.
Let us pause for a moment and consider the following questions, which illustrate the difference
between the utility and the privacy aspects of data in various scenarios. Can we find out whether
the same person has been treated in two different hospitals and share test results from the two places
without revealing the identities of other patients? Can we study the effect of a newly developed
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medicine on patients without revealing their individual test results? Can we analyze data from
social networks in order to target better ads and provide more relevant recommendations without
revealing the contacts and the online activities of the users? Can we find out whether a suspected
terrorist has boarded an airplane without learning the identities of the people on the flight? Can we
provide location based services without learning the exact location of the person? Can we conduct
an auction without exposing the individual bid prices? Can we ask the cloud to do computation
on our behalf without letting him learn our private data and getting assurance of the correctness
of the returned result?
The capabilities that the above questions ask for underly many of the services and the applica-
tions that people use and expect to have available. They rely on the ability to combine and process
private data from multiple sources. On the other hand, the privacy guarantees required concern
input data that is necessary to obtain the final result, and yet, is not inherently part of it. In many
cases the unwanted exposure of such information (in addition to the output) can be much more
damaging than the final output itself. Thus the major challenge that all of these questions pose
can be summarized as follows:
Can we conduct computation on private data that reveals nothing more than the desired output
and what is inherently leaked by it? Can we do this in an efficient way that will be usable in
practical applications?
Given the inherent tension between utilization and protection of sensitive data, the goal formu-
lated above defines the optimal privacy guarantees we can achieve while facilitating the intended
use of the private information.
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is an area of cryptography which offers a formal approach
to the above problem. It introduces cryptographic techniques that allow to compute the desired
output without revealing the inputs. Formally a secure multiparty computation protocol for the
evaluation of a function f on inputs x1, . . . , xn is a protocol that outputs f(x1, . . . , xn), but does
not reveal anything more about the inputs x1, . . . , xn than what is inherently leaked by the result
f(x1, . . . , xn). Early on work in cryptography research has demonstrated that every functionality
can be computed securely [Yao, 1982; Yao, 1986; Goldreich et al., 1987; Chaum et al., 1988b;
Ben-Or et al., 1988]. However, for a long time MPC has been considered too impractical for any
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real application because of the efficiency overhead that it incurs. In the recent years this perception
has gradually started to change and there have been multiple efforts towards implementation of
MPC techniques [Malkhi et al., 2004; Ben-David et al., 2008; Pinkas et al., 2009; Henecka et al.,
2010; Huang et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012]. While these results have demonstrated working
implementations of generic MPC protocols, which makes secure computation a much more tangible
option for practical solutions, the functionalities and the inputs that these implementations handle
are still far from the complexity and scale of many real world systems that need to deal with
privacy preserving computation. Nevertheless, this line of work is a sign that existing generic MPC
techniques can be useful for the secure implementation of moderate size building blocks in complex
systems.
If we consider scenarios where we need systems that operate on the private data from multiple
sources and where multiparty computation solutions would provide the necessary privacy guaran-
tees, we observe that these scenarios present a wide diversity of heterogeneous environments. Here
heterogeneity refers to the following aspects of the environment. Different parties have different
computation and storage resources. We can take as an example the setting of a big company pro-
viding services to its clients. In this case the clients have at their disposal a laptop or a smart
phone, which are limited in both CPU power and memory, while the service provider operates with
a data center that can handle orders of magnitude more information and computation. Further,
large scale computational resources often have distributed nature and can yield different efficiency
performance depending on the type of computation and whether it can be easily parallelized.
Another point to consider is the fact that communication channels may not exist between all
participants or might not be available at all times during the execution of the protocol. Furthermore,
available communication channels might have very different bandwidths. These concerns come up,
for example, in the case of multiple clients of a service provider, who do not know about each
other and most often cannot communicate directly. The visitors of a webpage can be expected to
interact only once with the web server but would not be available to repeatedly come back and
communicate with the website just in order to execute a secure computation protocol. Also the
rate-limited data connection of a client’s phone can accommodate much less information transfer
than the high speed connection between the data centers at the provider’s site.
While preserving the privacy of the data that is used in the computation is often an important
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requirement, maintaining the correctness of the final output is really the first property that we
want to guarantee. Seemingly if we are not concerned with data privacy, correctness should not
be an issue since each participant should be able to verify the correctness of the final output given
the inputs. However, this is not quite the case when we are dealing with parties that have different
computational resources such that some of the participants cannot execute the whole computation
on their own. In this case achieving efficient verification even without privacy guarantees is an
important question. This is quite relevant in setups of outsourced computation where a weak client
delegates to a powerful party some computation over his data, and he wants to be able to confirm
that the returned output is really the result of the intended evaluation.
A computation protocol prescribes the steps that each party has to follow in its execution.
However, the participants may exhibit different adversarial behavior and deviate from the protocol
depending on their specific incentives. While some parties may be willing to cheat in the execution
if they can obtain any advantage, others may be legally bound to follow honestly all steps but can
still try to learn as much as possible from the exchanged information during the execution. Some
dishonest parties might choose to collude and share private information in order to get advantage
in the final outcome of the protocol. But for others, who might have competing interests in the
long run, the potential risks of revealing private information might outweigh the possible gain in
the particular computation. Thus, they could still choose to deviate from the prescribed protocol,
and yet, would not collude with other parties.
As we saw in the discussion above, once we start to examine carefully the exact settings for
which we would like to construct an MPC protocol, we encounter a wide range of diverse com-
putation, communication, and adversarial requirements. On the other hand, generic multiparty
computation techniques address much more homogeneous setups: they require all participants in
the protocol to have symmetric resources, both in terms of computation and memory storage. They
assume the existence of communication channels between every pair of parties and have symmetric
communication patterns. Generic MPC constructions model corruptions among the parties as a
monolithic adversary who controls all corrupted participants, all their information and determines
the same type of behavior (semi-honest or malicious) for all of them in the protocol execution.
Such protocols are not designed to address optimally heterogeneous setups for MPC such as the
ones that we discussed above, which hurts the efficiency of the resulting solutions or often makes
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such generic protocols unusable in settings with highly asymmetric resource distribution.
In this thesis we introduce techniques for multiparty computation that focus on heterogeneous
settings. We present solutions tailored to address different types of asymmetric constraints and
improve the efficiency of existing approaches in these scenarios. We tackle the question from three
main directions. First, we consider the computation model for the evaluated functionality that is
used in MPC constructions. While existing protocols use circuits (Boolean and arithmetic) as com-
putational models, which introduces several inherent points of inefficiency in the resulting MPC
solutions, we consider new computation models and use them to construct MPC protocols that
improve the efficiency guarantees of existing generic approaches. In particular we construct MPC
solutions using random access machines and multivariate polynomials to represent the evaluated
functionality. Second, we focus on the setting of outsourced computation, where we have one com-
putationally powerful party and several weak clients. This is a setting of increasing importance in
view of the ever growing popularization of cloud computing and the concept of providing computa-
tion resources as a service. We tackle the question of verification for the delegated computation in
this setup and introduce a new paradigm for constructing efficient verifiable computation solutions.
Further, we introduce a new adversarial model of non-colluding adversaries, which is weaker than a
fully malicious adversarial setting but still models accurately many scenarios of computation out-
sourcing. We leverage this new security model to construct protocols for outsourced computation
that improve the efficiency of the participants. We also consider just the setting of outsourced
storage and the ensuing challenges for access control when sharing outsourced data. Finally, we
adopt a different approach to MPC for the setting of encrypted search. Starting with particular
efficiency requirements dictated by what is considered usable from a practical point of view, we
explore how we can relax in a meaningful way strong security definitions to meet the efficiency
threshold. We architect and implement a system which provides these security guarantees and at
the same time incurs acceptable efficiency overhead.
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1.1 Contributions
1.1.1 New Models for Secure Computation
Traditional approaches for secure computation use circuits (Boolean or arithmetic) as a computation
model for the evaluated function. Since circuits have size at least linear in the length of their inputs,
this implies that any protocol for secure evaluation that uses circuit function representation will have
complexity at least linear in the size of the input on which it depends. Further, the requirement for
linearity of the running time for secure protocols appears inherent in the fact that if a computation
does not ”touch” every part from its input, this already leaks information that the untouched parts
of the input were not used in the computation. This seems to rule out secure computation as
a viable practical solution for many interesting functionalities that take as input huge databases
and for which there are sublinear algorithms in the insecure setting. Such an example is private
database search where binary search gives a solution for the insecure setting that has logarithmic
complexity in the database size.
Secure Computation for Random Access Machines. We explore the question of filling in
the efficiency gap between protocols in the insecure and the secure setting and propose a two
party protocol that achieves sublinear amortized computation in the size of its input. We develop a
generic method to compile any two party functionality that can be computed in sublinear amortized
time in the size of its input on a random access machine (RAM) into a secure protocol for the same
function that runs in sublinear time [Gordon et al., 2011; Gordon et al., 2012]. The resulting secure
protocol has the following space requirements for the two parties: O(log s) and O(s · polylog(s))
where s is the size of the database. This general compiler makes use of any oblivious RAM protocol,
which provides access pattern privacy for memory access, and any protocol for secure two-party
computation, which is used for the evaluation of a small number of simple operations. We extend the
general construction into an optimized protocol that looks at particular instantiations of the main
building block protocols (Yao two party computation and the ORAM construction of Goldreich-
Ostrovsky). In this construction we improve the efficiency beyond the asymptotic bounds looking
at the exact constants. We minimized the part of the computation that would be implemented
with the more expensive generic techniques and develop new primitives such as a shared oblivious
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pseudorandom function that contribute to the efficiency of the protocol.
Secure Computation for Multivariate Polynomials. A large collection of problems are nat-
urally and efficiently expressed as multivariate polynomials over a field or a ring: for example,
problems from linear algebra, statistics, logic and set operations, which makes them of practical in-
terest. At the same time multivariate polynomials yield more succinct functionality representation
than circuits. We show how to take advantage of this representation and construct a protocol that
allows multiple parties to evaluate a multivariate polynomial that depends on their private inputs
more efficiently than the corresponding generic MPC approaches [Dachman-Soled et al., 2011]. It
also achieves better communication complexity than the solution of [Franklin and Mohassel, 2010],
the only previous work that focuses on multivariate polynomial evaluation, as well as it answers an
open question in [Franklin and Mohassel, 2010] for constructing protocols for polynomials of degree
higher than 3 that improve generic MPC techniques. As a special case of our general protocol
we propose the first solution for the problem of multi-party set intersection in the fully malicious
adversarial model that does not use generic zero knowledge techniques. This work extends the
first solution that provides security against malicious adversaries for the problem of two-party set
intersection, which we introduced in [Dachman-Soled et al., 2009].
1.1.2 Outsourcing Computation
The recent advent of cloud computing has popularized the paradigm of providing computation
resources as a service. The goal in this setting is to utilize the resources of a single powerful service
provider for the work that computationally weak clients need to perform on their data with the
following caveats. Computation outsourcing can be useful only if the returned results can be trusted,
and hence we need to enable the clients to efficiently verify the correctness of the returned output.
On the other hand, if the clients’ input data is sensitive, we need mechanisms that allow the server to
process the data while maintaining its privacy. While there are solutions for both of these questions
based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gentry, 2009; Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan, 2011;
Brakerski et al., 2012], this is a primitive that is still too expensive for most practical applications.
Thus we focus on looking for trade-offs that would allow constructions for outsourced computation
with better efficiency not using FHE.
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Publicly Verifiable Computation. The goal of verifiable computation (VC) is to provide means
for a weak client to efficiently verify the correctness of the results returned for outsourced computa-
tion jobs (i.e. doing less work than the job itself). We extend this definition with the following two
properties: public delegation and public verifiability, which are useful for many practical scenarios.
Public delegation allows to decouple the party who provides the function to be evaluated and the
party who has the input for the computation. Public verifiability enables anyone to verify the
correctness of the returned results. To illustrate the importance of these two properties, we can
consider the scenario where we outsource the evaluation of an analysis function for the lab tests of
hospital patients. In this case public delegation enables the doctor to specify the function that will
be evaluated and the lab assistant to provide the input for the computation. The public verifiability
property makes it possible that both the doctor and the patients can verify the output of the anal-
ysis function on the test results. We show how to construct a verifiable computation scheme, which
satisfies both of these properties, from attribute-based encryption [Parno et al., 2012]. Our solution
does not use expensive primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption or probabilistically check-
able proofs (PCPs), which underly existing VC solutions [Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010;
Chung et al., 2011; Bitansky et al., 2011; Goldwasser et al., 2011].
Server-Aided Multiparty Computation with Non-Colluding Adversaries. Existing ad-
versarial models used in the proofs for MPC protocols assume a monolithic adversary who controls
all corrupted parties among the participants and sees their private inputs. However, there are
many instances in practice where collusion between participants is unlikely to happen while each
corrupted party may still misbehave on his own. Collusion may be infeasible because it is too
costly, it is prevented by physical means, by the Law or due to conflict of interests. An important
example for such a heterogeneous environment is the cloud where the users might be in completely
different parts of the world and even not know about each other; or the same parties might be
interacting in several different contexts and while a possible collusion may give them a short-term
advantage, it will be harmful in the long term if they are competitors on the market. Motivated
by this application scenario we formally define the heterogeneous adversarial model where some of
the adversaries are not willing to collude. We present new server-aided MPC protocols providing
security in this model with efficiency improvements [Kamara et al., 2011], where all but one of the
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parties have to do work only proportional to the size of their input. In the constructions of these
protocols we introduce a new technique for oblivious cut-and-choose that allows to outsource the
major part of the verification work for correctness of the construction of Yao garbled circuits to
the server facilitating the computation. In addition we show a general transformation from any
delegated computation scheme into a two-party server-aided protocol. Finally we constructe a spe-
cialized protocol for the problem of set intersection in the server-aided setting that achieves better
efficiency than existing solutions.
Privacy Enhanced Access Control for Outsourced Data Sharing. One of the most popular
cloud services is data storage. The next logical step extending this capability is to facilitate data
sharing among different clients. Constructing an access control scheme for this setting faces the
following challenge: the storage server, which is the first point of access control enforcement, is
not the data owner and thus the access rules as well as the access patterns of the users are private
information that needs to be protected from him. With these privacy requirements in mind we
design a new scheme for access control built for sharing of outsourced data [Raykova et al., 2012].
It divides the outsourced data into access blocks and combines different approaches for coarse-
grained (at block level) and fine-grained (within each block) access control to offer a flexible level
of trade-offs between efficiency and privacy guarantees.
1.1.3 Efficient Private Search in Practice
There are many scenarios where parties possess data of mutual interest, which they are willing to
share but without revealing any other information about the rest of their data sets. Examples for
such scenarios include police investigating embezzlement who needs to check banks’ databases for
information relevant to the case, a physician who wants to find other patients with a rare disease
that he is trying to treat and methods that have worked before, institutions who want to detect
attacks on their networks using the information from their logs to correlate across different domains.
In these settings the parties need methods to find out whether they have data worth sharing and
means to exchange such data. One approach for a solution to this problem is to provide search
capabilities over the data of one party (data owner) to other parties (queriers). However, providing
such capabilities needs to be accompanied by the appropriate privacy guarantees for both parties.
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For the data owner these are guarantees that the queriers will be able to retrieve only data relevant
to their queries and further that only authorized parties will be allowed to submit queries. On the
other hand, for the queriers this means keeping their queries private from the data owner and even
anonymous (within the set of authorized parties) since in certain scenarios even the intent to query
might already be revealing some sensitive information.
Secure Data Sharing with Encrypted Search. We explore solutions for secure search from
a different perspective compared to traditional settings for MPC. We start with strict efficiency
requirements motivated by speeds of available hardware and what is considered acceptable over-
head from practical point of view, and we adopt relaxed definitions of privacy, which still provide
meaningful security guarantees while allowing us to meet the efficiency requirements. We design a
security architecture and implement a system for data sharing based on encrypted search [Raykova
et al., 2009; Pappas et al., 2011]. Our protocol combines ideas of Bloom filters, a construction for a
new private key deterministic encryption scheme and a new primitive called re-routable encryption.
We evaluate the performance of our system and its practical usability with tests over tens of giga-
bytes of data, in which our implementation achieves only 30% overhead compared to the running
time for SQL queries on the same database. The latencies for the document retrieval in our system
are of the order of the time required for file transfer over SSH. Further, we propose a modification
of the protocols that trades off a relaxation of the privacy guarantees for the opportunity of another
implementation optimization (bitslicing) that brings several orders of improvement in the search
time.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.0.4 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) addresses the following problem: how a set of n parties,
each with a private input, can securely and jointly evaluate an n-party functionality f over their
inputs. An MPC protocol guarantees that (1) the parties will not learn any information from
the interaction other than their output and what is inherently leaked from it; and (2) that the
functionality was computed correctly. A major factor determining the complexity of an MPC
protocol is the adversarial model in which it is proven secure. This includes the adversarial behavior
that is admissible for the participants: whether they follow the prescribed steps or deviate from
the protocol arbitrarily, whether they try to derive additional information from the messages they
receive during the execution on their own or collude with other parties. It also depends on the
computational power that each participant is assumed to have: whether we would want perfect
information theoretic security that provides against adversaries with unbounded computational
power, or we are willing to assume limited computational power that allows the use of computational
hardness assumptions. While the former provides theoretically stronger security guarantees, it
limits the extent of collusion among parties that protocols can handle, allowing at most a half
passive corruptions or at most a third active corruptions among the pasties [Ben-Or et al., 1988;
Chaum et al., 1988b], and resulting in more computational and communication overhead for the
protocol. At the same time for practical purposes computational security suffices and such setting
allows protocols that can be proven secure even in the case of when the majority of the parties
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behave maliciously and collude.
Early feasibility results in the area [Yao, 1982; Yao, 1986; Goldreich et al., 1987; Ben-Or et
al., 1988; Chaum et al., 1988b] demonstrated that any functionality can be computed securely in
both the two party and the multiparty setting. There are multiple sources of inefficiency in these
early works: their communication and computation complexities depends on the number of wires
and gates in the Boolean circuit computing the functionality, and they use generic zero-knowledge
proofs or require many rounds of computation. Following works introduce multiple directions
of improvement of these initial protocols: constant round [Beaver et al., 1990], black-box use of
crypto pseudorandom generators [Damgard and Ishai, 2005; Ishai et al., 2008] , adaptive adversary
[Damgard and Ishai, 2006; Ishai et al., 2008], and dishonest majority [Ishai et al., 2008], cut-and-
choose techniques that eliminate the need of generic zero-knowledge proofs [Lindell and Pinkas,
2007]. Certain classes of functionalities admit more efficient representation as arithmetic circuits
rather than Boolean circuits. There have been corresponding constructions for MPC protocols
using arithmetic circuits [Cramer et al., 1999; Ishai et al., 2009; Damgard and Orlandi, 2010;
Cramer et al., 2000].
While generic MPC techniques using Boolean or arithmetic circuits can be used for the secure
evaluation of any function, such protocols do incur computational and communication overhead
proportional to the size of the function circuit. An alternative approach for optimizing the effi-
ciency of MPC protocols is to consider limited classes of functionalities that admit more efficient
representation than circuits, which can be used in MPC constructions. Franklin et el. [Franklin
and Mohassel, 2010] consider secure computation of a class of functionalities representable as multi-
variate polynomials. This work focuses on multivariate polynomials of degree 3 but points out that
the proposed protocols can be generalized to higher degree polynomials, however, with communi-
cation complexity that is no longer optimal and leaves as an open question improvements of this
complexity. Two functionalities that can be expressed as multivariate polynomials are oblivious
polynomial evaluation and set intersection. Oblivious polynomials evaluation [Naor and Pinkas,
2006] gives a secure solution for class of two party computation functionalities where the inputs
one of the parties are coefficients of a polynomial and the inputs of the other party are the evalu-
ation points. The problem of set intersection asks how several parties with private input sets can
compute the intersection of these sets. It has been considered in several works providing secure
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computation solutions specifically for this problem. The two-party variant of the set intersection
problem has been addressed in a series of works [Freedman et al., 2004; Hazay and Lindell, 2008;
Kissner and Song, 2005; Jarecki and Liu, 2009; Dachman-Soled et al., 2009] providing solutions in
various different adversarial models. The only work that has considered specifically the problem
of multiparty set intersection in the malicious adversarial model is [Dawn and Song, 2005] giving
a semi-honest protocol and suggesting to use generic zero knowledge techniques to address the
malicious case, which incurs substantial complexity overhead.
Random access machines present a different computational model, where the computation can
be expressed as a series of small computations and reads/write instructions into memory, which
stores the inputs and intermediate state for the protocol execution. The works of [Damgard et
al., 2010] and [Ostrovsky and Shoup, 1997] observe that this model can be also used for secure
computation. Specifically, these works consider the following scenarios: two parties share the
entire (super-linear) memory state for the protocol in [Damgard et al., 2010], and a (stateless)
client storing data on two servers that are assumed not to collude [Ostrovsky and Shoup, 1997].
Collusion. The problem of collusion in MPC was first explicitly considered in the work Lepinski,
Micali and Shelat [Lepinksi et al., 2005], where they defined and gave constructions of collusion-free
protocols. Roughly speaking, an MPC protocol is collusion-free if it meets all the standard security
properties and, in addition, it cannot be used as a covert channel. While the protocol of [Lepinksi
et al., 2005] relies on physical assumption (e.g., ballot boxes and secure envelopes), recent work
by Alwen, Shelat and Visconti [Alwen et al., 2008] and Alwen, Katz, Lindell, Persiano, Shelat and
Visconti [Alwen et al., 2009] shows how to construct collusion-free protocols that rely only on a
trusted mediator.
2.0.5 Delegation of Computation
The goal of a verifiable computation (VC) scheme is to provide a way to efficiently verify the
correctness results of outsourced computation. Solutions for this problem have been proposed in
various settings. These include interactive proofs [Lund et al., 1992; Shamir, 1992; Fortnow and
Lund, 1991; Goldwasser et al., 2008] and interactive arguments [Kilian, 1992; Brassard et al., 1988;
Micali, 1994]. However, in the context of delegated computation, a non-interactive approach for
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verifiability is much more desirable. CS proofs [Micali, 1994] realize a non-interactive argument
in the random oracle model where the verification work is logarithmic in the complexity of the
computation performed by the worker. Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [Goldwasser et al., 2008]
construct a two message (non-interactive) protocol for functions in NC, where the verifier’s running
time depends on the depth of the circuit for the evaluated function.
The first solutions that provide single round verifiable computation schemes secure in the stan-
dard model for any polynomial-time computable function are the works of Gennaro, Gentry, and
Parno [Gennaro et al., 2010] and Chung, Kalai, and Vadhan [Chung et al., 2010]. Both construc-
tions employ fully homomorphic encryption for the evaluation of the delegated function, and neither
can safely provide oracle access to the verification algorithm. This problem is resolved by Chung
et al. [Chung et al., 2011], who consider the setting of memory delegation, where all inputs are pre-
processed and given to the worker who will later execute multiple computations on them. Similar
to the non-interactive solution of Goldwasser et al. [Goldwasser et al., 2008], the effort required to
verify results from memory delegation is proportional to the depth of the computation’s circuit,
which for certain functions may be proportional to the circuit size (e.g., exponentiation). The re-
cent works of Bitansky et al. [Bitansky et al., 2011] and Goldwasser et al. [Goldwasser et al., 2011]
also achieve reusable soundness, though they rely on non-falsifiable “knowledge of exponent” type
assumptions to do this. Specifically, Bitansky et al. [Bitansky et al., 2011] present a construction
for succinct non-interactive arguments based on a combination of PCP and PIR techniques, while
Goldwasser et al. [Goldwasser et al., 2011] give a construction for designated verifier CS proofs for
polynomial functions, which also employs leveled fully homomorphic encryption.
Barbosa and Farshim [Barbosa and Farshim, 2011] construct a verifiable computation protocol
for arbitrary functions (without the rejection problem) from fully homomorphic encryption and
functional encryption. Similar to the proposal of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [Applebaum
et al., 2010], their protocol calculates a verifiable MAC over the computation’s result, allowing
efficient verification. However, this approach relies on powerful functional encryption functionality
(e.g., the ability to compute MACs) that are currently not known to be achievable.
The solutions of Benabbas, Gennaro, and Vahlis [Benabbas et al., 2011] and Papamanthou,
Tamassia, and Triandopoulos [Papamanthou et al., 2011] provide verifiable computation schemes
for smaller classes of functions, polynomials and set operations respectively, but using more efficient
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tools than FHE or PCPs. Although VC schemes with reusable soundness protect against cheating
even when the worker learns the output of the verification algorithm, they do not provide public
verifiability where anyone can check the correctness of the result. The only exception is the work
of Papamanthou et al. [Papamanthou et al., 2011] which allows anyone who receives the result of
the set operation to verify its correctness.
2.0.6 Secure Search
Secure search considers the following question: there are two parties, one of which holds a database
and the other has a query, and we want to enable the querier to submit his query and learn the
relevant results from the database without leaking any private information about either participant
where private information is defined as follows.The query is always private information that should
be protected from the data owner. As far as the database is concerned there are two main types
of scenarios that have different requirements: in data outsourcing the stored database is owned
by the querier and in data sharing the querier and the data owner are different parties. The
latter case requires that any non-matching information should be kept private from the querier. A
generalization of the problem allows multiple querying parties, which introduces issues of access
control and revocation of search capabilities as well as anonymity of the querier among all authorized
parties for search. The problem of secure anonymous database search can be solved with general
secure multiparty techniques, which, however, will not be optimal in terms of efficiency and would
not be suitable for practical purposes. Since the problem is relevant to many real scenarios there
are numerous protocols that offer solutions specifically for this setting.
Protocols for Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [Chor et al., 1998] and Symmetric Private
Information Retrieval (SPIR) [Gertner et al., 2000] provide a limited type of privacy preserving
search. The scenario that PIR addresses is between two parties: server and client, where the server
has a database of n items and the client wants to obtain the item at position i without the server
learning the value of i. In the case of SPIR, it is additionally required that the user does not learn
any other item except the one that was requested. These protocols have sub-linear communication
and polynomial computational complexity, already improving on generic multiparty computation
protocols, but still remain inefficient for many practical uses. Additionally, these protocols typically
support only simple selection, rather than general query capability (a notable exception being [Chor
CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK 16
et al., 1997]).
Many papers address the scenario of database outsourcing [Song et al., 2000; Boneh et al., 2004;
Boneh and Waters, 2007; Boneh et al., 2007; Williams and Sion, 2008; Williams et al., 2008;
Curtmola et al., 2006; cheng Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005; Aviv et al., 2007]. In this setting
one party possesses data but does not have enough resources to store it. He keeps the data on
an untrusted storage server, but maintains the ability to search the data without leaking any
information to the server. The approaches of [Song et al., 2000; Boneh et al., 2004; Boneh and
Waters, 2007; Boneh et al., 2007] use encryption systems that allow matching of ciphertexts of the
same encrypted word and enable search over the encrypted content of documents. Thus the running
time of the search in these approaches is linear in the number of all searchable tokens. Bellare et
al. [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007] show that in order to achieve better than linear complexity of
search the mechanism for computing the searchable tags needs to be deterministic, which affects
the security guarantees that can be proven for the protocol. This pinpoints the issue for tradeoff
between efficiency and strong privacy guarantees. Curtmola et al. [Curtmola et al., 2006] use the
idea of inverted indices for efficiency gain and suggest the querier preprocess the data by computing
inverted indices on search words. An inherent leakage in this case is the search pattern over multiple
queries. The works of [Bellovin and Cheswick, 2007] and [Goh, 2004] use Bloom filters as a basis
for their search structures, which allow efficiency improvement but weaker privacy definitions.
In data sharing an important question relevant to the leakage of information is how and at what
granularity the search capability is granted. The works of [Waters et al., 2004] and [Shi et al., 2007]
assume the existence of an authorization party that can provide search tokens for words that the
querier is allowed to decrypt. The approach of [Bellovin and Cheswick, 2007] allows that search
capabilities are granted for a collection of documents as opposed to separate words, which will be
more relevant in cases where data sharing should be enabled for the whole content of a particular
set of documents.
2.0.7 Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM)
Oblivious RAM was introduced by Goldreich and Ostrosky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] as
a solution that allows storage and data access on an untrusted server while hiding the access
pattern and avoiding computational overhead linear in the database size. The main idea behind
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the construction is that the entries in the database are associated with virtual addresses, which
serve as their searchable tags, and these virtual addresses change their actual physical location
in memory each time they are accessed (read or written). For this purpose the database with n
entries is preprocessed to be stored encrypted in a multilevel structure with log n levels. Using this
structure each operation (read or write) accesses all elements in the first level (the cache) and a
constant number of elements in each of the rest of the levels of the ORAM. After a certain number
of data operations some part of the stored encrypted database needs to be reshuﬄed in order to
maintain the hiding property for the data access pattern.
Pinkas et al. [Pinkas and Reinman, 2010] suggested an optimization for the construction of [Gol-
dreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] that uses Cuckoo hash tabled for data storage at each level which results
in smaller space and computation overhead. However, an attack [Goodrich and Mitzenmacher, 2011;
Kushilevitz et al., 2012; Gordon et al., 2011] on the scheme of [Pinkas and Reinman, 2010] have
demonstrated that additional care is required when using Cuckoo hash. The idea of the attack
is related to the fact that even if a Cuckoo hash can hold all the elements assigned to a par-
ticular level, there still might be search sequences of elements that result in collisions that are
incompatible with the structure of the Cuckoo hash tables. The fix for the issue [Goodrich and
Mitzenmacher, 2011] is a new construction for a Cuckoo hash table in which all possible collisions
are allocated into a separate stash. Several following works have adopted with some modifications
the approach relying on Cuckoo hashing [Goodrich and Mitzenmacher, 2011; Goodrich et al., 2011;
Kushilevitz et al., 2012]. The work of [Kushilevitz et al., 2012] improves the computational com-
plexity of accesses to O(log2 n/ log logN) . An alternative construction for oblivious RAM, which
does not use the hierarchical memory structure but rather a series of recursive binary trees and
avoids the need of oblivious shuﬄes, is suggested by Shi et al. [Shi et al., 2011]. The works of [Ajtai,
2010] and [Damgard et al., 2010] provide ORAM construction that avoid the use of pseudorandom
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Chapter 3
Secure Computation with Sublinear
Amortized Work
3.1 Motivation and Contributions
Consider the natural task of searching over a sorted database of n elements. Using binary search,
this can be done in time O(log n). Next consider a secure version of this problem where a client
holds an item and wants to learn whether this item is present in a database held by a server, with
neither party learning anything else. Applying standard protocols for secure computation to this
task, we would find that they begin by expressing the computation as a (binary or arithmetic)
circuit of size at least n, resulting in protocols of complexity Ω(n). Moreover, it is well known that
this is inherent. Namely, in any secure protocol for this problem the server must “touch” every
bit of its database; otherwise, the server learns some information about the client’s input from the
portions of its database that were never touched.
One may notice two opportunities for improvement:
• Any circuit computing a non-trivial function f on inputs of length n must have size Ω(n).
On the other hand, many interesting functions can be computed in sublinear time on a
random-access machine (RAM). Thus, it would be desirable to have protocols for generic
secure computation that use RAMs — rather than circuits — as their starting point.
• The fact that linear work (or more) is inherent for secure computation of any non-trivial
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function f only applies when f is computed once. However, it does not rule out the possibility
of doing better, in an amortized sense, when the parties compute the function several times.
Inspired by the above, we explore scenarios where secure computation with sublinear amortized
work is possible. We focus on a setting where a client and server repeatedly evaluate a function f ,
maintaining state across these executions, with the server’s (huge) input D given at the outset and
the client’s (small) input x chosen anew each time f is evaluated. Our main result is:
Theorem 1 (Informal). Say f(x,D) can be computed in time t and space s in the RAM model of
computation. Then there is a secure two-party protocol computing f in which the client and server
run in amortized time O(t) · polylog(s), the client uses space O(log(s)), and the server uses space
O(s · polylog(s)).
We show a generic protocol achieving the above bounds based on any oblivious RAM (ORAM)
construction and any secure two-party computation protocol, following an idea of Ostrovsky and
Shoup [Ostrovsky and Shoup, 1997]. The resulting protocol demonstrates the feasibility of sublinear-
complexity secure computation, and serves as a useful template for our second, optimized construc-
tion. Here we use a specific ORAM construction, and design the protocol so that generic secure
computation is utilized only for a small number of simple operations. The resulting protocol is
much more efficient.
3.2 Solution Overview
Our starting point is the ORAM primitive [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996], which allows a client
(with small memory) to perform RAM computations using the (large) memory of a remote untrusted
server. At a high level, the client stores its encrypted memory cells on the server and then emulates
a RAM computation of some function f by replacing each read/write access of the original RAM
computation with a series of read/write accesses of the remote data, such that the client’s actual
access pattern remains hidden from the server. Results of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and
Ostrovsky, 1996], since improved by others (see Section 2.0.7), show that if f can be computed on
a RAM in t steps and space s (see Section 3.3.1 for our formal model of RAM algorithms), then it
can be computed on an ORAM in t · polylog(s) steps while using s · polylog(s) space at the server.
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In our setting, ORAM suggests a candidate protocol for computing f with sublinear amortized
overhead. Say the server starts with input D, and the client wants to compute f(xi, D) for a
sequence of inputs x1, x2, . . .. The client and server (interactively) pre-process D as required for
the ORAM construction. This pre-processing step will take (at least) time linear in |D|, but will
be amortized over several computations of f . In each computation, the client and server run the
ORAM protocol until the client learns the output. If f can be evaluated in t steps on a RAM, then
each such evaluation can be done in time t · polylog(|D|).
The above protocol provides “one-sided security,” in that it ensures privacy of the client’s input
against a semi-honest server. (Though, in fact, it was already shown by Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] how malicious behavior by the server can be addressed.)
However, it provides no security guarantees for the server! We can address this by running each
ORAM instruction inside a (standard) secure two-party computation protocol, with intermediate
states being shared between the client and server. This is the basic idea behind our generic con-
struction, as described in detail in Section 3.4. We note that this idea can be traced to the work of
Ostrovsky and Shoup [Ostrovsky and Shoup, 1997] from 1997 (see Section 2.0.4).
In our second construction, we optimize the efficiency of the above by building on the specific
ORAM construction of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] and aiming to
minimize our reliance on generic secure computation. In particular, we make sure that generic
secure computation is applied only to very small circuits. To reduce our reliance on generic secure
computation, we design a protocol for obliviously evaluation of a pseudorandom function (PRF)
where both the key and the input/output are shared; this may be of independent interest. With
careful attention to detail, and several important changes to the underlying ORAM protocol, we
end up with a much more efficient protocol. We describe this in detail in Section 3.5.
In the course of proving security of our protocol, we identified a security issue with some previous
ORAM constructions; our observations impact the security of the Pinkas-Reinman protocol [Pinkas
and Reinman, 2010] as well as the analysis (and the security for some parameter settings) of
the Goldreich-Ostrovsky protocol [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996].1 See Section 3.5.4 for further
discussion.
1Independent of (but prior to) our work, similar flaws have been pointed out by others [Goodrich and Mitzen-
macher, 2011; Kushilevitz et al., 2011].
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3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Random Access Machines
In this work, we focus on RAM programs for computing a function f(x,D), where x is a “small”
input that can be read in its entirety and D is a larger array that is accessed via a sequence of
read and write instructions. Any such instruction I ∈ ({read,write} × N × {0, 1}∗) takes the form
(write, v, d) (“write data element d in location/address v”) or (read, v,⊥) (“read the data element
stored at location v”). We also assume a designated “stop” instruction of the form (stop, z) that
indicates termination of the RAM protocol with output z.
Formally, a RAM program is defined by a “next instruction” function Π which, given its current
state and a value d (that will always be equal to the last-read element), outputs the next instruction
and an updated state. Thus if D is an array of n entries, each ` bits long, we can view execution
of a RAM program as follows:
• Set stateΠ = (1logn, 1`, start, x) and d = 0`. Then until termination do:
1. Compute (I, state′Π) = Π(stateΠ, d). Set stateΠ = state
′
Π.
2. If I = (stop, z) then terminate with output z.
3. If I = (write, v, d′) then set D[v] = d′.
4. If I = (read, v,⊥) then set d = D[v].
(We stress that the contents of D change during the course of the execution.) To make things
non-trivial, we require that the size of stateΠ, and the space required to compute Π, is polynomial
in log n, `, and |x|. (Thus, if we view a client running Π and issuing instructions to a server storing
D, the space used by the client is small.)
We allow the possibility for D to grow beyond n entries, so the RAM program may issue write
(and then read) instructions for indices greater than n. The space complexity of a RAM program
on inputs x,D is the maximum number of entries used by D during the course of the execution.
The time complexity of a RAM program on the same inputs is the number of instructions issued in
the execution as described above. For our application, we do not want the running time of a RAM
program to reveal anything about the inputs. Thus, we will assume that any RAM program has
associated with it a polynomial t such that the running time on x,D is exactly t(n, `, |x|).
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3.3.2 Oblivious RAM
We view an oblivious-RAM (ORAM) construction as a mechanism that simulates read/write access
to an underlying (virtual) array D via accesses to some (real) array D˜; “obliviousness” means that
no information about the virtual accesses to D is leaked by observation of the real accesses to D˜.
An ORAM construction can be used to compile any RAM program into an oblivious version of
that program.
An ORAM construction consists of two algorithms ORAMInit and ORAMEval for initialization
and execution, respectively. ORAMInit initializes some state stateoram that is used (and updated
by) ORAMEval. The second algorithm, ORAMEval, is used to compile a single read/write instruc-
tion I (on the virtual array D) into a sequence of read/write instructions I˜1, I˜2, . . . to be executed
on (the real array) D˜. The compilation of an instruction I into I˜1, I˜2, . . . , can be adaptive; i.e.,
instruction I˜j may depend on the values read in some prior instructions. To capture this, we de-
fine an iterative procedure called doInstruction that makes repeated use of ORAMEval. Given a
read/write instruction I, we define doInstruction(stateoram, I) as follows:
• Set d = 0`. Then until termination do:
1. Compute (I˜ , state′oram)← ORAMEval(stateoram, I, d), and set stateoram = state′oram.
2. If I˜ = (done, z) then terminate with output z.
3. If I˜ = (write, v, d′) then set D˜[v] = d′.
4. If I˜ = (read, v,⊥) then set d = D˜[v].
If I was a read instruction with I = (read, v,⊥), then the final output z should be the value
“written” at D[v]. (See below, when we define correctness.)
Correctness. We define correctness of an ORAM construction in the natural way. Let I1, . . . , Ik
be any sequence of instructions with Ik = (read, v,⊥), and Ij = (write, v, d) the last instruction that
writes to address v. If we start with D˜ initialized to empty and then run stateoram ← ORAMInit(1κ)
followed by doInstruction(I1), . . . , doInstruction(Ik), then the final output will be equal to d with all
but negligible probability.
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Security. Intuitively, the security requirement is that for any two equal-length sequences of RAM
instructions, the (real) access patterns generated by those instructions will be indistinguishable. We
will use the standard definition from the literature, which assumes the two instruction sequences are
chosen in advance.2 Formally, let ORAM = 〈ORAMInit,ORAMEval〉 be an ORAM construction
and consider the following experiment:
Experiment ExpAPHORAM,Adv(κ, b):
1. The adversary Adv outputs two sequences of queries (I0, I1), where I0 = {I01 , . . . , I0k} and
I1 = {I11 , . . . , I1k} for arbitrary k.
2. Run stateoram ← ORAMInit(1κ); initialize D˜ to empty; and then execute doInstruction(stateoram, Ib1),
. . . , doInstruction(stateoram, I
b
k) (note that stateoram is updated each time doInstruction is run).
The adversary is allowed to observe D˜ the entire time.
3. Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The experiment evaluates to 1 iff b′ = b.
Definition 1. An ORAM construction ORAM = 〈ORAMInit,ORAMEval〉 is access-pattern hiding
against honest-but-curious adversaries if for every ppt adversary Adv the following probability,
taken over the randomness of the experiment and b ∈R {0, 1}, is negligible:∣∣∣∣Pr [ExpAPHORAM,Adv(1κ, b) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
3.3.3 Secure Computation
We focus on the setting where a server holds a (large) database D and a client wants to repeatedly
compute f(x,D) for different inputs x; moreover, f may also change the contents of D itself. We
allow the client to keep (short) state between executions, and the server will keep state that reflects
the (updated) contents of D.
For simplicity, we focus only on the two-party (client/server) setting in the semi-honest model
but it is clear that our definitions can be extended to the multi-party case with malicious adversaries.
2It appears that existing ORAM constructions are secure even if the adversary is allowed to adaptively choose the
next instruction after observing the access pattern on D˜ caused by the previous instruction. Since this has not been
claimed by any ORAM construction in the literature, we do not define it.
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Definition of security. We use a standard simulation-based definition of secure computation [Gol-
dreich, 2001], comparing a real execution to that of an ideal (reactive) functionality F . In the ideal
execution, the functionality maintains the updated state of D on behalf of the server. We also allow
F to take a description of f as input (which allows us to consider a single ideal functionality).
The real-world execution proceeds as follows. An environment Z initially gives the server a
database D = D(1), and the client and server then run protocol Πf (with the client using input init
and the server using input D) that ends with the client and server each storing some state that they
will maintain (and update) throughout the subsequent execution. In the ith iteration (i = 1, . . .),
the environment gives xi to the client; the client and server then run protocol Πf (with the client
using its state and input xi, and the server using its state) with the client receiving output outi.
The client sends outi to Z, thus allowing adaptivity in Z’s next input selection xi+1. At some point,
Z terminates execution by sending a special end message to the players. At this time, an honest
player simply terminates execution; a corrupted player sends its entire view to Z.
For a given environment Z and some fixed value κ for the security parameter, we let realΠf ,Z(κ)
be the random variable denoting the output of Z following the specified execution in the real world.
In the ideal world, we let F be a trusted functionality that maintains state throughout the
execution. An environment Z initially gives the server a database D = D(1), which the server in
turn sends to F . In the ith iteration (i = 1, . . .), the environment gives xi to the client who sends
this value to F . The trusted functionality then computes
(outi, D
(i+1))← f(xi, D(i)),
and sends outi to the client. (Note the server does not learn anything from the execution, neither
about outi nor about the updated contents of D.) The client ends outi to Z. At some point, Z
terminates execution by sending a special end message to the players. The honest player simply
terminates execution; the corrupted player may send an arbitrary function of its entire view to Z.
For a given environment Z, some fixed value κ for the security parameter, and some algorithm
S being run by the corrupted party, we let idealF,S,Z(κ) be the random variable denoting the
output of Z following the specified execution.
Definition 2. We say that protocol Πf securely computes f if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time ideal-world adversary S (run by the corrupted player) such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-
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time environments Z there exists a negligible function negl such that
∣∣Pr [realΠf ,Z(κ) = 1]− Pr [idealF,S,Z(κ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ negl(κ).
Remark: “adaptivity” in the choice of the {xi}. In the “standard” ideal-world definition of
reactive computation, a corrupted player (either client or server) would give its entire view to the
environment each time the functionality F is accessed. Here, however, we allow the players to give
its view to the environment only at the end of the entire execution. This seems to be reasonable
in the semi-honest setting we consider, where a subsequent input xi+1 should have no dependence
on the view of the ith protocol execution. (On the other hand, we do allow xi+1 to depend on
out1, . . . , outi, a dependence that is realistic.) In fact, our protocols satisfy the stronger notion
(where a corrupted server gives its view to Z after each execution of the protocol in the real world,
and gives an arbitrary function of its view to Z after each iteration in the ideal world) as long
as the underlying ORAM construction they use satisfies the adaptive notion of security discussed
in footnote 2. (To the best of our knowledge, this property has not been considered in any prior
work on ORAM. Nevertheless, we conjecture that all known constructions are secure even under
adaptive choice of instructions.)
3.4 Generic Construction
In this section we present our generic solution to the amortized sublinear secure computation
problem. The construction is based in a black-box manner on any ORAM scheme and any secure
two-party computation protocol. While our second protocol, which we present in Section 3.5, is
substantially more efficient than any specific instantiation of the protocol in this section, this generic
protocol is conceptually simple and clean, demonstrates theoretical feasibility, and provides a good
overview of our overall approach.
Our first observation is that the server can store his own data in his own ORAM structure: the
security definition of ORAM in Section 3.3 guarantees security against a semi-honest server even
when he knows the data content completely. This allows us to give the client access to the server’s
data without violating client privacy, and without requiring him to store a secret-sharing of the
entire database. We now only need to ensure that the client does not learn any information either.
Our second observation is that this can be achieved, at a cost independent of the size of D, by always
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Secure initialization protocol
Input: The server has input D of length n, and the client does not use its input in this stage.
Protocol:
1. The participants run a secure computation of ORAMInit(1κ), which results in each party
receiving a secret share of the initial ORAM state. We denote this by [stateoram].
2. For i = 1, . . . , n do
(a) The server creates instruction I = (write, v,D[v])) and secret shares it with the client.
We denote the resulting sharing by [I].
(b) The parties execute ([state′oram], [⊥])← doInstruction([stateoram], [I]) (see Figure 3.3), and
set [stateoram]← [state′oram].
Figure 3.1: Secure initialization protocol piInit.
Secure evaluation protocol pif
Inputs: The server has array D˜ and the client has input 1logn, 1`, and x. Also the server and the
client have secret shares of an ORAM state, denoted [stateoram].
Shared input: A RAM program defined by the “next-instruction function” Π.
Protocol:
1. The client sets stateΠ = (1
logn, 1`, start, x) and d = 0` and secret shares both values with the
server; we denote the shared values by [stateΠ] and [d], respectively.
2. Do:
(a) The parties securely compute ([I], [state′Π])← Π([stateΠ], [d]), and set [stateΠ] = [state′Π].
(b) The parties perform a secure computation to check whether stateΠ = (stop, z). If so,
break.
(c) The parties execute ([state′oram], [d
′]) ← doInstruction([stateoram], [I]). They set
[stateoram] = [state
′
oram] and [d] = [d
′].
3. The server sends its share of [stateΠ] and [d] to the client, who recovers the output z.
Output: The client outputs z.
Figure 3.2: Secure evaluation of a RAM program.
CHAPTER 3. SECURE COMPUTATION WITH SUBLINEAR AMORTIZED WORK 28
secret-sharing the client’s state with the server (this keeps the client oblivious), and by facilitating
the ORAM operations using standard secure computation techniques on their joint state. More
specifically, we will use MPC to compute each next-instruction function in RAM, and then further
to compile each RAM instruction into a sequence of ORAM instructions. ORAM instructions are
then reconstructed and executed by the server (they can safely be shown to the server), and the
result of the RAM instructions is secret-shared with the client to form part of the updated client’s
state. The players then use the updated state to continue with the evaluation of the next RAM
instruction.
In more technical detail, let f , encoded as a RAM next-instruction function Π, be the computed
function. Notation-wise, for value v, let [v] denote a bitwise secret-sharing of v between the two
parties. Our secure ORAM protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The parties run a secure computation of ORAMInit (Figure 3.1). This initializes the ORAM
The doInstruction subroutine
Inputs: The server has array D˜, and the server and the client have secret shares of an ORAM state
(denoted [stateoram]) and a RAM instruction (denoted [I]).
1. The server sets d = 0` and secret shares this value with the client; we denote the shared value
by [d].
2. Do:




(b) The parties perform a secure computation to check if [Iˆ] = (done, z). If so, set [d] = [z]
and break.
(c) The client sends its share of [Iˆ] to the server, who reconstructs [Iˆ]. Then:
i. If Iˆ = (write, v, d′) then the server sets D˜[v] = d′ and sets d = d′.
ii. If Iˆ = (read, v,⊥) then the server sets d = D˜[v].
(d) The server secret shares d with the client.
Output: Each player outputs his share of stateoram and his share of [d].
Figure 3.3: Subroutine for executing one RAM instruction.
CHAPTER 3. SECURE COMPUTATION WITH SUBLINEAR AMORTIZED WORK 29
structure, and securely populates it with Server’s data D.
2. The parties securely generate and evaluate the RAM program (Figure 3.2). That is, the
following is repeated until the RAM protocol terminates:
(a) The server and the client use MPC to evaluate Π and obtain shares of the next instruction
I.
(b) I is then compiled, through repeated secure computations of ORAMEval, into a sequence
of sub-queries, Iˆ1, . . . Iˆ`, where ` = O(log n).
(c) After the server executes each of the sub-queries, instruction I is complete. (In case of
a read instruction, the resulting data item is secret shared between the server and the
client.)
Again, we stress that, although we do use generic MPC, it is independent of the size of D, and
depends only on the RAM representation of f (i.e., Π), and on the complexity of the ORAMEval
function. Of course, using generic MPC creates significant overhead. In Section 3.5 we present
several tailored MPC protocols for computing the ORAM steps, which greatly improve the perfor-
mance of our approach.
3.4.1 Proof of Security
We now prove that the construction presented in the previous section is a secure MPC protocol
according to Definition 2.
At the very high level, security against the client holds because he only manipulates the data
protected by secret sharing and MPC; the server additionally sees plaintext ORAM instructions
– but they do not reveal anything by the ORAM guarantee. (ORAM security [Goldreich and
Ostrovsky, 1996] is proven in the non-adaptive setting only. However, as we will show, our security
simulation goes through, since the adaptive input and function selection by Z does not depend
on protocol message view, and hence the simulators can query the ORAM functions after Z had
completed the adaptive selection.)
We start with the descriptions of the Client simulator Scl, who interacts with Z. In i-th
computation, Scl receives xi and yi = f(xi, D
(i−1)), stores them, and postpones it simulation until
he receives the special end symbol from Z.
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At this point, Scl outputs entire simulation, as follows:
Pre-processing. Scl simulates pre-processing by generating an appropriate number of random
ORAM state shares:
1. Scl runs the ORAMInit(1
κ) functionality to obtain an initial state for the ORAM, and
generates a uniformly random share [stateoram]c for the client.
2. Let I1, . . . , I|D(0)| be instructions of the form (write, v, 0¯) for 1 ≤ v ≤ |D(0)|. Scl sequen-
tially applies ORAMEval to I1, . . . , I|D(0)|, along with the current ORAM state. After
each instruction is submitted, the ORAMEval functionality returns an updated state,
and the simulator generates a uniformly random share [stateoram]
′
c of the updated state
for the client.
Computation. For each RAM f to be evaluated, Scl will simulate its execution evaluating the
same number of instructions of the form (read, 0,⊥) using ORAMEval. Denote by |f | the
execution length of RAM f . Then, for each functionality f :
1. Scl starts with a previously generated share [stateoram]c of the ORAM state that was
generated during the pre-processing, or during the last computation.
2. Let I1, . . . , I|f | be instructions of the form (read, 0,⊥). As in the pre-processing phase, Scl
sequentially runs ORAMEval on I1, . . . , I|f |, along with the current ORAM state. After
each instruction is evaluated, ORAMEval returns an updated state, and Scl generates a
new uniformly random state share [stateoram]
′
c.
3. The output reconstruction is simulated by opening to yi the secret sharing of the output.
The server simulator Sserv proceeds similarly to Scl. The notable difference is that the generated
view additionally contains the instructions issued by ORAMEval. Specifically, during pre-processing,
ORAMEval is used to evaluate instructions of the form Ij = (write, v, 0¯) for 1 ≤ v ≤ |D(i−1)|. For
each such instruction, ORAMEval generates a sequence of subqueries Iˆj , which are included in
the generated view. Similarly, during the computation of each functionality f , each instruction
is converted by ORAMEval into a sequence of subqueries. These subqueries are included in the
generated view (in addition to the state shares).
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It is not hard to see that these simulators produce views indistinguishable from real execution.
The reduction to the (non-adaptive) security of ORAM is straightforward, given our prior observa-
tion that the simulators produce their output only after the entire sequence of xi is specified by Z
(and hence the adaptively chosen sequence of xi can be fed non-adaptively into the ORAM security
experiment).
This leads to the following.
Theorem 2. Let ORAM be access-pattern hiding, as defined by Definition 1, and let the underlying
employed MPC be secure according to standard definitions. Then, our generic construction (pif )
described above is a secure protocol (according to Definition 2) for computing f , in the presence of
honest-but-curious adversaries. Furthermore, if f can be computed in time t and space s by a RAM
machine, then pif runs in amortized time t · polylog(s), the client uses space log(s), and the server
uses space s · polylog(s).
3.5 An Optimized Protocol
In Section 3.4 we showed that any Oblivious RAM protocol can be combined with any secure
two-party computation scheme to obtain a secure computation scheme with sublinear amortized
complexity. This generic solution may be appropriate in many situations, however, current instan-
tiations of the ORAM primitive require us to evaluate complex functions, such as pseudorandom
function (PRF), using a secure two-party computation protocol. For example, the ORAM con-
struction of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] requires many encryptions,
decryptions and executions of a PRF. In spite of the fact that recent advances in the latter provide
very efficient solutions for secure joint evaluation of PRFs [Freedman et al., 2005], such secure
evaluation is orders of magnitude slower than simply evaluating a PRF locally.
In this section we present a far more efficient secure computation system with sublinear amor-
tized input access. Specifically, we construct, and prove secure, a new secure computation scheme
that borrows ideas from ORAM protocols (specifically [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996]) and MPC
protocols, in order to provide extreme efficiency. Our resulting protocol uses only a handful of
garbled circuits that contain nothing more than a few multiplications, if statements, and XOR op-
erations, and in particular does not require evaluation of PRFs inside MPC. All other computation
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is done locally by the parties.
3.5.1 Technical Overview
Our starting point is the construction of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996],
which we use to store the server data. We begin with an overview of their ORAM protocol.
An overview of the Goldreich-Ostrovsky (GO) construction. In the GO construction, every
pair (vi, di), where di is a data item stored at index vi in the original RAM protocol, is encrypted
under a private key held by the client. (Recall that their protocol – and the ORAM model – does
not offer privacy from the client.) Each of the N pairs are stored together in a data structure that
has the following properties:
• It consists of L = logN levels for data of size N , though it will grow to size log t if there are
t read and write operations. Level i contains 2i “buckets”, each of which can hold up to m
data elements, where m = max(i, log κ) and κ is the security parameter. The extra allocation
in each bucket will be filled with “dummy” items, which we will explain below. All items
stored in these buckets are encrypted with a key that is held by the client.
• Each level i > 0 has a hash function associated with it, hi, which is chosen by the client. If
an element (v, d) is stored at level i, it will be stored in the bucket having index hi(v).
The execution of a read operation and the execution of a write operation have identical structure,
in order to prevent the server from distinguishing one from the other. The client begins by scanning
the entire bucket at level i = 0, looking for the element of interest. Specifically, he decrypts each
item in the bucket, one at a time, comparing it to the target value v. He then scans exactly one
bucket at each level i > 0: if v was not yet found, the client scans the bucket with index hi(v), and
if v was already found, he simply scans a random bucket. Finally after scanning a bucket at each
level, (v, d) is written to the top level (regardless of whether this is a read or a write operation).
As mentioned above, whenever an item is being read or written, it is placed in the top level of
the data structure. After m operations, this level will fill up. These items are then moved down a
level, and shuﬄed in with the items below. Similarly, after 2i read and write operations, the items
at level i are moved down and shuﬄed in with the items at level i+ 1. It follows that after every 2i
read and write operations, level i+ 1 becomes half full, and after another 2i operations, it becomes
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full and is immediately emptied. Every time level i is moved down to level i + 1, a fresh hash
function is chosen for level i+ 1, and the items are re-inserted in that level using the new function.
This process of merging two levels is quite complex, and we describe it in the course of describing
our own protocol below. We refer the interested reader to [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] for a
proof that this is a secure ORAM construction.
Extending the protocol to efficient secure computation: In our setting, we are further
restricted in that the content of the RAM and the access pattern must remain unseen by the client
as well as the server (with the exception of the output that is revealed at the very end of the
computation). We have to overcome several challenges:
1) In the protocol of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996], while the client
is reading or writing item (v, d), he has to compute hi(v) up to d times. In practice, these hash
functions would be implemented by a pseudo-random function (PRF), since we require hi to be
i-wise independent. In our setting, since the client should not learn the value of v, the naive
way of implementing their protocol is to compute the PRF inside a garbled circuit. The resulting
protocol would be extremely inefficient. Instead, we introduce a new primitive that we call a
shared-oblivious-PRF (soPRF). This is a PRF in which the input and secret key are each shared
between two parties, and the (single) recipient of the pseudo-random output can be designated at
the start of the execution.3 Our construction builds upon the oblivious PRF described by Freedman
et al. [Freedman et al., 2005]. Dodis et al. [Dodis et al., 2006] gave two constructions of the same
primitive. Their first construction, like ours, is based on the DDH assumption. However, the
round complexity of their protocol is linear in the input size, while ours is constant round. Their
second protocol is constant round, but relies on the stronger, q-decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion
assumption.
2) While scanning each bucket to look for v, the client has to decrypt every ciphertext to see
whether he has found a match. He also has to re-encrypt the value after reading it. We need to
use an encryption scheme that can be efficiently computed inside a secure computation. We use
Enc(m; r) = (FK(r)⊕m, r), and to ensure that encryption and decryption can be efficiently computed
inside a garbled circuit, we have the client compute FK(r) outside the secure computation. All
3So far we have only hinted at why the input to the soPRF needs to be shared, and we have said nothing about
why the secret key would need to be shared. We explain this when we give the details of the protocol.
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that has to be done inside the garbled circuit is boolean XOR. However, this requires care, since
the value r may reveal something about the access pattern to the client. For example, we perform
several oblivious sorts on the data during the shuﬄe protocol. In doing this, we repeatedly decrypt
two items, decide whether to swap them, and then re-encrypt them. Suppose the result of one of
these operations is (Enc(m0; r0),Enc(m1; r1)) if they are not swapped, and (Enc(m1; r1),Enc(m0; r0))
if they are. Since we allow the client to choose the randomness used in re-encryption, he can easily
determine whether the values were swapped if (when) he sees these ciphertexts again at a later time!
The solution is to make certain that the position of the randomness is independent of the outcome
of the swap: we use (Enc(m0; r0),Enc(m1; r1)) if they are not swapped, and (Enc(m1; r0),Enc(m0; r1))
if they are.
3) In the original protocol, the client randomly reassigns elements to buckets whenever two levels
are shuﬄed together (i.e., by choosing a new hash function, and re-hashing all the values). This
is a crucial step for providing privacy, but in our setting we cannot entrust this task to the client,
since we must protect their locations from him as well. Actually, this issue is subtly tied to the
fact that the client knows the encryption randomness. Because he is given the randomness used for
decryption during a lookup, he can easily determine the bucket index of the lookup as well. This
is not in itself a problem: recall that the server also learns the bucket index during lookup, even in
the original ORAM protocol. However, it requires us to hide bucket assignments from the client
during the shuﬄing. If we did not reveal the bucket index during lookup, we might have hoped
to reveal more to the client during the shuﬄe. Instead, we use a shared-oblivious-PRF during our
shuﬄe protocol in order to hide the bucket assignments from both parties.
3.5.2 Building Blocks
We start with a description of some primitives that we will use as building blocks in our construction.
3.5.2.1 Shared-Oblivious PRF
As we mentioned above, our protocol makes use of a new primitive that we call a shared-oblivious-
PRF (soPRF). Our soPRF construction is based on the oblivious PRF of Freedman et al. [Freedman
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et al., 2005] (see Figure 3.4). Our particular construction is a function
soPRF : ZO(logN)p × ZO(logN)p × {0, 1}logN × {0, 1}logN → G×G,
where G is a group of prime order p = O(2κ) for which the DDH assumption is expected to
hold. The output are secret shares α and β such that αβ is pseudorandom. Next we provide the
construction and the security proof for out soPRF.
Definition 3. Let F be some pseudorandom function (PRF) with key-space K and input domain
X. Let [k] denote a 2-out-of-2 secret of k ∈ K, and let [x] be the same for input x ∈ X. We say
that the function soPRF is a shared oblivious pseudorandom function (soPRF) built on F if for
any k ∈ K, and any x ∈ X, soPRF([x], [k]) outputs a secret sharing of F (k;x).
We note that we can trivially build an soPRF from any PRF by using Yao’s protocol. However,
the goal is to give more efficient construction. Our construction of an soPRF is built on the Naor-
Reingold PRF [Naor and Reingold, 2004]. We review this PRF here. Let G be some prime order
group for which the DDH assumption is expected to hold, and let g be a generator for G. The
Naor-Reingold PRF has input domain X = {0, 1}K , key-space K = Gκ, and output space G. The
function is defined as F (k;x) = gr0Πixiri , where ri ∈ G makeup the key, and xi ∈ {0, 1} the input.
Theorem 3. Assuming DDH is hard in G, and secure OT exists, the protocol described in Figure
3.4 computes an soPRF, and is secure against semi-honest, polynomial time adversaries.
Proof. Let I = {i1, . . . , i|I|} denote the set of indices such that vc[ij ] ⊕ vs[ij ] = 1. We prove our
theorem in the standard way, comparing a real execution of pi (in the OT-hybrid world) with an
ideal function that outputs frc,rs(vc, vs) = g
(r0c ·r0s)·Πi∈I(ric·ris). We define our ideal world functionality
as the following randomized functionality:
Ideal functionality F computing an soPRF:
Server input: (r0s , r
1
s , . . . , r
m
s , vs).
Client input: (r0c , r
1
c , . . . , r
m
c , vc)
The functionality F chooses b1, . . . , bm uniformly and independently at random from Z∗p.
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Shared Oblivious PRF
Let g be a generator of a group G of prime order p for which the DDH assumption holds.
Let rs, rc be the shares of the PRF key.
Inputs: Server: vs ∈ {0, 1}m, rs = (r0s , r1s , . . . , rms ), where each ris ∈ Z∗p
Client: vc ∈ {0, 1}m, rc = (r0c , r1c , . . . , rmc ), where each ric ∈ Z∗p
Protocol:
1. The server samples m values a1, . . . , am in Z
∗
p uniformly at random.
2. The client samples m values b1, . . . , bm in Z
∗
p uniformly at random.
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
1. The client and the server run an oblivious transfer protocol, with the server as
sender and the client as receiver, using the following inputs:
• If vs[i] = 0, the server’s input is (ai, ai · ris). Otherwise the server’s input is
(ai · ris, ai).
• The client’s input is vc[i].
Let xi be the output value that the client receives from the OT execution.
2. The client and the server run an oblivious transfer protocol, with the client as
sender and the server as receiver, using the following inputs:
• If vc[i] = 0, the client’s input is (bi ·xi, bi ·xi · ric). Otherwise the client’s input
is (bi · xi · ric, bi · xi).
• The server’s input is vs[i].
Let yi be the output value that the server receives from the OT execution.





















The client computes β = g
r0c∏m
i=1



















Outputs: The server outputs α, and the client outputs β.
Figure 3.4: A construction of a Shared Oblivious PRF
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Note that in the ideal functionality, we include Πbi in the output of the server. Although this
is not obviously necessary, it turns out that it is important for the simulation; in the real world
protocol, the server chooses the bi values himself, so leaking this information is not “harmful”.
However, we note that this has some implications about the pseudo-randomness of the output if a
player is given both shares. We will return to discuss this further below.
We begin our security proof by assuming that an adversary A controls the client in the protocol.
We construct a simulator S which interacts with the adversary and simulates the execution of the
protocol in the semi-honest setting.
Lemma 1. Let F denote an ideal execution of the soPRF as described above, and let piOT denote
an execution of the protocol in Figure 3.4 in the OT-hybrid world. For any semi-honest, polynomial
time adversary A with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗ that corrupts the server in the OT-hybrid world,
there exists a semi-honest, polynomial time adversary S with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗ corrupting

















s , . . . , r
m
s , vs)).
Proof. The simulator S acts as follows:
1. S submits the server’s input to the ideal functionality and receives output α.
2. S receives A’s input for the m ideal executions of OT in Step 1. From these inputs, he
computes and stores the value Πmi=1ai.
3. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, S simulates the output of the ith execution of the ideal OT in Step 2
by choosing ci ∈ Z∗p uniformly at random, and sending it to the server. He then simulates the




The only messages the server receives in the OT-hybrid world are the outputs of the m OTs in
Step 2. Therefore, the view of A in the hybrid world is {(y1, . . . , ym), α}, where yi is the output
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received in the ith execution of OT. In the ideal world, these messages are replaced by (c1, . . . , cm),
so the view of the adversary is instead {(c1, . . . , cm), α}. We must argue that these distributions
are indistinguishable, when taken jointly with the output of the honest client:
{(y1, . . . , ym), α, β,Πmi=1bi} c= {(c1, . . . , cm), α, β,Πmi=1bi}
where the first distribution is over the random coins of the two parties in the hybrid world, and
the second distribution is over the coins of the ideal party and of S in the ideal world. The
distributions on α, β and Πmi=1bi are clearly identical in both worlds, so we are really concerned
only with the distributions on (y1, . . . , ym) and on (c1, . . . , cm) given α, β and Π
m
i=1bi. Consider first
the distributions on (y1, . . . , ym−1) and (c1, . . . , cm−1). Since the value of Πmi=1bi does not restrict
the value of any m − 1 size subset of the bi values, and, by extension, neither does the value of α
or β, it follows that both (y1, . . . , ym−1) and (c1, . . . , cm−1) are uniformly distributed over {Z∗p}m−1










Since the simulator chooses cm in precisely this manner, we conclude that the distributions are
identical.
2
Lemma 2. Let F denote an ideal execution of the soPRF as described above, and let piOT denote
an execution of the protocol in Figure 3.4 in the OT-hybrid world. For any semi-honest, polynomial
time adversary A with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗ that corrupts the client in the OT-hybrid world,
there exists a semi-honest, polynomial time adversary S with auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}∗ corrupting

















c , . . . , r
m
c , vc)).
Proof. The only messages received by the client are the outputs from the first m executions of
OT in Step 1, (x1, . . . , xm). The simulator simulates these m outputs with random, independently
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chosen group elements from Z∗p: (d1, . . . , dm). As before, we need to prove that the distributions
{(y1, . . . , ym), α, β,Πmi=1bi} c= {(d1, . . . , dm), α, β,Πmi=1bi}
Here the proof is immediate, since the values of ai are never known to the distinguisher. It follows
that the xi are each independent, random values in Z∗p, even when the output of each party is given.
Therefore the simulated distribution, (d1, . . . , dm), and the hybrid world distribution are identically
distributed.
2
We now argue that our construction has an additional property: given the output γ = frc,rs(vc, vs),




s , . . . , r
m
c ), we can generate shares α and β from
the appropriate (random) distribution such that βα = γ. The implication is that the client can
safely send β to the server, who holds α, while still ensuring that βα looks random. We note that
this property does not have to hold, because our definition of an soPRF allows α and β to contain
information about the shares of the secret key. To make this issue more explicit, consider an soPRF
that includes player i’s share of the secret key (entirely) within i’s output share. The output could
still be pseudorandom given one of the two shares, but it is certainly not pseudorandom when one
player holds both shares. We remark that we did not require this property in our definition because
an soPRF may be useful even without it. For example, in our shuﬄe protocol, neither player ever
obtains both output shares. Instead, the shares are used directly as input to a secure computation,
which yields encrypted output.













s), but we note that this is not true if the share α is sent to the player
holding (β,Πmi=1bi). To see that it is secure when β is sent to the player holding α, note that given
a pseudo-random value γ and the secret key (r0s , . . . , r
i
s), we can easily simulate shares α and β such
that βα = γ, even without knowing r0c , . . . , r
m
c . The simulator simply chooses a random α, and
then computes β = γ−α. Since Πbi is not yet fixed, the simulated shares are always consistent with
the correct values of ric for some choice of Πbi. However, note that this simulation fails when Πbi is
already known and fixed. More specifically, without knowing r0s , . . . , r
m
s , given (γ,Πbi, r
0
c , . . . r
m
c ),
β is already well defined, and finding α that is consistent with β and γ requires solving an instance
of the discrete log problem. Due to this discussion, in our protocol we will always assign β to the
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client, since he will occasionally send his share of the soPRF output to the server. We leave it as
an open problem to find an efficient soPRF that allows either party to send their secret share to
the other.
3.5.2.2 A Secret Re-Sharing Scheme
For our purposes, this is insufficient, because subsequent use of these shares in a Yao garbled
circuit will be quite impractical; even a single exponentiation is more costly than computing AES.
We therefore provide a second, efficient protocol that takes shares of this form, and outputs new
multiplicative shares: α′ · β′ = αβ. This appears in Figure 3.5. When we use the soPRF in our
protocol, we leave the re-sharing protocol implicit. In our scheme, the input to the soPRF are
secret shares of a virtual address, and the output are shares of a pseudorandom value, which is
used for determining the location of the virtual address.
We describe a secret re-sharing protocol between two parties C and S. The protocol implements
(under the DDH assumption) an ideal functionality which, given group elements α, β that are
the inputs of S,C respectively, outputs uniformly distributed group elements uS , uC such that
ucus = α
β.
Recall that we use this protocol to reshare an soPRF value that was shared through exponen-
tiation, obtaining multiplicative shares instead. However, we note that the protocol works for any
α, β, and does not rely on the pseudorandomness of αβ.
The protocol. The protocol starts with S choosing random α1, α2 such that their product is α,
and C choosing random β1, β2 such that their sum is β. S sends α1 to C, who can now compute





without revealing any extra information. This is done by using blinding (raising to a random
power, or multiplying by a random number), and by El-Gamal encryption (and its multiplicative
homomorphic properties). The details are described in Figure 3.5.
















Security for one side is information theoretic, and for the other side is based on DDH assumption.
A simulator that gets only the input and output of one of the parties, can simulate the entire view
by using random values for the incoming messages, subject to the correct output being computed.
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Multiplicative Re-Sharing
Let G be a group of prime order p for which the DDH assumption holds.
Inputs: Server (S): α; Client (C): β.
Outputs: Server: us; Client: uc; where us, uc are uniformly distributed subject to ucus = α
β .
Protocol:
1. The server chooses random α1, α2 ← G such that α1 ·α2 = α. The server also chooses random
r ← Zp. The server sends α1, αr2 to the client.
2. The client chooses random β1, β2, x ← Zp such that β1 + β2 = β. The client also chooses
random g ← G and sets h = gx. We let [[W ]] denote an El Gamal encryption of W with
respect to the public key (g, h). The client sends g, h, [[αrβ2 ]], and [[α
β2
1 ]] to the server.
3. The server chooses random r2 ← Zp. Using the homomorphic properties of El Gamal encryp-
tion, the server computes [[αβ2α
β2
1 g
r2 ]] and sends it to the client.




to the server. The client outputs uc = α
β1
1 .





Figure 3.5: A protocol for converting exponentiation-based shares to multiplicative shares
Specifically, a simulator getting only the input β and output uc of the client can simulate the entire
view by choosing a random β1, β2 that sum up to β, then choosing α1 = u
β−11
c when simulating the
first message. All the other values on incoming messages are chosen randomly (and all values sent
out are computed honestly). It is easy to see that this simulated view is statistically close to the
real view (as all messages sent to the client in the protocol are blinded by a random number, and
since the output uc is random). A simulator getting only the input α and output us of the server
can simulate the entire view by using random values for the incoming message in step 2 (while
computing step 1 and 3 honestly), and then sending usg
r2 in step 4 (for the corresponding values
g, r2 from steps 2, 3). Using the semantic security of the El Gamal encryption (based on the DDH
assumption), it is easy to see that this view is indistinguishable from the view in the real protocol.
2
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3.5.2.3 Encryption Scheme with Small Encryption and Decryption Circuits
In the protocol that follows, all elements, (v, d), are encrypted using semantically secure, symmetric
key encryption; the key K for a (standard) PRF is stored by the client and never changes. We
will frequently perform secure computations that involve decrypting a ciphertext, performing an
operation, and the re-encrypting the resulting value. As described above, before performing any
such computation, the server first sends the random values r and r′ to the client, where r is the
randomness currently being used in the relevant ciphertext, and r′ is chosen randomly for the re-
encryption. The client computes FK(r) and FK(r
′) locally, and uses both values as input to the
secure computation. Then, inside the garbled circuit, both decryption and re-encryption can be
achieved with simple XOR operations. The server stores r′, and sends it again to the client the
next time the same value is needed in a secure computation. (This saves the client from having to
store the randomness.) Below, when we describe the protocol, we leave this step implicit.
3.5.3 Our Construction
Our construction follows along the lines of the general protocol we described in Section 3.4. The two
difficulties are to build an efficient implementation of the doInstruction function, and to make the
shuﬄe protocol from [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] secure against the client while maintaining
it’s efficiency. We focus on those two tasks here, and do not repeat the remainder of the protocol.
We find the prose that follows easier to read than would be precise pseudo-code. Although we
reference the functionalities that will be implemented using Yao, and we give precise pseudo-code
for each of those functionalities in Appendix A.1, we expect the reader will find those descriptions
helpful mainly to verify the simplicity of the garbled circuits that we rely upon. We note that in the
proof of security (Section 3.6), the interested reader will find a more precise listing of the messages
sent to and from each party.
Preprocessing: The players insert the server’s data into the ORAM using a sequence of write
instructions. We describe the process for a write instruction next.
Read/Write: We assume the players each hold a secret share of the instruction being performed,
which includes the virtual address, v ∈ [N ], being sought.
1. The players scan the top layer looking for data item d stored at address v. They
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do this by repeatedly performing a secure computation in which they decrypt an element,
compare its virtual address to v, and then re-encrypt it before storing it back. However, the
computation should not reveal to either player whether or not v was found, nor what the
value of d is. Therefore, the output of the secure computation includes a secret sharing of a
state variable that indicates whether v was found, along with shares of d in case v is found.
Both players remain unaware of the values of these variables. They scan the entire level, even
if v is found mid-way through the scan. The secure computation for this step is found in
Figure A.1.
2. The players scan exactly one bucket at each level. The index of the bucket scanned
at level i is chosen as follows:
(a) First, the players engage in a secure computation in which the output is:
• a secret sharing of v if v was not yet found, and
• a secret sharing of the string “dummy ◦ t” if v was already found.
Here t is a counter stored by the server, and incremented after every read or write
operation. The secure computation for this step is described in Figure A.2.
(b) They then compute the soPRF on their shares of v (or on their shares of the dummy
address). The key for the soPRF will have been created and shared when elements were
last inserted into this level. This is described in the shuﬄe protocol below. The client
sends his share of the soPRF output to the server.
(c) The server maps the output to the integers using the universal hash function hi associated
with level i. He then fetches the corresponding bucket from memory. The players scan
this bucket searching for (v, d), precisely the way they scanned the top layer. They do
this even if v was already found. If (v, d) is found in this bucket, they store the value in
their state (again, unaware that they have done so), and instead of re-encrypting (v, d)
and storing it back in the same location, they replace it with an encryption of an empty
item. We use the same secure computation as above, described in Figure A.1.
3. The players write the element back to the top layer. They do this by scanning the
layer as before, using a sequence of secure computations to decrypt, compare, and re-encrypt.
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If they come across the previous version of (v, d), they overwrite it with the (possibly) newer
value. (This will happen when (v, d) was first found in the top layer.) If they come across an
empty spot in the layer, they simply store the newly encrypted value there. Either way, they
continue the scan until they have re-encrypted the entire level. The secure computation for
this step is described in Figure A.3.
Shuﬄing. As in the work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996], we must
occasionally merge a level with the one below, shuﬄe together the items, and reinsert them into
the data structure. As in their protocol, we merge level i with level i + 1 after 2i read or write
instructions. We let n = 2i denote the maximum number of elements in level i. Recall that there
are also n buckets at level i, each of size m. We note that there are at most n elements in level
i+ 1 at the time of the shuﬄe; the capacity is 2n, but as soon as it fills, they are all moved down to
level i+ 2. Although there are at most 2n items in these two levels, there is enough space allocated
for 3nm words. The remaining spaces are filled with encryptions of empty elements, of the form
(“empty, empty”), which help hide how many real elements are currently contained in the level. The
goal in the shuﬄe is to exactly fill every bucket, while ensuring that neither player learns anything
about how the real items are distributed.
1. The players choose new keys and setup a buffer. They each choose a shared key for the
soPRF. Each player will store their share of the key until the next time these two levels are
merged; the same key will be used while reading and writing elements (as described above).
The server also chooses and stores a universal hash function hi+1, which will be used to map
the output of the soPRF to a bucket index in {1, . . . , 2n}. He stores this along with his share
of the soPRF key. Finally, the server creates a buffer big enough to hold 3nm data elements.
He places all nm elements from level i and all 2nm elements from level i+ 1 in this buffer.
2. The players assign the real items to buckets. There are 2n (or fewer) items to be put
in the 2n empty buckets of level i+1, and each bucket is of size m. (The remaining 2nm−2n
empty spaces of the will later be filled with (encrypted) empty items.)
(a) They begin this process by (obliviously) sorting the elements, giving priority to real
items. This is done by jointly implementing an oblivious sort over the virtual addresses.
For each comparison of the sort, the players compute a secure computation that recovers
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the value of the addresses, compares them, chooses whether to swap them, and finally
re-encrypts both the address and the data element. The secure computation to be
performed is described in Figure A.5.
(b) The players then do the following for each of the first 2n elements in the buffer:
• They perform a secure computation of the functionality GetHashInput (Figure A.2),
which outputs a secret sharing of v. For empty items (if there are any), the secure
computation simply outputs a random string r ∈ {0, 1}κ.
• They compute the soPRF on this value.
• They perform another secure computation in which both players use the shares
they received from the soPRF as input, and the server uses as additional input the
description of the universal hash function hi+1. Inside the secure computation, the
output shares of the soPRF are reconstructed and then mapped to a bucket index
using the hash function hi+1. The bucket index is encrypted and output to the
server, who stores it with the element (still kept in the buffer). In Figure A.4 we
describe the hash function of Mansour et al. [Mansour et al., 1993], which is very
simple to compute inside a Yao circuit.
3. The players assign the empty items to buckets.
(a) They scan the last 2nm elements in the buffer, which are all guaranteed to be empty
(since 2n < mn). The client encrypts a bucket index for each one: the first m items are
mapped to bucket 1, the next m to bucket 2, and so on until exactly m of these empty
elements have been assigned to each of the 2n buckets.
(b) They perform another oblivious sort (again using a sorting network), this time sorting
by bucket index, with priority given to real items. They then scan the items, using a
secure computation to decrypt, increase the count for the current bucket and re-encrypt.
If the counter has exceeded m elements for the current bucket, then the element’s index
is replaced with the symbol ⊥ before re-encryption. The count is kept private (again
by use of encryption). We note that the probability of removing a real element here
is negligible, since the probability that more than m real items fall into one bucket
is negligible. (See Lemma 5.) In case this does occur, we let the output of this secure
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computation be a special abort symbol, and the players abort the protocol. The necessary
secure computation is described by the functionality in Figure A.6.
(c) Finally, they perform one more oblivious sort on the bucket index, treating ⊥ as the
largest index. In the end, the buffer contains m items per bucket, ordered by bucket
index. The server simply copies these directly back into level i+1 in their current order,
ignoring the leftover items labeled with ⊥. They again use a secure computation for the
functionality described in Figure A.5.
3.5.4 Discussion: Bucket Size
As we will see below, the size of each bucket will play an important role in the proof of security.
In particular, we claimed above in Step 3b that if we map n items to n buckets, the probability of
overflowing a bucket of size m is negligible in the security parameter. Suppose this were not the
case: that we instead use a smaller bucket size, and that we simply sample a new hash function if
our elements overflow a bucket during insertion. This admits the following attack: consider a server
that is trying to distinguish between two different search sequences by the client, X = (x1, . . . , xn)
and Y = (y1, . . . , yn). Assume further that he knows all elements in search pattern X are found in
level i, while all elements in Y are found at (say) level i+ 1. We note that security must hold even
in such a situation. With non-negligible probability, while the client is searching for the elements of
Y , he will query the same bucket at level i at least m+1 times. On the other hand, if his search was
for items in list X, this could not happen, because, by our assumption, the hash function assigned
to level i was chosen to map no more than m items to any one bucket. Put another way, we can
ensure that the hash function for level i never overflows when mapping elements in level i, but we
cannot ensure that it doesn’t overflow when mapping elements that are not in level i. Therefore,
we choose bucket sizes that are large enough to guarantee a negligible probability of overflow for
any 2i elements.
This issue affects security of previous ORAM constructions as well, including [Pinkas and Rein-
man, 2010], and [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996] when the buckets are small ([Goldreich and
Ostrovsky, 1996] say that any bucket size will do). Indeed, [Pinkas and Reinman, 2010] suffers
from this issue (and a related one that stems from its use of cuckoo hashing) in a way that we were
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not able to repair (unless we increase their log2 overhead to log3).4 However, for the [Goldreich and
Ostrovsky, 1996] protocol, security is maintained for the parameters they suggest as most practical
(logarithmic bucket size).
3.6 Security Proof
The security of the protocol that we presented in the previous section is captured by the following
theorem (the performance is analyzed in detail in Section 3.7).
Theorem 4. Assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds, the protocol
described in Section 3.5.3 (ΠF ) is a secure protocol for computing F in the presence of honest-but-
curious adversaries. Furthermore, if F can be computed in time t and space s by a RAM machine,
then ΠF runs in amortized time t ·polylog(s), the client uses space log(s), and the server uses space
s · polylog(s).
Proof. To prove security of the protocol against honest-but-curious players, we analyze our protocol
in the hybrid model, in which we replace all secure computations used during the read and write
operations with ideal executions of their corresponding functionalities. It follows from a well known
result of Canetti [Canetti, 2000a] that if the resulting protocol is secure in this hybrid world, then
the protocol remains secure in the real world as well.
We start with the following lemma which will be an important part of our proof.
Lemma 3. In an honest-but-curious execution of protocol ΠF (as described in Section 3.5), for all
soPRF keys k and for all inputs v, the probability that the players compute soPRF(k, v) in Step 2b
more than one time is less than negl(κ), where negl is some negligible function.
Proof. We consider two types of inputs: v ∈ [N ], and dummy inputs of the form dummy ◦ t. For
inputs of the latter form, note that this particular input can only be used in the tth operation, since
t is incremented with every operation. The only way soPRF(k, dummy ◦ t) can be computed more
than once, therefore, is if the same key k is assigned to two different levels at the same time. Since
the number of levels is bound by some polynomial (in κ), and there are an exponential number of
4As mentioned in Section 2.0.7, these insecurities were independently discovered by others, and potential fixes as
well as alternative schemes have since been suggested.
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keys, this is negligibly likely to occur. Consider a pair (k, v) where v is of the first form. In this
case, the proof follows from three properties of the protocol: a) elements are moved to the top layer
once they are found. b) Whenever we have found an element at some level i, we query dummy◦ t at
all levels j > i, where t is uniquely chosen in each operation. c) Whenever an item is moved down
to a lower level, a new soPRF key is assigned to the lower level. If we assume that keys are chosen
without replacement (i.e. that we never choose the same key more than once), then the lemma
clearly follows from these three properties. Since the total number of keys chosen is bounded by
some polynomial in κ, the probability that the same key is chosen more than once is negligible.
Lemma 4. For every non-uniform, polynomial time adversary A corrupting the server in a hybrid-
world execution of the secure computation described in Section 3.5.3, there exists a non-uniform,
polynomial time adversary S corrupting the server in the ideal world execution F , and a negligible
function neg(·), such that for all κ ∈ N:
|Pr[Real(1κ,Π,A) = 1]− Pr[Ideal(1κ, F,S) = 1]| ≤ neg(κ)
Proof. We begin by describing the simulation of the shuﬄe protocol. We will then describe the
simulation of a single read/write operation. In the end we will put these together to argue that
sequences of read/write operations and shuﬄes remain secure.
In simulating the shuﬄe protocol, recall that S is simulating the hybrid world in which the
players have access to ideal executions of the functionalities described in Figures A.5, A.2, 3.4, 3.5,
A.4, and A.6. We outline the hybrid world protocol in Figure 3.6.
We note that in this hybrid world, almost the entire shuﬄe protocol proceeds through a sequence
of ideal function calls; the players rarely interact outside of these ideal executions. With a few
exceptions (described below), the simulator only needs to simulate the output of each of these
ideal functionalities. Furthermore, the output from these ideal functionalities is always either a
ciphertext, or a random secret sharing. The simulation is therefore quite straightforward: the
output of each functionality is simulated with a random string. When the output is supposed to be
a ciphertext, the indistinguishability of the simulation follows from the security of the PRF used
in the encryption scheme. When the output is supposed to be a secret share, the simulation is
distributed identically to the output of the hybrid world. As we will see, the messages that are sent




























Figure 3.6: The shuﬄe protocol in the hybrid world.
from the client (i.e. that are not communicated through an ideal function call) are always either
the random string used in some ciphertext, or a complete ciphertext. Both can again be simulated
with random strings.
Simulating oblivious sort: Since oblivious sort is performed three different times, we describe the
simulation separately. We note that each oblivious sort in the hybrid world proceeds through a
sequence of calls to the ideal instance of the swap functionality (Figure A.5), each preceded by
the exchange of four encryption and decryption strings. (In Figure 3.6, we have only depicted a
single call in order to save space.) As described above, we simulate (r′1, r′2, r′3, r′4), which are sent
from the client before each ideal function call, with random strings. We let α denote the output
of the Oblivious Swap functionality; α is a group of four ciphertexts, which are also simulated
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with random strings. The security of the PRF used in the encryption scheme guarantees that the
simulated ciphertexts are indistinguishable from the actual output of the trusted swap functionality.
Step 2a only contains an oblivious sort. In Step 2b, the players make three calls to ideal
functionalities (again, engaging in no other communication). To simulate βs, the output of the
ideal functionality of Figure A.2, and γs, the output of the ideal soPRF, the simulator simply
outputs a random string. In the hybrid world, βs and γs are random secret shares, so the simulated
output is identically distributed to the hybrid world output. (We note that even if the input to
the soPRF is identical in two sequential executions, the output is still a fresh pair of secret shares.
Therefore, the simulator does not need to do any “book keeping” regarding previous inputs to the
soPRF.) The random value r′5 is used in constructing the ciphertext δ, and can be simulated with
a random string. Finally, the last ideal call in this step is to an ideal functionality that takes the
output of the soPRF, along with the description of a hash function, and outputs an encryption, δ
of the bucket index that results from applying hi to the output of the PRF (Figure A.4). Since the
output is a ciphertext, the simulation simply proceeds as above, outputting a random string.
Step 3a proceeds without any ideal function calls. Here, the client sends exactly 2nm ciphertexts
to the server, each an encryption of a random bucket index, which is to be assigned to an empty
element. The simulator simply sends random strings, which are again indistinguishable from the
messages sent by the client in the hybrid world, due to the security of the PRF used in encryption.
In Step 3b, the simulator has to simulate the output of the ideal function described in Figure A.6.
In the hybrid world, when fewer than m real items are mapped to each bucket, the output of this
ideal function call is a pair of ciphertexts, which can be simulated as usual. However, the simulator
will not attempt to simulate the bad event in which more than m real items are mapped to a
particular bucket. Instead, we rely on Lemma 5, which proves that this is negligibly likely to occur,
and we allow our simulation to fail with his negligible probability. The final step of the shuﬄe
contains another oblivious sort, which is handled as described above.
Simulating read/write: We proceed now to describe the simulation of a single read or write op-
eration. With one important exception, the simulation of the server view during read and write
executions is very similar to the simulation used in the shuﬄe protocol. The only message sent
directly from the client to the server is the client’s secret share of the soPRF output, sent in Step




























Figure 3.7: The read and write protocol in the hybrid world.
2b (message γc in Figure 3.7). The rest of the protocol proceeds through the execution of ideal
function calls, and, as before, simulating the output of these functions is straightforward. This is
because the outputs of these computations are all either random secret shares, or ciphertexts, both
of which can be simulated with random strings. The output from CheckData (messages αS and
δS) contain two secret shares which are uniformly distributed, and one ciphertext. βS is a secret
sharing, and ζS contains one secret sharing and one ciphertext.
The most difficult part of the security proof is to simulate the secret share of the soPRF that
is sent from the client to the server (γc) in Step 2b. In the shuﬄe protocol, the players keep their
output from the soPRF private, using them as input to another secure computation. This simplified
the simulation, since it allowed us to simulate just one share of the pseudorandom value, which is
distributed uniformly. Here, since the client sends his share in the clear, we have to simulate the
reconstructed output of the PRF, and not just a secret sharing of that output.5
5We note that we could change the protocol to match the shuﬄing protocol, having the players use their output
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To simulate the client’s share of the soPRF output, we simply send a random group element.
We stress that the simulator does not try to simulate a random function, because he has no idea
what the input to the soPRF is; in particular, if the same input were used twice, he is very unlikely
to output the same value both times. To claim that this simulation is indistinguishable from the
real execution, therefore, we rely on Lemma 3, where we demonstrated that the players never reuse
the same input to the soPRF in between two shuﬄes. (Recall that when a level is shuﬄed, the
players refresh the key for the soPRF, so at that point it is irrelevant if they reuse an input that
was used prior to the shuﬄe.) If they did reuse the same input, the simulation of the soPRF would
be easily distinguished from the real execution.
As mentioned in the discussion of Section 3.5, another key lemma in the proof demonstrates
that the buckets are large enough that they are negligibly likely to overflow during the shuﬄe. If
this were not the case, the simulation of the soPRF would be distinguishable from the hybrid-world
execution of the soPRF. Note that in the hybrid world protocol, we abort if m + 1 inputs from
the same level collide under the choice of soPRF key (See Figure A.6). Therefore, the output
of the soPRF in the real execution is pseudorandom, conditioned on the fact that buckets do not
overflow. In contrast, the simulated output of the soPRF is truly random. Put more formally,
for any N inputs, v1, . . . , vN , let goodk denote the set of soPRF keys that map no more than m
elements in v1, . . . , vN to the same value. Then we require that the following two distributions are
indistinguishable:
{soPRF(k, v1), . . . , soPRF(k, vN ) | k R← K} c= {soPRF(k, v1), . . . , soPRF(k, vN ) | k R← goodk}
It follows that these distributions are indistinguishable if the probability of overflow is negligible
(i.e. if the set goodk contains most of the keyspace). We prove now that the buckets are unlikely to
overflow if the soPRF is replaced with a random function. It follows from a hybrid argument that
the simulation of message γc is indistinguishable from the hybrid-world soPRF.
Lemma 5 ([Mitzenmacher and Upfal, 2005]). Let Y be a Poisson random variable with parameter
(and mean) µ. If y > µ then Pr[Y ≥ y] ≤ e−µ(eµ)yyy .
from the soPRF in a secure computation of the functionality depicted in Figure A.4. However, it is much more
efficient to send the value in the clear. The reason we don’t do the same thing when shuﬄing is that the protocol
becomes insecure if the server sees the reconstructed output of the soPRF both during shuﬄing and during lookup.
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Lemma 6 ([Mitzenmacher and Upfal, 2005]). Let X
(m)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a random variable rep-
resenting the number of balls in the ith bin when m balls are randomly thrown into n bins. Let
Y
(m)
1 , . . . , Y
(m)
n be Poisson random variables with mean m/n. Then, any event that takes place with
probability p in the Poisson case, takes place with probability at most pe
√
m in the exact case.
Corollary 5. Suppose that n balls are thrown into n bins. Then, the probability that in the end





Proof. Let z = max(log(n), log(κ)). When n balls are thrown into n bins, the expected number
of balls in each bin is 1. Now consider Poisson variables Y1, . . . , Yn with parameter µ = 1. From
Lemmas 5 and 6 we obtain that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
Pr[Yi ≥ z] ≤ e
z−1
zz







We now put together the pieces and consider the full simulation of the server. Since we are
in a semi-honest setting, the simulator can begin by submitting the server’s input to the trusted
party. The output of the honest player is always correct, and is distributed identically to the hybrid
world execution. (We leave the correctness of the hybrid world protocol for the reader to verify.)
Since the server receives no output, it remains only to argue that the complete view of the server in
the ideal world is indistinguishable from that in the hybrid world. We have already argued above
that the simulation of a single shuﬄe, or a single read write execution, is indistinguishable from
the hybrid-world execution of the same protocol. We now need to argue that a sequence of such
simulations remains indistinguishable. Again, the only subtlety arises with the soPRF output; all
other messages are clearly independent of one another, even across multiple shuﬄes, reads and
writes. Given Corollary 5 and Lemma 3, it follows that the output of the soPRF in the hybrid
world is indistinguishable from a random sequence of group elements, each chosen independently.
This is precisely how we have simulated the soPRF, so this concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
2
CHAPTER 3. SECURE COMPUTATION WITH SUBLINEAR AMORTIZED WORK 54
Lemma 7. For every non-uniform, polynomial time adversary A corrupting the client in a hybrid-
world execution of the secure computation described in Section 3.5.3, there exists a non-uniform,
polynomial time adversary S corrupting the client in the ideal world execution F , and a negligible
function neg(·), such that for all κ ∈ N:
|Pr[Real(1κ,Π,A) = 1]− Pr[Ideal(1κ, F,S) = 1]| ≤ neg(κ)
Proof. Simulating encryption and decryption: In many of the ideal function calls, the server pro-
vides input FK(r)⊕ v, while the client provides FK(r) for decryption, and FK(r′) for re-encryption
(see the discussion in Section 3.5.3). In every such case, the server sends r, r′ to the client before
they call the ideal function. We need to describe how to simulate these random strings sent by
the server. The simulator has to do some book-keeping to be sure the appropriate random strings
are sent. (Recall, the client saw the random string needed for decryption at some prior time when
it was used for encryption, so the randomness sent by the simulator must remain consistent with
those values.) Specifically, the simulator keeps an array of size N to store random strings. He keeps
track of the randomness currently being used to encrypt each item at each location in the ORAM
structure. We stress that this book-keeping succeeds only because our functionalities all maintain
the ordering of the randomness provided by the client. For example, in Figure A.5, note that
regardless of whether the items are swapped, the ordering of the randomness provided by the client
remains fixed. If this were not the case, not only would the simulation fail (because it could not
know what order to place the random strings in), but the client would easily learn something about
the outcome of the oblivious sort by observing the final ordering of the randomness he provided.
In the hybrid world protocol, the only messages the client receives from the server are the random
strings that we have just finished discussing (see Figure 3.6). Everything else is done through the
execution of ideal functionalities. In the shuﬄe protocol, the simulation of these functionalities
is actually a bit simpler than it was in the case of the server, because the client does not receive
any output from the swap functionality used in oblivious sort (Figure A.5), from the functionality
that computes an encryption of the bucket index (Figure A.4), or from the functionality that skims
empty items from over-full buckets (Figure A.6). The outputs that the client receives from the
remaining ideal functionalities are random secret shares of various values: βc from GetHashInput,
and γc from the soPRF. The simulator simply outputs random strings to simulate each of these
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ideal function calls. In the read/write protocol, the same is true: the reader can verify that client
output from all functionalities are secert-shares of state variables (i.e. messages αc, βc, γc, δc and
ζc). All can be easily simulated with random secret shares.
To put these pieces together, when the simulator receives xi from the environment, he imme-
diately submits them to the trusted functionality and stores the output. He simulates the view of
the client through the appropriate number of read/write executions and shuﬄes, until the RAM
protocol terminates.6 He then sends a second secret share of the output to the client, allowing him
to reconstruct the correct output value, sends the output value to the environment, and waits for
the next input to arrive from the environment. We note that the server has no output, so we do
not need to worry about the joint distribution over the client’s view and the server’s output. When
we consider the simulation of a sequence of read and write executions, we have to describe how the
simulator chooses which random values to send to the client (i.e. which buckets should be read).
We claim that choosing a random bucket at each level suffices. This follows from two facts: a) the
client’s view during the shuﬄe protocol reveals no information about how items have been mapped
to buckets, and b) as proven in Lemma 3, with overwhelming probability, the same input is never
used twice in the soPRF.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
3.7 Performance
We evaluate the performance of our protocol and compare it with the state-of-the-art solutions.
First, recall our notation: N is the number of records in the database (each of length m), k is the
security parameter for underlying DDH groups (k ≈ 256). While we use big-O notation in our
analysis, we stress that we do not hide any large constants; in fact we keep the constants of the
higher-order terms.
Each ORAM read/write has complexity O(4m log2N+ m logN+ 3 log3N). Additionally, amor-
tized per read/write shuﬄing has complexity O((log logN)3 + klog2 3 log logN). The amortized
shuﬄing terms are of low order and may be dropped in further analysis, possibly except for the
6As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, we assume that the runtime of the RAM protocol is independent of the inputs.
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term klog2 3 log logN , (here klog2 3 ≈ k1.6 is the size of boolean circuit implementing Karatsuba
multiplication [Karatsuba and Ofman, 1962]).
While each step of ORAM is relatively costly, our solution is orders of magnitude faster than
existing solutions (which are all linear in input size) for important functions such as binary search
on large DB (or its derivative, location-based service provision). To illustrate the costs relationship
for today’s medium-size DB of 107 records, each of size 105, our solution performs ≈ 5 · 109 basic
operations (comparable to Yao-gate evaluations), vs standard solution’s cost of ≈ 1012 of same
operations. In general, our approach will likely be advantageous when server’s input is large, and
ORAM program length is short (it is logarithmic for search).
Most importantly, as DB sizes grow with time, the performance advantage of our approach will
increase (as much as exponentially, for binary search).
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Chapter 4
Secure Multiparty Computation for
Multivariate Polynomials
4.1 Motivation and Contributions
As we already observed generic MPC approaches have inherent inefficiency related to the fact that
they use circuits as their computation model and the circuit size representation of a functionality
may be very large. Thus, an important open problem in MPC is designing highly efficient protocols
for smaller, yet large enough to be interesting, sets of functionalities, taking advantage of the domain
specific mathematical structure (election problems is a narrow example, while linear algebraic
problems is a more generic example). One such class of functions are multivariate polynomials,
which can be used to express many problems from linear algebra, statistics, set operations.
We consider the problem of secure multiparty computation of the class of functions that can be
represented by polynomial-size multivariate polynomials. The multivariate polynomial is defined
over the inputs of the participating parties so that each party contributes its inputs as values for
some subset of the variables in the polynomial representation. There is a designated party receiving
output that learns only the output of the polynomial evaluation while all other parties receive no
output. 1 We assume a broadcast channel and that the private keys for the threshold encryption
scheme distributed in a preprocessing stage.
1We note that our protocol can be generalized to allow any subset of the parties to receive output.
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4.1.1 Our Contributions
General Protocol. We present a protocol that allows multiple parties to compute the above
functionalities, assuring security against a dishonest majority and robustness (detection misbehav-
ior). Our protocol is fully black-box assuming any threshold additive homomorphic encryption
with a natural property that we specify later, (instantiated by Paillier scheme, say). The pro-
tocol utilizes a ”round table” structure where parties are nodes in a ring network (which means
that frequently a party only communicates with the consecutive parties around the table). This
structure (employed already in past protocols) has two benefits: first, it allows each party to be
oﬄine for the majority of the execution of the protocol and to be involved only when it needs to
contribute its inputs at its turn. Second, it allows a division of the communication complexity
into two types: ”round table” communication complexity including messages exchanged between
two neighboring parties, and broadcast communication complexity including messages sent simul-
taneously to all parties. We give simulation-based proofs of security in the Ideal/Real (standard)
Model as per definitions in [Goldreich, 2005]. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that
has considered secure computation of multivariate polynomials is [Franklin and Mohassel, 2010].
This recent independent work has focused on multivariate polynomials of degree 3 but points out
that the proposed protocols can be generalized to higher degree polynomials, however, with com-
munication complexity that is no longer optimal, leaving as an open question improvements of this
complexity. Their protocol is based on the compiler of [Ishai et al., 2008], but with the difference
being that the outer and the inner protocols inhere are instantiated with efficient constructions
tailored for multivariate polynomials. The communication complexity of their protocol is (sub)-
exponential in the number of variables t: O(poly(k)dbt/2c) for polynomials of degree d and security
parameter k. Our work, in turn, improves their communication complexity to be fully polynomial
(i.e., polynomial in all parameters of the problem). Obviously one can take a poly-size multi-
variate polynomial and translate it to a circuit with poly time secure computation solultion, but
this will have a huge polynomial factor expansion and will lose the structure enabling the special-





t=1 logαj,t+1) for m parties where party i has li inputs of degrees αi,1, . . . , αi,li ,
D being the sum of the logarithms of the variable degrees for polynomials consisting of n mono-
mials. Next, recall that every polynomial can be easily converted into an arithmetic circuit, our
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protocol can be viewed as a protocol for MPC of a subclass of all arithmetic circuits. From this
point of view, the work of [Ishai et al., 2009] addresses a comparable problem to ours (constructing
a MPC protocol for all poly-size arithmetic circuits, using a black-box construction and assuming
no honest majority). The work of [Franklin and Mohassel, 2010] already improves in the worst case
the complexity results of [Ishai et al., 2009] (for proper set of multivariate polynomials), and as we
noted above we bring additional improvement (intuitively our amortized broadcast complexity is
linear in the size of the representation of the largest term of the polynomial, and does not depend on
the number of terms in the representation, which contributes to the size of the arithmetic circuit).
Further, the protocol of [Ishai et al., 2009] requires as many rounds (involving all the parties) as
the depth of the circuit and communication complexity depending on the size of the circuit. In
contrast, we achieve a number of rounds independent of depth of the size of the arithmetic circuit
of the polynomial (which is constant when either counting a round-table round as one round or
when considering only a constant number of parties).
Special Cases. The class of polynomial size multivariate polynomials contains a wide range of
efficiently representable functionalities with special structure that enables further optimizations.
Most of the commonly used statistics functions can either be represented as polynomials or approx-
imated with polynomials using Taylor series approximation for trigonometric functions, logarithms,
exponents, square, etc. Examples include average, standard deviation, variance, chi-square test,
Pearson’s correlation coefficients, and central moment of statistical distributions. Matrix operations
(i.e., linear algebra) can also be translated to polynomial evaluations.
In particular, as a special case of the general protocol, we implement secure multiparty set
intersection against a malicious adversary controlling a majority of the parties; we note that the set
intersection question in the two party case has been addressed in many works [Freedman et al., 2004;
Hazay and Lindell, 2008; Kissner and Song, 2005; Jarecki and Liu, 2009; Dachman-Soled et al., 2009;
Cristofaro et al., 2010] while there are fewer works that have considered the multiparty version. Two
works adress the issue in the computational protocol setting. First, Kissner et al. [Kissner and Song,
2005] present a semi-honest protocol and suggests using generic zero knowledge techniques (ZK)
to address the malicious case which requires communication complexity O(m2d2) for m parties
with input sets of size d. The work of [Sang and Shen, 2009] improves this complexity by a
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factor of O(m) for m party protocols, using more efficient ZK based on pairings. In addition,
relatively inefficient information theoretic solutions are presented in [Patra et al., 2009a; Patra et
al., 2009b]). Our protocol achieves communication complexity O(md + 10d log2 d) improving the
existing works. We note that we achieve linear complexity in the number of parties m due to
the round table communication paradigm, whereas even the recent unpublished work [Cheon et al.,
2010] is quadratic in the number of parties. We note that our scheme extends the classical approach
of representing a set as the zeroes of a polynomial as in [Freedman et al., 2004; Camenisch and
Zaverucha, 2009; Agrawal et al., 2003; Dawn and Song, 2005].
Finally, if we view the polynomial’s coefficients as the input of the designated output receiver, we
obtain a multi-party oblivious multivariate polynomial evaluation, a generalization of the problem
of oblivious polynomials evaluation [Naor and Pinkas, 2006] to inputs from multiple parties.
Techniques. Multivariate polynomials have a “nice structure” and in our protocol we utilize
a number of techniques exploiting the structure and various interactions of this structure with
structures of other algebraic and cryptographic primitives.
We crucially utilize the fact that multivariate polynomials can be viewed as linear operators
when combined with additive homomorphic encryption and polynomial secret sharing. We formal-
ize this property by presenting a commutativity property between the evaluation of multivariate
polynomials and reconstruction of Shamir’s secret sharing [Shamir, 1979]. Intuitively, this allows us
to evaluate a given polynomial on multiple (modified) Shamir secret shares in parallel and obtain
the final evaluation of the polynomial by reconstructing the secret shares. This technique is useful
since it allows us to apply generic (black box) ”cut-and-choose” techniques to verify the correctness
of the evaluation for malicious parties, without revealing information about the shared inputs or
outputs. We note that analogous techniques were used in a different context by [Choi et al., 2008;
Dachman-Soled et al., 2009].
A second property of multivariate polynomials is that they can be viewed as a collection of
monomials which can be computed under additive homomorphic encryption non-interactively in
a round-table type protocol where each participant incrementally contributes his inputs to the
encryption of the partial monomial evaluation done by the previous participants (note that each
participant’s contribution is a multiplication by a scalar).
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We additionally use the polynomial structure of a variant of Shamir’s threshold sharing in zero
knowledge protocols proving that inputs were shared correctly and committed under homomorphic
encryption. We utilize Lagrange interpolation combined with what we call vector homomorphic
encryption (where the homomorphic properties hold for both the plaintexts and the encryption
randomness; which is true for many of the known homomorphic encryption schemes [Paillier, 1999;
Fouque et al., 2001; ElGamal, 1985; Goldwasser and Micali, 1982]) to verify that inputs were
shared correctly by interpolating over encrypted values. This verifies that inputs were shared and
encrypted correctly, provided that the randomness for the encryptions was chosen in a specific way.
This encrypted interpolation technique combined with the large minimum distance of Reed-Solomon
codes allows us to guarantee the correctness of an entire computation on encrypted codewords based
on the verification that a small random subset of shares were computed correctly. Finally, we use
the linear operator properties of the sharing polynomials for share re-randomization under additive
homomorphic encryption.
We note that when we perform our protocol with homomorphic encryption over a ring, then
we use the technique initiated by Feldman ([Feldman, 1987]) and also used, e.g., in Fouque et al.
([Fouque et al., 2001]) for Paillier sharing that transforms interpolation over an RSA-composite
ring and similar structures to an interpolation over (a range of) the integers (where computing
inverses, i.e., division, is avoided and finding uninvertible elements is hard, assuming factoring is
hard).
4.2 Solution Overview
Semi-honest structure. As described above, we view multivariate polynomials as a collection
of monomials that can be computed under homomorphic encryption in a round-table type protocol.
We employ this to construct the underlying semi-honest evaluation protocol.
Robustness idea. To achieve security against malicious adversaries, in turn, we employ the
commutativity between evaluation of multivariate polynomials and Shamir’s secret sharing recon-
struction described above. Consider the following very simplified example that illustrates a few of
the basic techniques we utilize. Let us say that we have m parties that wish to evaluate the univari-
ate polynomial Q(x) = x5+10x3+6x+9, at point x, where x is the input of Party 1. Letting Party 1
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execute the whole computation will not handle the case the it is a malicious party. One approach will
be to use techniques based on threshold fully homomorphic encryption schemes [Myers et al., 2011;
Asharov et al., 2012], which will be more computationally expensive than approaches using circuit
representation for the function.
Instead, we take the following approach: Party 1 computes a Shamir secret-sharing of its in-
put x by choosing a polynomial Px of degree k uniformly at random conditioned on Px(0) = x.
Now, instead of committing to the value x, Party 1 commits to, say, 20k input shares of Px :
Px(1), . . . , Px(20k). Next, Party 1 commits to 20k output shares of Q◦Px(i) : Q(Px(1)), . . . ,Q(Px(20k)).
Notice that Q ◦ Px(i) is a polynomial of degree 5k and that Q ◦ Px(0) = Q(Px(0)) = Q(x). Thus,
by reconstructing Q ◦ Px(0) we obtain the output value Q(x). After Party 1 sends the input
and output commitments, the parties verify efficiently that the input and output shares indeed
lie on a polynomial of degree k and 5k respectively using an interpolation algorithm we define
below. Now, the parties run a cut-and-choose step where a set I ⊂ [20k] of size k is chosen at
random. For each index i ∈ I, Party 1 must open the commitments to reveal Px(i) and Q ◦ Px(i).
The remaining parties now verify privately that for each index, Q ◦ Px(i) was computed correctly.
Note that due to the secret-sharing properties of the commitment scheme, the cut-and-choose step
reveals no information about Px(0) = x or Q ◦ Px(0) = Q(x). Now, let’s assume that Party
1 acted maliciously. Since the set I was chosen at random, we have that if Party 1 is able to
open all the shares corresponding to I correctly, then with very high probability Party 1 must
have computed all of the output shares correctly. We note that the above description leaves out
important re-randomization techniques (that are described in the full protocol) whose goal
is to prevent parties from learning during the incremental evaluation and robustness checking.
When the polynomial has inputs from more than one party, for example Q(x, y) = x3y2 + x where
Party 1 contributes x and Party 2 contributes y the evaluation is broken down at the mono-
mial level M1(x, y) = x
3y2 and M2(x, y) = x. Party 1 evaluates M
1
1 (x) = x
3 and M12 = x on
its shares and passes the encrypted values to Party 2 Enc(M11(Px(1))), . . . ,Enc(M
1
1(Px(20))) and
Enc(M12(Px(1))), . . . ,Enc(M
1
2(Px(20))). Party 2 evaluates M
2
1 (y) = y
2 and M22 (y) = 1 on its shares
and contributes then to the received encryption using the homomorphic properties of the encryp-
tion (Enc(M1i (Px(j)))
M2i (Py(j)) = Enc(M1i (Px(j)) ∗M2i (Py(j))) = Enc(Mi(Px(j),Py(j))) for i = 1, 2 and
1 ≤ j ≤ 20. Now the verification proceeds as above where both Party 1 and Party 2 will open the
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shares chosen in the cut-and-choose protocol.
Efficient Robustness. Although the technique described above is sufficient to ensure that the
parties behave honestly, it causes a huge blow-up in the number of required shares. This is because
in order to reconstruct the zero coefficient of a polynomial of degree deg, we must have at least
deg + 1 secret shares. Thus, when evaluating a polynomial such as Q = x2
n
, we would require
an exponential number of shares. To prevent this blow-up, we utilize an input preprocessing step
(described in Section ??).
Secure output reconstruction. Finally, we use an additive homomorphic encryption scheme
with a threshold decryption algorithm to ensure that no subset of the parties can decrypt any of the
intermediate messages exchanged between the parties in the protocol. The threshold decryption
is needed in the case that more than one party contributes its inputs to the polynomial (and
is actually not necessary in our example above). Although any additive homomorphic threshold
encryption scheme (with one additional natural property, which we describe later) would suffice
for the correctness of our protocol, the only such schemes that we are aware of are the El Gamal
threshold encryption scheme [Gennaro et al., 2007] and the Paillier threshold encryption scheme
[Fouque et al., 2001]. Additive El Gamal does not allow efficient decryption over a large domain
(field), but it suffices for our Set Intersection applications. We use the Paillier threshold encryption
scheme (over a ring) to instantiate our general polynomial evaluation protocols. To obtain the final
output, the designated party receiving output decrypts reconstructs the encryption of the final
output value using Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values and decrypts with the help of the
other parties.
4.3 Definitions and Techniques
4.3.1 Definitions
We use a standard simulation-based definition of security see [Canetti, 2000b], and follow the
definitions of zero knowledge proofs of knowledge and commitment schemes presented in [Goldreich,
2005]. We denote by ComB a perfectly binding commitment scheme and by ComH a perfectly
hiding commitment scheme.
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Lagrange interpolation allows reconstruction of a polynomial of degree d given d+ 1 evaluation
points in the following way:
Definition 4. Let (x0, y0), . . . (xd, yd) be d+1 evaluation point of a polynomial of degree d. We can
reconstruct the evaluation L(x) of the polynomial at point x as Lx0,...,xd(y0, . . . , yd, x) =
∑d
j=0 yjlj(x)




xj−xi for 0 ≤ j ≤ d.
In most cases where we will use Lagrange interpolation the points x0, . . . , xd will be 1, . . . , d
and we will omit them and use the notation L(y0, . . . , yd, x) and lj(x).
We utilize the following notation for Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [Shamir, 1979], which can
also be viewed as a Reed-Solomon encoding of x:
Definition 5. Let R be a ring and let x ∈ R. Let Px ∈ R[x] be a random polynomial of degree
t (threshold decryption parameter) such that Px(0) = x, let z1, . . . , zk be points different from 0.
Then we say that the values Px(z1), . . . , Px(zk), are shares of x. We say that x is reconstructed
from the k shares Px(z1), . . . , Px(zk) for k > t when the value x = Px(0) is computed via Lagrange
interpolation, which we denote by Lz1,...,zk(Px(z1), . . . , Px(zk), 0).
We require threshold additive homomorphic encryption scheme with the following additional
property, capturing the fact that the homomorphism applies also to the randomness.
Property 1 (Vector Homomorphic Encryption). Let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme
where the plaintexts come from a ring R1 with operations (+, ·), the randomness comes from a ring
R2 with operations (⊕,), and the ciphertexts come from a ring R3 with operations (⊗,ˆ). We say
that E is vector homomorphic if the following holds: Enc(m1; r1)⊗Enc(m2; r2) = Enc(m1+m2; r1⊕r2)
and Enc(m; r)c = Enc(c ·m; r  c).
Such a property is satisfied by most known homomorphic encryption schemes, such as Pail-
lier [Paillier, 1999] and threshold Paillier [Fouque et al., 2001], ElGamal [ElGamal, 1985], and
Goldwasser-Micali [Goldwasser and Micali, 1982] encryption schemes. In the case of Paillier en-
cryption, which we will use in our protocols, we have the following operations: addition (+ );
multiplication (·, ⊕, ⊗ ); exponentiation (, ˆ).
4.3.2 Techniques
In this section we describe the main techniques that we employ in our protocols.
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4.3.2.1 Polynomial Code Commutativity.
Shamir secret sharing/Reed-Solomon codes are commutative with respect to polynomial evalua-
tions, which we formalize as follows:
Property 2 (Polynomial Code Commutativity). Let Q(x1, . . . , xm) be a multivariate polynomial,
t be the threshold for Shamir secret-sharing and L be the secret reconstruction algorithm for Shamir
secret-sharing. The evaluation of Q commutes with L in the sense that we can compute the value
Q(x1, . . . , xm) with either of the following algorithms starting from shares of the inputs x1, . . . , xm:
(Q ∗ L)(Px1(1), . . . Px1(t+ 1), . . . Pxm(1), . . . Pxm(t+ 1), 0) =
= Q((L(Px1(1), . . . Px1(t+ 1), 0), . . . , L(Pxm(1), . . . Pxm(t+ 1), 0))) = Q(x1, . . . xm),
where we first use L to retrieve the secrets and then evaluate Q on those secrets and
(L ∗Q)(Px1(1), . . . Px1(t+ 1), . . . Pxm(1), . . . Pxm(t+ 1), 0) =
= L(Q(Px1(1), . . . , Pxm(1)), . . . ,Q(Px1(t+ 1), . . . , Pxm(t+ 1)), 0) =
= L(w1, . . . , wt+1, 0) = Q(x1, . . . xm),
where we evaluate Q on each set of shares of x1, . . . , xm to obtain shares of Q(x1, . . . , xm) and then
use L to reconstruct the final secret.
The above property allows us to evaluate Q in parallel on shares of the inputs to yield shares
of the output.
4.3.2.2 Incremental Encrypted Polynomial Evaluation.
We will use homomorphic encryption to allow multiple parties to evaluate a multivariate poly-
nomial depending on their inputs by incrementally contributing their inputs to partial encrypted
evaluations of its monomials. This is facilitated by the following property:
Property 3 (Incremental Encrypted Polynomial Evaluation). Let m be the number of parties
evaluating a multivariate polynomial Q defined by






hj,s(xj,1, . . . , xj,lj )),
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where hj,s represents the inputs of party j to the s-th monomial of Q. Let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an
additive homomorphic encryption. We define the partial evaluations bj,s (including the contributions
of parties 1,. . . , j) of the monomials s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n of Q as follows:
b0,s = Enc(cj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and bj,s = b
hj,s(xj,1,...,xj,lj )
j−1,s for 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Polynomial Interpolation Over Encrypted Values In Figure 4.1 We present a protocol
that allows a verifier to verify (without help from the prover) that the prover’s encrypted points lie
on a polynomial of low degree, assuming the prover constructed the encryptions in a predetermined
manner. Recall that Lagrange interpolation allows us, given d + 1 points, to reconstruct the
polynomial of degree d that interpolates the given points. In the following, we use the fact that
Lagrange interpolation can, in fact, be carried out over encrypted points when the known encryption
used possesses the vector homomorphic Property 1. Since the encryption is over a ring we use
Feldman’s technique for shift interpolation by factorial [Feldman, 1987].
Lagrange Interpolation Protocol Over Encrypted Values (LIPEV)
Input: (1,Encpk(y1, r1)), . . . (A,Encpk(yA, rA)), d where d+ 1 < A,
Output: Verifier outputs Accept if there are polynomials P1 ∈ R1[x], P2 ∈ R2[x] of degree at most
d such that yj = P1(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ A and rj = P2(j) (P1 and P2 are defined with respect to the
operations in the respective rings) for 1 ≤ j ≤ A.
Protocol:
1. Let ∆ = A!.




j−i for 1 ≤ j ≤ d+ 1.




lj(i), and rejects otherwise.
Figure 4.1: Encrypted Interpolation
Using the LIPEV protocol, a prover can prove to a verifier that A encrypted points lie on one
polynomial of degree d, provided that the randomness for the encryptions was chosen in a specific
way; namely, the random values chosen must also lie on a polynomial of degree d. For completeness,
we describe in Figure 4.2 how to compute the random values for the encryptions so that they lie
on a polynomial P2 ∈ R2[x] of degree d. We note that even though the randomness for all A
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encrypted points are not chosen uniformly at random, semantic security is still preserved since the
randomness for d + 1 of the points is chosen uniformly at random and the remaining A − d − 1
encryptions can be computed given only the first d+ 1 encryptions due to Property 1.
Generation of Encryption Randomness for Shamir Shares
Input: (1, y1), . . . , (A, yA), r1, . . . , rd+1 for d+ 1 < A
Output: r∆d+2, . . . , r
∆
A such that the Lagrange Interpolation Protocol Over Encrypted Values outputs
accept on the input: [i,Encpk(yi, ri)
∆]1≤i≤A, d.
Protocol:




j−i for 1 ≤ j ≤ d+ 1.
• Compute r∆i =
∏d+1
j=0(rj)
lj(i) for d+ 2 ≤ i ≤ A.
Figure 4.2: Interpolation Randomness
4.4 Building Block Protocols
In this section we introduce several subprotocols that we will use in our main construction.
4.4.1 Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption Proof of Knowledge and Plaintext
Verification (HEPKPV)
In several places in our main protocol we would need to enable a party to prove statements to the
other participants in the computation about plaintext values given the encryptions of their shares.
For this purpose we introduce a protocol multiparty homomorphic encryption proof of knowledge
and verification that allows a prover to show that the plaintexts underlying a set of homomorphic
encryptions belong to a particular language.
To illustrate the main idea for the proof in this protocol we consider the example where a prover
(P) needs to prove to a verifier (V) that a ciphertext c = Enc(0; r) encrypts zero. In this case the
two parties execute the following protocol:
• Prover sends to Verifier c′ = Enc(0; r′).
• Verifier sends to Prover b ∈ {0, 1}.
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• If b = 0, Prover reveals r′ and Verifier checks that c′ = Enc(0; r′).
• If b = 1, Prover reveals r · r′ and Verifier checks that c · c′ = Enc(0; r · r′).
In the following full protocol we boost the soundness of the above proof from 1/2 to 1 − negl
with a polynomial number of parallel executions. To provide security for the parallel executions we
utilize the modification of [Goldwasser and Micali, 1982] which requires the verifier to first commit
to its challenge and extend this modified protocol to the multiparty setting. We use the fact that
a slight variation of the above protocol can be used to prove that the plaintexts belong to any
language that is closed under addition/subtraction to be able to instantiate the protocols with any
of the following languages:
• Description: Language consisting of a vector of encryptions of val:
Luval = {[c0,j ]1≤j≤u | for 1 ≤ j ≤ u, c0,j = Encpk(val; r) for some r}
• Description: Language consisting of a vector of pairs of encryptions that encrypt the same
value.
Lu= = {[c00,j , c10,j ]1≤j≤u | for 1 ≤ j ≤ u, c00,j = Encpk(m0; r0) and
c10,j = Encpk(m1; r1) and m0 = m1 for some r0, r1}
We note that this language will be used subsequently with pairs of the form (c00,j , c
1
0,j) such
that c00,j and c
1
0,j have been interpolated from encrypted shares of polynomials of degree k
and 2k respectively.
Lemma 8. Assume that E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a CPA-secure Vector Homomorphic encryption
scheme. Then protocol ΠPOK presented in Figure 4.3 is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge for L.
See Appendix B.1 for the proof of the lemma.
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Homomorphic Encryption Proof of Knowledge and Proof of Verification
Input:
P1 ← C = (pk, c1, . . . , cu), (x1, . . . xu), (r1, . . . , ru), k, L where ci = Encpk(xi; ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ u;
P2, . . . Ps ← C = (pk, c1, . . . , cu), L
Output:
P2, . . . Ps output ACCEPT if (c1, . . . , cu) ∈ L, and REJECT otherwise.
Protocol:
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, P1 computes random encryptions (ci1, . . . , ciu) =
(Encpk(ei1, ri1), . . . ,Encpk(eiu, riu)) such that (ci1 . . . , ciu) ∈ L. for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and sends
them on the broadcast channel.
2. For 2 ≤ j ≤ s Pj chooses a sequence of k bits bj1 . . . bjk and sends a commitment to those
bits: ComH(bj1 . . . bjk) on the broadcast channel.
3. P1 chooses a sequence of k bits b11 . . . b1k and sends them on the broadcast channel.
4. For 2 ≤ j ≤ s Pj decommits the value bj1 . . . bjk.
5. All parties verify that the decommitted values correspond to the commitments that were sent
earlier and if the check fails abort.
6. The parties compute b1 . . . bk = ⊕sj=1(bj1 . . . bjk) and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
(a) if bi = 0, P1 sends to on the broadcast channel M = ((ei1, ri1), . . . , (eiu, riu)).
(b) if bi = 1, P1 sends on the broadcast channel M = ((x1 + ei1, r1ri1), . . . , (x` + eiu, r`riu)).
7. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
(a) if bi = 0 each party Pj for 2 ≤ j ≤ s verifies that (ci1, . . . , ciu) =
(Encpk(ei1, ri1), · · · ,Encpk(xiu, riu)) and (ci1, . . . , ciu) ∈ L. If the verification fails the pro-
tocol aborts.
(b) if bi = 1 each party Pj for 2 ≤ j ≤ s verifies that (c1ci1, . . . , cuciu) = (Encpk(x1 +
ei1, r1ri1), · · · ,Encpk(xu +eiu, ruriu)) and that (c1ci1, . . . , cuciu) ∈ L. If the verification fails
the protocol aborts.
8. If any of the verifications steps of P1 fail, abort the protocol. Otherwise, accept.
Figure 4.3: HEPKPV
4.4.2 Multiparty Coin Tossing
Following ideas from [Lindell, 2001; Barak and Lindell, 2002] and using the HEPKPV protocol as
an efficient zero knowledge proof we present a protocol that implements constant round multiparty
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coin tossing in Figure 4.4. The goal of the protocol is to allow s parties T1, . . . , Ts to jointly
compute a random number in the interval [1,max]. We assume the existence of broadcast channel
that the parties use for communication. All parties know a homomorphic encryption scheme E =
(Gen,Enc,Dec).
Multiparty Coin Tossing
Input: E = (Gen,Enc,Dec), max, k
Output: R
Protocol:
1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ s party Ti runs Gen to obtain a pair of public and private keys (pki, ski).
2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ s party Ti chooses a random Ri ∈ [0,max] and commits to it sending
Ci = Encpki(Ri, ri) to all other parties on the broadcast channel, where ri is the randomness
used for encryption.
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ s− 1 party Ti sends the value Ri on the broadcast channel.
4. All parties run in parallel s executions of the multiparty HEPKPV protocol. In the j-th
execution for 1 ≤ i ≤ s party Tj proves that Cj ∈ L1Rj , i.e. Cj is an encryption of Rj .
5. Party Ts computes R = ⊕si=1Ri and runs the multiparty HEPKPV protocol to prove that
Cs ∈ L1R−R′ , i.e. R = R′ +Rs where Cs was the commitment of Rs and R′ = ⊕s−1i=1Ri.
Figure 4.4: Choosing Joint Randomness
Lemma 9. If E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme, the
protocol Πcoin presented in Figure 4.4 is a secure multiparty protocol when there is at least one
honest party.
See Appendix B.2 for the proof of the lemma.
4.4.3 Input Preprocessing and Verification
One of the ideas that we employ in our main protocol is to share function evaluation by secret
sharing the arguments of the function via polynomials of degree k and evaluating the function on
the corresponding shares in order to obtain shares of the final value of the function. The above can
be implemented straightforwardly using Shamir’s secret sharing ([Shamir, 1979]) and evaluating
the polynomial on corresponding shares. The problem with this approach is that if the degree of
the output function is Deg, then we require at least k ·Deg shares to reconstruct the output value.
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We avoid this blow-up in number of required shares by applying the following transformation on
the inputs.
We consider a multivariate polynomial Q(x1, . . . , x`) over the input set X = {x1, . . . , x`} which
we would like to evaluate on shares of the input variables in order to obtain shares of the output
value. Since the number of output shares that we will need to compute will depend on the degree
of Q and the degrees of the sharing polynomials Pxi that we use to share each of the input variable,
we employ techniques that allow us to decrease the degree of the final polynomial [Dachman-Soled
et al., 2009]. The main idea is to introduce new variables that represent higher degrees of the
current variables. For each variable xi that has maximum degree di in Q we substitute each power
x2
j
i with a new variable for 0 ≤ j ≤ blog dic. Note that if we view the original polynomial Q as a
polynomial over these new variables, we have that each variable has degree at most one. Let Mt be
the t-th monomial in Q and let dMt,i ∈Mt be the degrees of the variables in monomial Mt. Thus,
the original degree of Q was maxt{
∑
i∈Mt dMt,i}, whereas the degree of the transformed polynomial
over the new variables is only maxt{
∑
i∈Mt log dMt,i}. In our protocol, each party will pre-process
its inputs to compute its new input variables and their shares and will prove that the new shares
are consistent with the initial inputs.
We realize the above functionality through two protocols: Efficient Preprocessing of Input, pre-
sented in Figure 4.5, which starts with the input variables of a party and produces commitments
to shares of the new variables computed according to the above intuition, and Preprocessing Veri-
fication, presented in Figure 4.6, that takes the commitments from the efficient preprocessing and
verifies their correctness by opening and verifying the committed values in a random subset of
those. For the purposes of these protocols let J be the ordered set of all elements of {0, 1}10kD
that contain exactly k ones. Note that given R, an index of a string in the set J , we can efficiently
reconstruct the R-th string, jR. Let JR = {i|jR[i] = 1}, where jR[i] denotes the i-th position of the
string jR.
Claim 1. Assume R was chosen randomly after T committed to its inputs through the Efficient
Preprocessing protocol. If the parties run the Preprocessing Verification protocol and do not abort,
then with all but negligible probability, the committed input shares of T are valid encryptions of
k + 1-sharing polynomials of the inputs x`, x
2
` , . . . , x
2blogd`c
` .
See Appendix B.3 for the proof of the claim.
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Efficient Input Preprocessing
Let k be a security parameter and 10kD be the number of required shares. Let T be one of the
parties with input set X of size |X|. For each input xj ∈ X, we assume that the highest power of
xj required is x
2αj
j .
1. For each xj ∈ X, T chooses a random polynomial Pxj of degree k such that Pxj (0) = xj ,
and computes shares of the form Pxj (i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD. T chooses randomly values
rj,1, . . . , rj,k+1 and computes according to the Randomness generation protocol the values
r∆j,k+2, . . . r
∆
j,10kD. T computes the encryptions Enc(Pxj(i), rj,i)
∆.
2. For each xj , for ` = 0 to αj , for i = 1 to 10kD, T chooses randomly values rj,`,1, . . . , rj,`,k+1
and r′j,`,1, . . . , r
′
j,`,k+1 and computes according to the Randomness generation protocol the





∆, . . . (r′j,`,10kD)
∆. S computes the following:




























3. For each xj , for ` = 0 to αj , for i = 1 to 10kD, T computes the following commitments:
• New input shares: Encpk(Px2`+1j (i), rj,`,i)
∆ = Encpk(∆ · Px2`+1j (i), r
∆
j,`,i) and











where the randomness r∆j,`,i and (r
′
j,`,i)
∆ are chosen using the Randomness generation protocol
and sends them on the broadcast channel.
Figure 4.5: Input Preprocessing
Lemma 10. For all sets X1, X2 where |X1| = |X2| = poly(k), we have that the output distributions
of the Verifier in consecutive executions of the Efficient Preprocessing protocol and Preprocessing
Verification protocol with inputs X1 and X2 (respectively) are computationally indistinguishable.
See Appendix B.3 for the proof of the lemma.
4.5 Main Protocol
The multiparty polynomial evaluation has the following setup:
• Each party Tj has lj inputs Xj = {xj,1, . . . , xj,lj} for 1 ≤ j ≤ m.












∆ for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, 0 ≤ ` ≤ αj , 1 ≤ i ≤
10kD
A number number R ∈ [|J |] chosen by all parties using the Coin-Tossing protocol after T com-
mitted to its inputs.
Private Inputs of T: Decommitments to the above values.
Protocol:


















(i), r′j,`,i. All parties verify the committed encryptions.









3. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ s the parties run the LIPEV protocol to interpolate the values c0,j0,` from




0,` from the shares c
1,j




and to check that the shares indeed lie on polynomials of degree k and 2k, respectively, for
1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD and then HEPKPV for the language Lαj= = {[c0,j0,` , c1,j0,` ]0≤`≤αj}.
Figure 4.6: Preprocessing Verification
• A polynomial Q(x1,1, . . . , x1,l1 , . . . , xm,1, . . . , xm,lm), which depends on the inputs of all par-
ties.
• A public parameter ∆ = 10kD! and a security parameter k.
We use the following representation of the polynomial Q:





1,1 . . . x
α1,l1,s
1,l1
. . . x
αm,1,s
m,1 . . . x
αm,lm,s
m,lm
where αj,v,s = 0 if xj,v does not participate in the s-th monomial of Q and cs values are known




j,2 . . . x
αj,lj ,s
j,lj
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ s ≤ n. Thus







Alternatively, we view hj,s for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ s ≤ n in the following way:
hj,s(xj,1, x
2
j,1, . . . , x
2blogαj,1,sc
j,1 , . . . , xj,lj , x
2
j,lj
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in which each variable is of degree at most one.
A designated party receives the output of the polynomial evaluation while all other parties learn
nothing. We denote the designated output receiver by T ∗. For 1 ≤ s ≤ n, let Dh,s =
∑m
j=1 deg(hj,s)
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, let Dh,j,s = k
∑j
v=1 deg(hv,s), where hj,s is defined as above as a polynomials
with variables of degree at most 1. Let D = maxns=1Dh,s.
Protocol Intuition. The protocol consists of four phases: Input Preprocessing, Round-Table
Step, Re-randomization, Verification and Reconstruction. During the Input Preprocessing phase,
each party commits to shares of its inputs via the Efficient Preprocessing protocol. In the Round
Table Step the parties compute the encrypted evaluations of the monomials in Q in a round-table
fashion. Next, in the Re-Randomization phase, each party helps re-randomize the output shares.
Honest behavior of the parties is checked during the Verification step via cut-and-choose. If the
verification passes, the parties jointly decrypt the output shares and the output receiver reconstructs
the final polynomial evaluation result in the Reconstruction phase. We now present the detailed
protocol and state our main theorem 2. In the following, let E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a threshold
encryption scheme that possesses Property 1.
4.5.1 Security analysis
We state the security guarantees of the multivariate polynomial evaluation protocol presented in
Section 4.5 in following theorem:
Theorem 6. If the Decisional Composite Residuosity problem is hard in Z∗n2, where n is a product
of two strong primes, and protocol Πpoly eval is instantiated with the threshold Paillier encryption
scheme TPmenc such that E = TP
m
enc, then Πpoly eval securely computes the Polynomial Evaluation
functionality in the presence of malicious adversaries.
Proof. The correctness of the protocol in the case that all parties are honest follows from Property
2, Property 3, and the correctness of the building-block protocols.
2We note that for each intermediate monomial hj,s passed between the parties in the round-table step, each Party
j needs to transmit only Dh,j,s+1 shares to Party j+1 since the rest of the shares may be constructed by the receiving
party via Lagrange interpolation over committed values. This may yield significant savings in the communication
complexity, which we assumed in our discussion in the introduction.
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Multiparty Polynomial Evaluation Protocol Πpoly eval
Input: T1 ← {X1, pk, sk1, k,Q}, . . . , Tm ← {Xm, pk, skm, k,Q}
Output: T ∗ → Q(x1,1, . . . , x1,l1 , . . . , xm,1, . . . , xm,lm), {T1, . . . , Tm}\T ∗ →⊥
Protocol:
Input Preprocessing:
1. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ s ≤ n Party Tj converts each hj,s from a function over xj,1, . . . , xj,lj to a
function in which each variable is of degree at most one:
hj,s(xj,1, x
2
j,1, . . . , x
2blogαj,1,sc
j,1 , . . . , xj,lj , x
2




Let Dh,j,s = k
∑j
v=1 deg(hv,s).
2. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Party Tj runs the Efficient Input Preprocessing protocol to generate 10kD
shares for each of its new inputs
xj,1, x
2
j,1, . . . , x
2blogαj,1c
j,1 , . . . , xj,lj , x
2




where αj,t = max
n
i=1 αj,t,i for 1 ≤ t ≤ lj and commits to these shares.
Round-Table Step:
3. For 1 ≤ s ≤ n party T1 encrypts the polynomial coefficients b0,i = Encpk(cs; 1).
4. For 1 ≤ s ≤ n, T1 generates 10kD numbers that will be used for the encryptions of his shares
as follows:
(a) Generate Dh,1,s + 1 random values r
1,s




(b) Run the protocol for Generation for Encryption Randomness for Shamir Shares with




∆, . . . , (rj,s10kD)
∆.
5. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD, 1 ≤ s ≤ n T1 uses the values r1,si from the previous step to compute b1,s,i =
b
∆·h1,s(i)
0,j · Encpk(0; r1i )∆, where
h1,s(i) = h1,s
(
Px1,1(i), . . . , Px2
blogα1,1,jc
1,1





and sends b1,s,i to party T2.
6. For each 2 ≤ j ≤ m:
(a) Tj receives from Tj−1 coefficients bj−1,1,i, . . . , bj−1,n,i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD.
Figure 4.7: Polynomial Evaluation
Proof Intuition. We start with a sketch that gives the intuition of the proof of security for the
protocol. Assume there is a fixed set B, |B| ≤ m, chosen at the outset of the protocol and that
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6. (b) For 1 ≤ s ≤ n, Tj generates 10kD numbers that will be used for the encryptions of his
shares as follows:
i. Generate Dh,j,s + 1 random numbers r
j,s




ii. Run the protocol for Generation for Encryption Randomness for Shamir





∆, . . . , (rj,s10kD)
∆.
7. (a) For 1 ≤ s ≤ n Tj uses the values rj,si from the previous step to compute
bj,s,i = b
∆·hj,s(i)
j−1,s,i · Encpk(0; rj,si )∆ where
hj,s(i) = hj,s(Pxj,1(i), . . . , Px2
blogαj,1c
j,1




and hj,s(i) denotes evaluation of hj,s on the i-th shares of its inputs .
(b) If j < m, Tj sends all bj,s,i to Pj+1.
(c) If j = m, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD Tm computes S′i = Πns=1bm,s,i and sends them to all
parties on the broadcast channel.
Re-Randomization Step:
8. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Party Tj computes polynomial Pj,0 of degrees kD such that Pj,0(0) = 0.
9. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, Party Tj generates 10kD values that it will used for share encryptions as
follows:
(a) Generate kD + 1 random values rj,1, . . . , rj,kD+1.
(b) the protocol for Generation for Encryption Randomness for Shamir Shares with inputs
(1, Pj,0(1)), . . . , (10kD,Pj,0(10kD)), rj,1, . . . , rj,kD+1 to compute r
∆
j,kD+2, . . . , r
∆
j,10kD.
10. Tj uses the rj,i values computed in the previous step to commit to shares Zj,0 =
Encpk(Pj,0(i); rj,i)
∆ for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD
11. All parties run the LIPEV and HEPKPV protocols in parallel to ensure that each vector
[Zj,i]1≤i≤10kD is an encryption of a polynomial with constant coefficient 0.
12. The final encryptions are calculated as Si = S
′
i ·Πmj=1Zj,0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD.
Verification:
13. All parties verify independently using the LIPEV protocol that the encryptions Si lie on a
polynomial of degree kD. Otherwise reject.
Figure 4.8: Polynomial Evaluation Continued
a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time real adversary AB controls the parties Tj such that
j ∈ B. We construct a non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomial-time ideal model adversary
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14. All parties run a multi-party coin-tossing protocol (Figure 4.4) to choose a random subset I
of size k from [1, 10kD].
15. For each i ∈ I parties T1, . . . , Tm decommit their corresponding shares from the Efficient Input
Preprocessing.
16. All parties run the Preprocessing Verification for their inputs.
17. For each i ∈ I each party Tj decommits the i-th shares of its inputs as well as the i-th share
of the polynomials Pj,0. Additionally, each party Tj reveals the randomness r
j,s
i for 1 ≤ s ≤ n
and rj,i used for the corresponding shares. To verify, each party recomputes the entire share
S∗i , using the inputs and randomness revealed and checks that Si = S
∗
i . If any verification
fails the protocol is aborted.
Reconstruction:
18. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD each party computes its partial decryption si,j of Si and sends it to
the designated output receiver T ∗.
19. Party T ∗ uses the partial decryptions si,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m received in the previous step to
completely decrypt Si. T
∗ reconstructs the value of Q(x1,1, . . . , x1,l1 , . . . , xm,1, . . . , xm,lm)
using interpolation and division by ∆m.
Figure 4.9: Polynomial Evaluation Continued
simulator SB.
The idea behind how SB works is that it extracts the inputs of the parties Tj such that j ∈ B.
using the extractor for the HEPKPV protocol. Additionally, SB simulates the messages of the
honest parties Ti, for i ∈ [m] \B using dummy inputs and outputs. When proving knowledge and
validity of the parties’ inputs, SB uses the simulator for the HEPKPV protocol. At the outset of
the protocol, SB chooses a random subset I
′ of size k such that I ′ ⊂ [10kD]. When committing
to the secret-sharing of the honest parties, it places random values in the positions indexed by I ′.
SB computes correctly all calculations that will be verified in the cut-and-choose step for elements
in the subset I ′. Then, SC uses the simulator for the Coin-Tossing protocol to guarantee that the
outcome of the Coin-Tossing is I = I ′. After the cut-and-choose step and all verifications have
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executed without aborting, the simulator calls the Trusted Party with the inputs it has previously
extracted and receives the final output of the protocol. Note that the Simulator has the secret
keys of the malicious parties and thus is able to find out their partial decryption of the dummy
ciphertext. To ensure that the final output sent to party receiving output is correct, the Simulator
uses the share reconstruction protocol for threshold Paillier [Fouque et al., 2001] to reconstruct
shares for the honest parties so that the final reconstructed decryption is equal to the output of
the trusted party. SB uses the simulator for the threshold decryption scheme to simulate the proof
that the shares of the honest parties were decrypted correctly.
Intuitively, because the Simulator is able to choose the set I = I ′ ahead of time, he can run
the protocol using the challenge ciphertext from a CPA-IND experiment as the constant coefficient
of the shared inputs of all uncorrupted parties, thereby reducing indistinguishability of the views
to the semantic security of the encryption scheme TPmenc. Therefore, we have that AB’s view is
indistinguishable in the Ideal Model when interacting with a Simulator that chooses all 0 values as
the constant coefficients of the shared inputs of the uncorrupted parties and its view in the Real
model when each uncorrupted party uses its actual input. This is due to the information-theoretic
secrecy of the secret-sharing scheme and the semantic security of the encryption scheme. The
detailed descriptions if the simulators and the distinguishability of the views are given in the full
version of the paper.
Full Proof. We now describe in detail the Simulator SB
• SB chooses a random subset I ′ ⊂ [10kD] of size k, I ′ = {j1, . . . , jk}.
• For each of the corrupt parties, Tj for j ∈ B, SB extracts the input of party Tj using the
extractor for the HEPKPV protocol.
• Efficient Preprocessing: For each of the Honest Parties, Tj for j /∈ B, SB simulates the
efficient preprocessing step as described below.
1. SB chooses a random value ri,v,w and sets Px2ij,v
(w) = ri,v,w for 1 ≤ v ≤ lj , 0 ≤ i ≤
αj,v, w ∈ I ′. SB computes a random encryption Encpk(Px2ij,v(w)).
2. SB chooses a random subset M ⊆ [10kD] \ I ′ of size k.
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3. SB sets Px2ij,v
(0) = 0 for 1 ≤ v ≤ lj , 0 ≤ i ≤ αj,v and computes a random indexed
encryption (0,Encpk(Px2ij,v
(0))).
4. SB uses Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values and the above encryptions to
compute the indexed encryptions (w,Encpk(Px2ij,v
(w))∆) for 1 ≤ v ≤ lj , 0 ≤ i ≤ αj,v, w ∈
[10kD].









(w))2 for 1 ≤ v ≤ lj , 0 ≤ i ≤ Dxj,v − 1, w ∈ I ′ and computes a
random indexed encryption (w,Encpk((Px2ij,v
(w))2)).





(w) = 0 for 1 ≤ v ≤ lj , 0 ≤ i ≤ αj,v − 1, w = 0, w ∈ M and computes a
random indexed encryption (w,Encpk((Px2ij,v
(w))2)).
7. SB uses Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values and the above encryptions to com-
pute the indexed encryptions (w,Encpk((Px2ij,v
(w))2)∆) for 1 ≤ v ≤ lj , 0 ≤ i ≤ αj,v, w ∈
[10kD].
8. SB broadcasts the encryptions computed above.
• Round-Table Step: For each of the Honest Parties, Tj for j /∈ B, SB simulates the round-
table step as described below:
1. For 1 ≤ s ≤ n, i ∈ I ′, SB computes the indexed encryption (i, b′j,s,i) = (i, bhj,s(i)j−1,s,i ·
Encpk(0; r
j,s
i )) honestly using the values committed above and a randomly chosen r
j,s
i .
2. For 1 ≤ s ≤ n, SB chooses a set Ns ⊆ [10kD] \ I ′ of size Dh,j,s − k.
3. For each s, 1 ≤ s ≤ n, SB computes the random indexed encryptions (i,Encpk(0)) for
i = 0, i ∈ Ns.
4. For 1 ≤ s ≤ n, SB uses Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values and the above
encryptions to compute (i, (b′j,s,i)
∆) = (i, bj,s,i) for i ∈ [10kD].
• For each of the Honest Parties, Tj for j /∈ B, SB follows steps 5(d) and 5(e) of the protocol.
• Re-Randomization Step: For each of the Honest Parties, SB chooses the encrypted shares
of Pj,0 in the following way:
1. For all but one of the honest parties: SB chooses the random indexed encryptions of 0,
(i,Encpk(0)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ kD + 1.
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2. SB uses Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values to compute the rest of the indexed
encryptions (raised to ∆).
3. For the final honest party Ph: SB chooses a random degree kD polynomial P
′
h,0 and
computes the following random indexed encryptions: Ei = (i,Encpk(P
′
h,0(i))) for 1 ≤ i ≤
kD + 1.
4. SB uses Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values to compute the rest of the indexed
encryptions (raised to ∆).
5. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 10kD, SB calculates the shares Ei ·S′i and uses these as the encrypted shares
of Ph,0.
6. SB uses the HEPKPV protocol to prove that all the 0-shares were computed correctly.
• SB plays the role of the honest parties as specified in steps 10, 11 of the protocol.
• Verification:
1. SB simulates a run of the Coin-Tossing protocol to ensure the outcome is the set I
′ using
the simulator for the Coin-Tossing protocol.
2. SB plays the role of the honest parties as specified in steps 14, 15, 16.
• Reconstruction:
1. If all the corrupt parties pass the cut-and-choose step, SB queries the Trusted Party
with the previously extracted inputs and receives back Out.
2. SB now shares Out via a random degree kD polynomial POut such that POut(0) =
Out ·∆m.
3. For each of the Corrupt Parties, Tj for j ∈ B, SB calculates the partial decryption of
Sj,i, obtaining sj,i, using Tj ’s secret key.
4. SB uses the share reconstruction protocol for threshold Paillier to construct simulated
shares sj,i for each value P
sim
Out (i) for each of the Honest Parties and follows step 1 of the
protocol honestly using the simulated shares.
5. For each of the Honest Parties, Tj for j /∈ B, SB uses the simulator for the threshold
encryption scheme to simulate the proof that sj is the correct decryption of Sj .
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We show that the view of AB in the simulation with SB is indistinguishable from its view in a
real execution.
In the case that one of the parties controlled by AB does not answer the challenges in the Efficient
Preprocessing protocol correctly, the output distributions are computationally indistinguishable in
the real and ideal executions. In the case that all the parties controlled by AB do answer the
challenges correctly, the probability that SB fails to extract the parties’ inputs is negligible.
We now consider the case that AB answers the challenge correctly and SB successfully extracts
the parties’ inputs. We consider the following hybrid distributions: The first hybrid distribution
consists of the joint ouput of AB and the honest parties in a real execution of Πpoly eval. The second
hybrid distribution is the same as the first, except instead of a real execution of Πpoly eval, the proofs
of correct decryption of the threshold encryption scheme are replaced with simulated proofs for each
of the honest parties. The third hybrid distribution is the same as the second, except we additionally
replace the real Coin-Tossing protocol with a simulation. The fourth hybrid distribution is the same
as the third, except for each honest party Tj , we replace the real Efficient Preprocessing protocol
and computation step with a simulation (as above). The fifth hybrid distribution is the same as
the fourth, except we replace the computation of the Re-Randomization step with the one given
above. The sixth hybrid distribution is the same as the fifth, except we replace all intermediate
outputs of the honest parties’ the encryptions described above in the simulator’s execution of the
Round-Table step. The seventh hybrid distribution is the same as the sixth, except we replace all
committed input shares of the honest parties’ as described above in the simulator’s execution of the
Efficient Preprocessing step. The eighth hybrid distribution is the same as the seventh, except we
replace the final decrypted output by the simulated output as described above. The eighth hybrid
distribution is distributed identically to the joint output of SB and the honest parties in an Ideal
execution.
Indistinguishability follows due to the indistinguishability of the simulated runs of the Proof of
Correct Decryption, Coin-Tossing protocols, and Efficient Preprocessing protocols from real runs,
the information-theoretic security of the secret-sharing scheme, and the semantic security of the
threshold encryption scheme TPmenc.
We give some intuition for the indistinguishability of the seventh and eighth hybrid distribution.
Given that the honest parties do not abort after the input preprocessing verification and cut-and-
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choose step, we have that with all but negligible probability, at least a .9-fraction of the final
encrypted output shares were computed correctly. If the honest parties do not abort in the LIPEV
protocol, then the decryptions of the output shares must all lie on some degree kD polynomial.
Since any 2 degree kD polynomials must disagree on at least a .9-fraction of the 10kD shares, we
must have that the output shares are actually all exactly correct. Due to the re-randomization
steps, this degree kD polynomial is distributed uniformly conditioned on the fact that its constant
coefficient is equal to the final output value.
In the case that party T ∗ is an honest party, we show that the joint output distribution of AB
and P ∗ in the Real model is indistinguishable from the joint output distribution of SB and P ∗
in the Ideal model. Similarly to the analysis above, we note that if the honest party reaches the
end of the protocol, then with all but negligible probability all the shares were computed exactly
correctly. Thus, when the honest party in the Real model reconstructs the final output, it will be
the same value outputted by the honest party in the Ideal model.
We note that the Simulator exactly as specified does not run in expected polynomial time. This
is a subtlety that concerns the probability that the adversary will open the commitment in the
coin-tossing protocol correctly after rewinding, since after rewinding, the commitment is no longer
random, but is correlated with the input; all indices in I (the set chosen by the coin-tossing protocol)
are computed honestly, while all indices not in I are incorrect. This technicality was pointed out
by [Goldreich and Kahan, 1996] in their work on constant-round zero knowledge. However, as in
[Lindell, 2008] we slightly modify the simulator so it will run in expected polynomial time. Very
briefly, the simulator first estimates p, the probability that all parties controlled by AB decommit
correctly when the commitment they received was randomly chosen, and then bounds the number
of rewinding attempts by poly(k)p, where poly(k) is a fixed polynomial.
4.6 Communication and Computation Complexity
Our protocol computes the polynomial functionality in a constant number of rounds (counting
round-table rounds as one, or with a constant number of players). The communication complexity
of the protocol can be divided into two types: messages that are broadcast to all parties and
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the ”round-table” communication that is passed between two consecutive parties. We note that
the ”round-table” communication can be done off-line. The broadcast communication consists of
the commitments of the inputs shares, the decommitments used in the final verification phase,
the encrypted and decrypted output shares as well as the messages used in the coin tossing and




t=1 logαj,t + 1). Note that the
communication complexity may be much smaller than the size of the polynomial representation.
For example, if party Pj with input xj,1 must contribute αj,t consecutive powers of xi: x
1
i , . . . , x
αj,t
i
to αj,t different terms, the broadcast communication complexity for this party will still only be
k(10D + 1) logαj,t + 1. The round-table messages passed between consecutive parties include all
intermediate messages in the computation that are sent by the all the parties except the last one,
which in total are 10kDn(m − 1). The computational complexity (where we count number of
exponentiations) for all m parties in total is O(kDnm). Further, if we apply the share packing
optimization from Section 4.7.1 over k executions of the protocol, we can drop k factor for the new
amortized complexities.
4.7 Multiparty Set Intersection and Other Applications
4.7.1 Optimizations
We apply several optimizations to the protocol given in Section 4.5 for polynomials with specific
structures. First, if we have a monomial that is computed only from the inputs of a subset of the
parties, then clearly, we can evaluate it in a round-table fashion that only includes parties in this
subset and proceed to the Re-Randomization Step.
Additionally, in some cases, we can remove the requirement of a party to share all of its inputs.
Recall that we require the input-sharing in order to enable the cut-and-choose verification of honest
behavior of the parties. In the case when an input is used only once in the polynomial, this type of
proof may not be necessary. We can avoid sharing an input if it belongs to the first party in the round
table computation of the corresponding monomial as long as we can verify that the encryption itself
is valid with a ZKPOK and extract the encrypted value. We notice that the requirements imposed
on the structure of the polynomial in order to be able to apply this optimization substantially limit
the range of the possible polynomials. However, in the next section we will see how the problem of
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multiparty set intersection can be reduced to the evaluation of exactly this type of polynomials.
Finally, we use the approach of multi-secret sharing from [Franklin and Yung, 1992] that allows
us to use the same polynomials to share the input values for multiple parallel executions of the
protocol, which lowers the amortized communication complexity of our protocol. Intuitively, we
choose a set of points on the sharing polynomials to represent the input values for each of the
different executions of the protocol, say points 1 to k for each of k different executions. The shares
that will be used in the computation will be those corresponding to points not in this set. As a
result, the final output polynomial will evaluate to each of the different output values corresponding
to each execution at the points 1 to k respectively.
4.7.2 Multiparty Set Intersection as Polynomial Evaluation
The setting for the multiparty set intersection problem that we consider is as follows: there are





one of the parties Tm is the designated output receiver that will learn the elements in the set
intersection 3. The first step is our approach is to translate the problem into a problem for secure
multivariate polynomial evaluation that depends on the inputs of all participants. Recall that a set
X = {x1, . . . , xd} can be represented as a polynomial P (x) = (x−x1) . . . (x−xd). Now if we consider
the polynomial P ′(x) = r ·P (x)+x, where r is random, we have that if x′ ∈ X then P ′(x′) = x′ and
if x′ /∈ X then P ′(x′) is uniformly distributed (see [Freedman et al., 2004]). In the multiparty case
we have m parties with input sets X1, . . . , Xm, represented by polynomials PX1(x), . . . , PXm(x).
Thus the polynomial P(x) = r ·∑m−1i=1 PXi(x) + x, where r = r1 + r2 + · · · + rm and each ri is a











′) is uniformly distributed.
Now to compute the intersection of the sets X1, . . . , Xm, the parties T1, . . . , Tm−1 would construct
the multivariate polynomial that represents the intersection of their sets as above and the parties
will run the polynomial evaluation algorithm to evaluate this polynomial on all inputs of Tm. We
treat the multivariate polynomial constructed by T1, . . . , Tm−1 as polynomial P′ that has coefficients
1 and its real coefficients being input variables for the parties.
Applying the optimizations described in Section 4.7.1 we obtain or final protocol for computing
3We note that our protocol can be generalized to allow any subset of the parties to receive output.
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multiparty set intersection for which we have the following theorem and complexities:
Theorem 7. If the Decisional Composite Residuosity problem is hard in Z∗n2, where n is a product
of two strong primes, protocol Πpoly eval is instantiated with the threshold Paillier encryption scheme
TPmenc such that E = TP
m
enc, and Q = P
′, then Πpoly eval securely computes the Set Intersection
functionality 4 in the presence of malicious adversaries.
We have that the broadcast communication complexity of the Set Intersection protocol is
O(md + d log2 d) (there is no round-table communication) and the computational complexity is
O(md2 log d), where d >> k is the maximum input set size of each party.
Multiparty Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation. In the protocol for multiparty set intersec-
tion the coefficients of the evaluated polynomial are inputs for different parties. If we assume that
the polynomial coefficients are the inputs of one of the parties, we reduce the problem to oblivious
multivariate polynomial evaluation (introduced by [Naor and Pinkas, 2006] in the single-variable
case) for a small class of multivariate polynomials.
4We consider here a slight variant of the Set Intersection functionality where Party i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 submits
the polynomial PXi to the Trusted Party, Party m submits Xm and the Trusted Party returns the intersection of
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Chapter 5
How to Delegate and Verify in Public:
Verifiable Computation from
Attribute-based Encryption
5.1 Motivation and Contributions
In the modern age of cloud computing and smartphones, asymmetry in computing power seems to
be the norm. Computationally weak devices such as smartphones gather information, and when
they need to store the voluminous data they collect or perform expensive computations on their
data, they outsource the storage and computation to a large and powerful server (a “cloud”, in
modern parlance). Typically, the clients have a pay-per-use arrangement with the cloud, where the
cloud charges the client proportional to the “effort” involved in the computation.
One of the main security issues that arises in this setting is – how can the clients trust that
the cloud performed the computation correctly? After all, the cloud has the financial incentive
to run (occasionally, perhaps) an extremely fast but incorrect computation, freeing up valuable
compute time for other transactions. Is there a way to verifiably outsource computations, where
the client can, without much computational effort, check the correctness of the results provided by
the cloud? Furthermore, can this be done without requiring much interaction between the client
and the cloud? This is the problem of non-interactive verifiable computation, which was considered
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implicitly in the early work on efficient arguments by Kilian [Kilian, 1995] and computationally
sound proofs (CS proofs) by Micali [Micali, 1994], and which has been the subject of much attention
lately [Goldwasser et al., 2008; Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010; Applebaum et al., 2010;
Benabbas et al., 2011; Barbosa and Farshim, 2011; Bitansky et al., 2011; Goldwasser et al., 2011].
Our starting point is that while the recent solutions consider and solve the bare-bones verifiable
computation problem in its simplest form, there are a number of desirable features that they fail
to achieve. We consider two such properties – namely, public delegatability and public verifiability.
Public Delegatability. In a nutshell, public delegatability says that everyone should be able to
delegate computations to the cloud. In some protocols [Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010;
Applebaum et al., 2010; Benabbas et al., 2011], a client who wishes to delegate computation of a
function F is required to first run an expensive pre-processing phase (wherein her computation is
linear in the size of the circuit for F ) to generate a (small) secret key SKF and a (large) evaluation
key EKF . This large initial cost is then amortized over multiple executions of the protocol to
compute F (xi) for different inputs xi, but the client needs the secret key SKF in order to initiate
each such execution. In other words, clients can delegate computation to the cloud only if they put
in a large initial computational investment. This makes sense only if the client wishes to run the
same computation on many different inputs. Can clients delegate computation without making
such a large initial commitment of resources?
As an example of a scenario where this might come in handy, consider a clinic with a doctor and
a number of lab assistants, which wishes to delegate the computation of a certain expensive data
analysis function F to a cloud service. Although the doctor determines the structure and specifics
of F , it is in reality the lab assistants who come up with inputs to the function and perform the
delegation. In this scenario, we would like to ask the doctor to run the (expensive) pre-processing
phase once and for all, and generate a (small) public key PKF and an evaluation key EKF . The
public key lets anyone, including the lab assistants, delegate the computation of F to the cloud
and verify the results. Thus, once the doctor makes the initial investment, any of the lab assistants
can delegate computations to the cloud without the slightest involvement of the doctor. Needless
to say, the cloud should not be able to cheat even given PKF and EKF .
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Public Verifiability. In a similar vein, the delegator should be able to produce a (public) “ver-
ification key” that enables anyone to check the cloud’s work. In the context of the example above,
when the lab assistants delegate a computation on input x, they can also produce a verification
key V Kx that will let the patients, for example, obtain the answer from the cloud and check its
correctness. Neither the lab assistants nor the doctor need to be involved in the verification process.
Needless to say, the cloud cannot cheat even if it knows the verification key V Kx.
Put together, we call a verifiable computation protocol that is both publicly delegatable and publicly
verifiable a public verifiable computation protocol. We are not aware of any such protocol (for a
general class of functions) that is non-interactive and secure in the standard model. Note that we
still require the party who performs the initial function preprocessing (the doctor in the example
above) to be trusted by those delegating inputs and verifying outputs.
As a bonus, a public verifiable computation protocol is immune to the “rejection problem”
that affects several previous constructions [Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010; Applebaum
et al., 2010]. Essentially, the problem is that these protocols do not provide reusable soundness;
i.e., a malicious cloud that is able to observe the result of the verification procedure (namely, the
accept/reject decision) on polynomially many inputs can eventually break the soundness of the
protocol. It is an easy observation that public verifiable computation protocols do not suffer from
the rejection problem. Roughly speaking, verification in such protocols depends only on the public
key and some (instance-specific) randomness generated by the delegator, and not on any long-term
secret state. Thus, obtaining the result of the verification procedure on one instance does not help
break the soundness on a different instance.1
5.1.1 Our Contributions
Verifiable Computation from Attribute-Based Encryption. Our main result is a (some-
what surprising) connection between the notions of attribute-based encryption (ABE) and verifiable
computation (VC). In a nutshell, we show that a public verifiable computation protocol for a class
of functions F can be constructed from any attribute-based encryption scheme for a related class of
functions – namely, F ∪F . Recall that attribute-based encryption (ABE) [Sahai and Waters, 2005;
1In fact, this observation applies also to any protocol that is publicly delegatable and not necessarily publicly
verifiable.
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Goyal et al., 2006] is a rich class of encryption schemes where secret keys ABE.SKF are associated
with functions F , and can decrypt ciphertexts that encrypt a message m under an “attribute” x if
and only if F (x) = 1.
For simplicity, we state all our results for the case of Boolean functions, namely functions with
one-bit output. For functions with many output bits, we simply run independent copies of the
verifiable computation protocol for each output bit.
Theorem 8 (Main Theorem, Informal). Let F be a class of Boolean functions, and let F =
{F | F ∈ F} where F¯ denotes the complement of the function F . If there is a key-policy ABE
scheme for F ∪ F , then there is a public verifiable computation protocol for F .
Some remarks about this theorem are in order.
1. First, our construction is in the pre-processing model, where we aim to outsource the com-
putation of the same function F on polynomially many inputs xi with the goal of achieving
an amortized notion of efficiency. This is the same as the notion considered in [Gennaro et
al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010], and different from the one in [Goldwasser et al., 2008]. See
Definition 6.
2. Secondly, since the motivation for verifiable computation is outsourcing computational effort,
efficiency for the client is obviously a key concern. Our protocol will be efficient for the client,
as long as computing an ABE encryption (on input a message m and attribute x) takes less
time than evaluating the function F on x. We will further address the efficiency issue in the
context of concrete instantiations below (as well as in Section 5.3.2).
3. Third, we only need a weak form of security for attribute-based encryption which we will
refer to as one-key security. Roughly speaking, this requires that an adversary, given a
single key ABE.SKF for any function F of its choice, cannot break the semantic security of a
ciphertext under any attribute x such that F (x) = 0. Much research effort on ABE has been
dedicated to achieving the much stronger form of security against collusion, namely when the
adversary obtains secret keys for not just one function, but polynomially many functions of
its choice. We will not require the strength of these results for our purposes. On the same
note, constructing one-key secure ABE schemes is likely to be much easier than full-fledged
ABE schemes.
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We consider attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes to be ones in which each secret key
ABE.SKF is associated with a function F . We provide further discussion about the difference
and the parallel between the notions of attribute-based encryption and predicate encryption in
Appendix C.1.
Let us now describe an outline of our construction. The core idea of our construction is simple:
attribute-based encryption schemes naturally provide a way to “prove” that F (x) = 1. Say the
server is given the secret key ABE.SKF for a function F , and a ciphertext that encrypts a random
message m under the attribute x. The server will succeed in decrypting the ciphertext and recov-
ering m if and only if F (x) = 1. If F (x) = 0, he fares no better at finding the message than a
random guess. The server can then prove that F (x) = 1 by returning the decrypted message.
More precisely, this gives an effective way for the server to convince the client that F (x) = 1.
The pre-processing phase for the function F generates a master public key ABE.MPK for the
ABE scheme (which acts as the public key for the verifiable computation protocol) and the secret
key ABE.SKF for the function F (which acts as the evaluation key for the verifiable computation
protocol). Given the public key and an input x, the delegator encrypts a random message m under
the attribute x and sends it to the server. If F (x) = 1, the server manages to decrypt and return
m, but otherwise, he returns ⊥. Now,
• If the client gets back the same message that she encrypted, she is convinced beyond doubt
that F (x) = 1. This is because, if F (x) were 0, the server could not have found m (except
with negligible probability, assuming the message is long enough).
• However, if she receives no answer from the server, it could have been because F (x) = 0 and
the server is truly unable to decrypt, or because F (x) = 1 but the server intentionally refuses
to decrypt.
Thus, we have a protocol with one-sided error – if F (x) = 0, the server can never cheat, but if
F (x) = 1, he can.
A verifiable computation protocol with no error can be obtained from this by two independent
repetitions of the above protocol – once for the function F and once for its complement F¯ . A
verifiable computation protocol for functions with many output bits can be obtained by repeating
the one-bit protocol above for each of the output bits. Intuitively, since the preprocessing phase
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does not create any secret state, the protocol provides public verifiable computation. Furthermore,
the verifier performs as much computation as is required to compute two ABE encryptions.
Perspective: Signatures on Computation. Just as digital signatures authenticate messages,
the server’s proof in a non-interactive verifiable computation protocol can be viewed as a “signature
on computation”, namely a way to authenticate that the computation was performed correctly.
Moni Naor has observed that identity-based encryption schemes give us digital signature schemes,
rather directly [Boneh and Franklin, 2003]. Given our perspective, one way to view our result
is as a logical extension of Naor’s observation to say that just as IBE schemes give us digital
signatures, ABE schemes give us signatures on computation or, in other words, non-interactive
verifiable computation schemes.
Multi-Function Verifiability and ABE with Outsourcing. The definition of verifiable com-
putation focuses on the evaluation of a single function over multiple inputs. In many construc-
tions [Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010; Benabbas et al., 2011] the evaluated function is em-
bedded in the parameters for the VC scheme that are used for the input processing for the computa-
tion. Thus evaluations of multiple functions on the same input would require repeated invocation for
the ProbGen algorithm. A notable difference are approaches based on PCPs [Goldwasser et al., 2008;
Bitansky et al., 2011; Goldwasser et al., 2011] that may require a single oﬄine stage for input pro-
cessing and then allow multiple function evaluations. However, such approaches inherently require
verification work proportional to the depth of the circuit, which is at least logarithmic in the size of
the function and for some functions can be also proportional to the size of the circuit. Further these
approaches employ either fully homomorphic encryption or private information retrieval schemes
to achieve their security properties.
Using the recently introduced definition of ABE with outsourcing [Green et al., 2011], we achieve
a multi-function verifiable computation scheme that decouples the evaluated function from the
parameters of the scheme necessary for the input preparation. This VC scheme provides separate
algorithms for input and function preparation, which subsequently can be combined for multiple
evaluations. When instantiated with an existing ABE scheme with outsourcing [Green et al., 2011],
the verification algorithm for the scheme is very efficient: its complexity is linear in the output size
but independent of the input length and the complexity of the computation. Multi-function VC
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provides significant efficiency improvements whenever multiple functions are evaluated on the same
input, since a traditional VC scheme would need to invoke ProbGen for every function.
Attribute-Based Encryption from Verifiable Computation. We also consider the opposite
direction of the ABE-VC relation: can we construct an ABE scheme from a VC scheme? We are
able to show how to construct an ABE scheme from a very special class of VC schemes with a
particular structure in Appendix C.2. Unfortunately, this does not seem to result in any new ABE
constructions.
5.2 Definitions
5.2.1 Public Verifiable Computation
We propose two new properties of verifiable computation schemes, namely
• Public Delegation, which allows arbitrary parties to submit inputs for delegation, and
• Public Verifiability, which allows arbitrary parties (and not just the delegator) to verify the
correctness of the results returned by the worker.
Together, a verifiable computation protocol that satisfies both properties is called a public
verifiable computation protocol. The following definition captures these two properties.
Definition 6 (Public Verifiable Computation). A public verifiable computation scheme (with pre-
processing) VC is a four-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify)
which work as follows:
• (PKF , EKF ) ← KeyGen(F, 1λ): The randomized key generation algorithm takes as input a
security parameter λ and the function F , and outputs a public key PKF and an evaluation
key EKF .
• (σx, V Kx) ← ProbGen(PKF , x): The randomized problem generation algorithm uses the
public key PKF to encode an input x into public values σx and V Kx. The value σx is given
to the worker to compute with, whereas V Kx is made public, and later used for verification.
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• σout ← Compute(EKF , σx): The deterministic worker algorithm uses the evaluation key EKF
together with the value σx to compute a value σout.
• y ← Verify(V Kx, σout): The deterministic verification algorithm uses the verification key V Kx
and the worker’s output σout to compute a string y ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥}. Here, the special symbol
⊥ signifies that the verification algorithm rejects the worker’s answer σout.
A number of remarks on the definition are in order.
First, in some instantiations, the size of the public key (but not the evaluation key) will be
independent of the function F , whereas in others, both the public key and the evaluation key will
be as long as the description length of F . For full generality, we refrain from making the length of
the public key a part of the syntactic requirement of a verifiable computation protocol, and instead
rely on the definition of efficiency to enforce this (see Definition 9 below).
Secondly, our definition can be viewed as a “public-key version” of the earlier VC definition [Gen-
naro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010]. In the earlier definition, KeyGen produces a secret key that
was used as an input to ProbGen and, in turn, ProbGen produces a secret verification value needed
for Verify (neither of these can be shared with the worker without losing security). Indeed, the
“secret-key” nature of these definitions means that the schemes could be attacked given just oracle
access to the verification function (and indeed, there are concrete attacks of this nature against the
schemes in [Chung et al., 2010; Gennaro et al., 2010; Applebaum et al., 2010]). Our definition, in
contrast, is stronger in that it allows any party holding the public key PKF to delegate and verify
computation of the function F on any input x, even if the party who originally ran ProbGen is no
longer online. This, in turn, automatically protects against attacks that use the verification oracle.
Definition 7 (Correctness). A verifiable computation protocol VC is correct for a class of functions
F if for any F ∈ F , any pair of keys (PKF , EKF ) ← KeyGen(F, 1λ), any x ∈ Domain(F ), any
(σx, V Kx) ← ProbGen(PKF , x), and any σout ← Compute(EKF , σx), the verification algorithm
Verify on input V Kx and σout outputs y = F (x).
Providing public delegation and verification introduces a new threat model in which the worker
knows both the public key PKF (which allows him to delegate computations) and the verification
key V Kx for the challenge input x (which allows him to check whether his answers will pass the
verification).
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Definition 8 (Security). Let VC be a public verifiable computation scheme for a class of functions
F , and let A = (A1, A2) be any pair of probabilistic polynomial time machines. Consider the
experiment ExpPubV erifA [VC, F, λ] for any F ∈ F below:
Experiment ExpPubV erifA [VC, F, λ]
(PKF , EKF )← KeyGen(F, 1λ);
(x∗, state)← A1(PKF , EKF );
(σx∗ , V Kx∗)← ProbGen(PKF , x∗);
σ∗out ← A2(state, σx∗ , V Kx∗);
y∗ ← Verify(V Kx∗ , σ∗out)
If y∗ 6=⊥ and y∗ 6= F (x∗), output ‘1’, else output ‘0’;
A public verifiable computation scheme VC is secure for a class of functions F , if for every function
F ∈ F and every p.p.t. adversary A = (A1, A2):
Pr[ExpPubV erifA [VC, F, λ] = 1] ≤ NEGLλ. (5.1)
where negl denotes a negligible function of its input.
Later, we will also briefly consider a weaker notion of “selective security” which requires the
adversary to declare the challenge input x∗ before it sees PKF .
For verifiable outsourcing of a function to make sense, the client must use “less resources” than
what is required to compute the function. “Resources” here could mean the running time, the
randomness complexity, space, or the depth of the computation. We retain the earlier efficiency
requirements [Gennaro et al., 2010] – namely, we require the complexity of ProbGen and Verify
combined to be less than that of F . However, for KeyGen, we ask only that the complexity be
poly(|F |). Thus, we employ an amortized complexity model, in which the client invests a larger
amount of computational work in an “oﬄine” phase in order to obtain efficiency during the “online”
phase. We provide two strong definitions of efficiency – one that talks about the running time and
a second that talks about computation depth.
Definition 9 (Efficiency). A verifiable computation protocol VC is efficient for a class of functions
F that act on n = n(λ) bits if there is a polynomial p s.t.: 2
2To be completely precise, one has to talk about a family F = {Fn}n∈N parameterized by the input length n. We
simply speak of F to implicitly mean Fn whenever there is no cause for confusion.
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• the running time of ProbGen and Verify together is at most p(n, λ), the rest of the algorithms
are probabilistic polynomial-time, and
• there exists a function F ∈ F whose running time is ω(p(n, λ)). 3
In a similar vein, VC is depth-efficient if the computation depth of ProbGen and Verify combined
(written as Boolean circuits) is at most p(n, λ), whereas there is a function F ∈ F whose compu-
tation depth is ω(p(n, λ)).
We now define the notion of unbounded circuit families which will be helpful in quantifying the
efficiency of our verifiable computation protocols.
Definition 10. We define a family of circuits {Cn}n∈N to be unbounded if for every polynomial
p and all but finitely many n, there is a circuit C ∈ Cn of size at least p(n). We call the family
depth-unbounded if for every polynomial p and all but finitely many n, there is a circuit C ∈ Cn of
depth at least p(n).
5.2.2 Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Introduced by Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters [Goyal et al., 2006], Key-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (KP-ABE) is a special type of encryption scheme where a Boolean function F is as-
sociated with each user’s key, and a set of attributes (denoted as a string x ∈ {0, 1}n) with each
ciphertext. A key SKF for a function F will decrypt a ciphertext corresponding to attributes
x if and only if F (x) = 1. KP-ABE can be thought of as a special-case of predicate encryp-
tion [Katz et al., 2008] or functional encryption [Boneh et al., 2011], although we note that a
KP-ABE ciphertext need not hide the associated policy or attributes. We will refer to KP-ABE
simply as ABE from now on. We state the formal definition below, adapted from [Goyal et al., 2006;
Lewko et al., 2010].
Definition 11 (Attribute-Based Encryption). An attribute-based encryption scheme ABE for a
class of functions F = {Fn}n∈N (where functions in Fn take n bits as input) is a tuple of algorithms
(Setup,Enc,KeyGen,Dec) that work as follows:
3This condition is to rule out trivial protocols, e.g., for a class of functions that can be computed in time less than
p(λ).
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• (PK,MSK) ← Setup(1λ, 1n) : Given a security parameter λ and an index n for the family
Fn, output a public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
• C ← Enc(PK,M, x): Given a public key PK, a message M in the message space MsgSp, and
attributes x ∈ {0, 1}n, output a ciphertext C.
• SKF ← KeyGen(MSK,F ): Given a function F and the master secret key MSK, output a
decryption key SKF associated with F .
• µ ← Dec(SKF,C): Given a ciphertext C ∈ Enc(PK,M, x) and a secret key SKF for function
F , output a message µ ∈ MsgSp or µ =⊥.
Definition 12 (ABE Correctness). Correctness of the ABE scheme requires that for all (PK,MSK)←
Setup(1λ, 1n), all M ∈ MsgSp, x ∈ {0, 1}n, all ciphertexts C ← Enc(PK,M, x) and all secret keys
SKF ← KeyGen(MSK,F ), the decryption algorithm Dec(SKF,C) outputs M if F (x) = 1 and ⊥ if
F (x) = 0. (This definition could be relaxed to hold with high probability over the keys (PK,MSK),
which suffices for our purposes).
We define a natural, yet relaxed, notion of security for ABE schemes which we refer to as
“one-key security”. Roughly speaking, we require that adversaries who obtain a single secret key
SKF for any function F of their choice and a ciphertext C ← Enc(PK,M, x) associated with any
attributes x such that F (x) = 0 should not be able to violate the semantic security of C. We note
that much work in the ABE literature has been devoted to achieving a strong form of security
against collusion, where the adversary obtains not just a single secret key, but polynomially many
of them for functions of its choice. We do not require such a strong notion for our purposes.
Definition 13 (One-Key Security for ABE). Let ABE be a key-policy attribute-based encryption
scheme for a class of functions F = {Fn}n∈N, and let A = (A0, A1, A2) be a three-tuple of proba-
bilistic polynomial-time machines. We define security via the following experiment.
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Experiment ExpABEA [ABE , n, λ]
(PK,MSK)← Setup(1λ, 1n);
(F, state1)← A0(PK);
SKF ← KeyGen(MSK,F );
(M0,M1, x
∗, state2)← A1(state1, SKF );
b← {0, 1}; C ← Enc(PK,Mb, x∗);
bˆ← A2(state2, C);
If b = bˆ, output ‘1’, else ‘0’;
The experiment is valid if M0,M1 ∈ MsgSp and |M0| = |M1|. We define the advantage of the
adversary in all valid experiments as
AdvA(ABE , n, λ) = |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2|.
We say that ABE is a one-key secure ABE scheme if AdvA(ABE , n, λ) ≤ NEGL(λ).
5.2.3 Multi-Function Verifiable Computation
The original definition of verifiable computation [Gennaro et al., 2010] assumed that multiple inputs
would be prepared for a single function; here, we expand this definition to efficiently allow workers
to verifiably apply multiple functions to a single input. In other words, previously, to evaluate
F (x) and G(x), the client needed to run KeyGen for F , KeyGen for G, and then run ProbGen on
x twice, once for F and once for G (since the public key PK used for the input preprocessing in
ProbGen depends on the function that is evaluated). Our new definition only requires the client to
run ProbGen once, and yet still allows the client to verify that a particular output was the output
of a particular function on a particular input.
We present the multi-function property in the secret key setting of the original definition of
verifiable computation [Gennaro et al., 2010], but note that it is orthogonal to the public delegation
and verification defined in Section 5.2.1, and hence a scheme may have both properties, none, or
one but not the other.
Since the original definition embeds the function to be computed in the scheme’s parameters,
we separate the generation of the parameters for the scheme, which will be used in ProbGen, into
a Setup stage, and the generation of tokens for the evaluation of different functions into a KeyGen
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routine, which could be executed multiple times using the same parameters for the scheme. This
allows the evaluation of multiple functions on the same instance produced by ProbGen.
Definition 14 (Multi-Function Verifiable Computation). A VC scheme VC = (Setup, KeyGen,ProbGen,
Compute, Verify) is a multi-function verifiable computation scheme if it has the following properties:
• Setup(λ) → (PKparam, SKparam): Produces the public and private parameters that do not
depend on the functions to be evaluated.
• KeyGenPKparam,SKparam(F ) → (PKF , SKF ): Produces a keypair for evaluating and verifying
a specific function F .
• ProbGenPKparam,SKparam(x) → (σx, τx): The algorithm requires the secret SKparam, which is
independent of the function that will be computed. It generates both the encoding σx for the
input, and the secret verification key τx.
• ComputePKparam,PKF (σx)→ σy: The computation algorithm uses both parts of the public key
to produce an encoding of the output y = F (x).
• VerifySKF ,τx(σy) → y ∪ ⊥: Using the private, function-specific key SKF and the private,
input-specific value τx, the verification algorithm converts the worker’s output into y = F (x),
or outputs ⊥ to indicate that σy does not represent a valid output of F on x.
Definition 15 (Multi-Function Verifiable Computation Security). Let VC = (Setup,KeyGen, ProbGen,
Compute, Verify) be a multi-function verifiable computation scheme. We define security via the fol-
lowing experiment.
Experiment ExpMultV erifA [VC, λ]
(PKparam, SKparam)
R← Setup(λ);
(x, F, σˆy)← AOKeyGen(·),OProbGen(·)(PKparam);
yˆ ← VerifySKF ,τx(σˆy)
If yˆ 6=⊥ and yˆ 6= F (x), output ‘1’, else ‘0’;
We define the adversary’s advantage and the scheme’s security in the same fashion as Definition 8.
In the experiment, the adversary has oracle access to OKeyGen(F ), which calls
KeyGenPKparam,SKparam(F ), returns PKF , and stores SKF . Similarly, the adversary can access
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the OProbGen(·) oracle, which calls ProbGenSKparam(x), returns σx, and stores τx. Eventually, the
adversary returns an encoding σˆy which purports to be an output of F applied to x. The challenger
runs Verify with the corresponding values of τx and SKF , and the adversary wins if this check passes.
5.2.3.1 KP-ABE With Outsourcing
Green, Hohenberger, and Waters define a notion of ABE with outsourcing in which the party per-
forming the decryption can oﬄoad most of the decryption work to an untrusted third party [Green
et al., 2011]; the third party learns nothing about the underlying plaintext, and the party holding
the secret key can complete the decryption very efficiently, in time independent of the size of the
formula associated with the key. Although they define and construct ABE with outsourcing for
both CP-ABE and KP-ABE, below, we focus on the definitions for KP-ABE, which will be relevant
for our work. We also give an IND-CPA security definition, since we do not require the stronger
RCCA they defined. Note that Green et al.’s construction [Green et al., 2011] is selectively secure,
but they provide a sketch, based on Lewko et al.’s work [Lewko et al., 2010], to show that their
scheme can also be made adaptively secure.
Note that in this context the outsourcing done is for the very specific function of ABE partial
decryption. The definitions also do not include a notion of integrity or verification, as in verifiable
computation, but instead are concerned with the secrecy of the underlying plaintext.
Definition 16 (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption With Outsourcing [Green et al., 2011]). A
KP-ABE scheme with outsourcing, ABE, is a tuple of algorithms (Setup,Enc, KeyGen, Transform,Dec)
defined as follows:
• Setup(λ,U) → (PK,MSK) : Given a security parameter λ and the set of all possible at-
tributes U , output a public key PK and a master secret key MSK.
• EncPK(M, γ) → C: Given a public key PK, a message M , and a set of attributes γ, output
ciphertext C.
• KeyGenMSK(F )→ (SKF , TKF ): Given a function F and the master secret key MSK, output
a decryption key SKF and a transformation key TKF associated with that function.
• TransformTKF (C)→ C ′ ∪ ⊥: Given a ciphertext C = EncPK(M, γ) and a transformation key
TKF for function F , output a partially decrypted ciphertext C
′ if F (γ) = 1, or ⊥, otherwise.
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• DecSKF(C′)→ M ∪ ⊥: Given a partially decrypted ciphertext C ′ = TransformTKF (EncPK(M, γ))
and a secret key SKF for function F , output M if F (γ) = 1, or ⊥, otherwise.
Definition 17 (KP-ABE With Outsourcing IND-CPA Security). Let ABE = (Setup,Enc, KeyGen,
Transform,Dec) be a key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with outsourcing. We define
security via the following experiment.





bˆ← AOKeyGen(·),OCorrupt(·)(PK,EncPK(Mb, γ)) ;
If b = bˆ, output ‘1’, else ‘0’;
In the experiment, the adversary has access to two oracles. OKeyGen(F ) invokes
(SKF , TKF ) ← KeyGenMSK(F ), stores SKF and returns TKF . OCorrupt(F ) returns SKF if
the adversary previously invoked OKeyGen(F ) and returns ⊥ otherwise. Eventually, A chooses two
messages M0,M1 of equal length and a set of challenge attributes γ, and he receives the encryption of
one of two messages. Ultimately, he must decide which of the two plaintext messages was encrypted.
We consider the experiment valid if ∀SKF ∈ R : F (γ) 6= 1, where R = {SKF } is the set of
valid responses to the OCorrupt(F ) oracle. In other words, the adversary cannot hold a key that
trivially decrypts messages encrypted under the challenge attribute γ.
We define the advantage of the adversary in all valid experiments as
AdvA(ABE , U, λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We say that ABE is a secure key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with outsourcing if
AdvA(ABE , U, λ) < negl(λ).
5.3 Verifiable Computation from Attribute-Based Encryption
In Section 5.3.1, we present our main construction and proof, while Section 5.3.2 contains the
various instantiations of our main construction and the concrete verifiable computation protocols
that we obtain as a result.
CHAPTER 5. HOW TO DELEGATE AND VERIFY IN PUBLIC: VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION FROM ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION 102
5.3.1 Main Construction
Theorem 9. Let F be a class of Boolean functions (implemented by a family of circuits C), and
let F = {F | F ∈ F} where F¯ denotes the complement of the function F . Let ABE be an attribute-
based encryption scheme that is one-key secure (see Definition 13) for F ∪ F , and let g be any
one-way function.
Then, there is a verifiable computation protocol VC (secure under Definition 8) for F . If the
circuit family C is unbounded (resp. depth-unbounded), then the protocol VC is efficient (resp.
depth-efficient) in the sense of Definition 9.
We first present our verifiable computation protocol.
Let ABE = (ABE.Setup,ABE.KeyGen,ABE.Enc,ABE.Dec) be an attribute-based encryption
scheme for the class of functions F∪F . Then, the verifiable computation protocol VC = (VCKeyGen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify)
for F works as follows.4 We assume, without loss of generality, that the message space M of the
ABE scheme has size 2λ.
Key Generation VCKeyGen: The client, on input a function F ∈ F with input length n, runs
the ABE setup algorithm twice, to generate two independent key-pairs
(msk0,mpk0)← ABE.Setup(1n, 1λ) and (msk1,mpk1)← ABE.Setup(1n, 1λ)
Generate two secret keys skF ← ABE.KeyGen(msk0, F ) (corresponding to F ) and skF ←
ABE.KeyGen(msk1, F ) (corresponding to F ).
Output the pair (skF , skF ) as the evaluation key and (mpk0,mpk1) as the public key.
Delegation ProbGen: The client, on input x and the public key PKF , samples two uniformly
random messages m0,m1
R←M, computes the ciphertexts
CT0 ← ABE.Enc(mpk0,m0) and CT1 ← ABE.Enc(mpk1,m1)
Output the message σx = (CT0,CT1) (to be sent to the server), and the verification key
V Kx = (g(m0), g(m1)), where g is the one-way function.
4We denote the VC key generation algorithm as VCKeyGen in order to avoid confusion with the ABE key generation
algorithm.
CHAPTER 5. HOW TO DELEGATE AND VERIFY IN PUBLIC: VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION FROM ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION 103
Computation Compute: The server, on receiving the ciphertexts (CT0,CT1) and the evaluation
key EKF = (skF , skF ) computes
µ0 ← ABE.Dec(skF ,CT0) and µ1 ← ABE.Dec(skF ,CT1)
and send σout = (µ0, µ1) to the client.




0 if g(µ0) = v0 and g(µ1) 6= v1
1 if g(µ1) = v1 and g(µ0) 6= v0
⊥ otherwise
Remark 1. Whereas our main construction requires only an ABE scheme, using an attribute-
hiding ABE scheme (a notion often associated with predicate encryption schemes [Katz et al., 2008;
Boneh et al., 2011]) would also give us input privacy, since we encode the function’s input in the
attribute corresponding to a ciphertext.
Remark 2. To obtain a VC protocol for functions with multi-bit output, we repeat this protocol
(including the key generation algorithm) independently for every output bit. To achieve better
efficiency, if the ABE scheme supports attribute hiding for a class of functions that includes message
authentication codes (MAC), then we can define F ′(x) = MACK(F (x)) and verify F ′ instead,
similar to the constructions suggested by Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [Applebaum et al.,
2010], and Barbosa and Farshim [Barbosa and Farshim, 2011].
Remark 3. The construction above requires the verifier to trust the party that ran ProbGen.
This can be remedied by having ProbGen produce a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of correct-
ness [Blum et al., 1988] of the verification key V Kx. While theoretically efficient, the practicality
of this approach depends on the particular ABE scheme and the NP language in question.
Proof. Correctness The correctness of the VC scheme above follows from:
• If F (x) = 0, then F (x) = 1 and thus, the algorithm Compute outputs µ0 = m0 and µ1 =⊥.
The algorithm Verify outputs y = 0 since g(µ0) = g(m0) but g(µ1) =⊥6= g(m1), as expected.
5As a convention, we assume that g(⊥) =⊥.
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• Similarly, if F (x) = 1, then F (x) = 0 and thus, the algorithm Compute outputs µ1 = m1 and
µ0 =⊥. The algorithm Verify outputs y = 1 since g(µ1) = g(m1) but g(µ0) =⊥6= g(m0), as
expected.
We now consider the relation between the efficiency of the algorithms for the underlying ABE
scheme and the efficiency for the resulting VC scheme. Since the algorithms Compute and Verify
can potentially be executed by different parties, we consider their efficiency separately. It is easily
seen that:
• The running time of the VC key generation algorithm VCKeyGen is twice that of ABE.Setup
plus ABE.KeyGen.
• The running time of Compute is twice that of ABE.Dec.
• The running time of ProbGen is twice that of ABE.Enc, and the running time of Verify is the
same as that of computing the one-way function.
In short, the combined running times of ProbGen and Verify is polynomial in their input lengths,
namely p(n, λ), where p is a fixed polynomial, n is the length of the input to the functions, and
λ is the security parameter. Assuming that F is an unbounded class of functions (according to
Definition 10), it contains functions that take longer than p(n, λ) to compute, and thus our VC
scheme is efficient in the sense of Definition 9. (Similar considerations apply to depth-efficiency).
We now turn to showing the security of the VC scheme under Definition 8. We show that an
attacker against the VC protocol must either break the security of the one-way function g or the
one-key security of the ABE scheme.
Proof. Security Let A = (A1, A2) be an adversary against the VC scheme for a function F ∈ F .
We construct an adversary B = (B0, B1, B2) that breaks the one-key security of the ABE, working
as follows. (For notational simplicity, given a function F , we let F0 = F , and F1 = F .)
1. B0 first tosses a coin to obtain a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. (Informally, the bit b corresponds to B’s
guess of whether the adversary A will cheat by producing an input x such that F (x) = 1 or
F (x) = 0, respectively.)
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B0 outputs the function Fb, as well as the bit b as part of the state.
2. B1 obtains the master public key mpk of the ABE scheme and the secret key skFb for the
function Fb. Set mpkb = mpk.
Run the ABE setup and key generation algorithms to generate a master public key mpk′ and
a secret key skF1−b for the function F1−b under mpk
′. Set mpk1−b = mpk
′.
Let (mpk0,mpk1) be the public key for the VC scheme and (skF0 , skF1) be the evaluation key.
Run the algorithm A1 on input the public and evaluation keys and obtain a challenge input
x∗ as a result.
If F (x∗) = b, output a uniformly random bit and stop. Otherwise, B1 now chooses two
uniformly random messages M (b), ρ←M and outputs (M (b), ρ, x∗) together with its internal
state.
3. B2 obtains a ciphertext C
(b) (which is an encryption of either M (b) or ρ under the public key
mpkb and attribute x
∗).
B2 constructs an encryption C
(1−b) of a uniformly random message M (1−b) under the public
key mpk1−b and attribute x∗.
Run A2 on input σx∗ = (C
(0), C(1)) and V Kx∗ = (g(M
(0)), g(M (1))), where g is the one-way
function. As a result, A2 returns σout.
If Verify(V Kx∗ , σout) = b, output 0 and stop.
We now claim the algorithms (B0, B1, B2) described above distinguish between the encryption
of M (b) and the encryption of ρ in the ABE security game with non-negligible advantage.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: C(b) is an encryption of M (b). In this case, B presents to A a perfect view of the execution
of the VC protocol, meaning that A will cheat with probability 1/p(λ) for some polynomial
p.
Cheating means one of two things. Either F (x∗) = b and the adversary produced an inverse
of g(M (1−b)) (causing the Verify algorithm to output 1−b), or F (x∗) = 1−b and the adversary
produced an inverse of g(M (b)) (causing the Verify algorithm to output b).
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In the former case, B outputs a uniformly random bit, and in the latter case, it outputs 0,
the correct guess as to which message was encrypted. Thus, the overall probability that B
outputs 0 is 1/2 + 1/p(λ).
Case 2: C(b) is an encryption of the message ρ. In this case, as above, B outputs a random bit if
F (x∗) = b. Otherwise, the adversary A has to produce σout that makes the verifier output b,
namely a string σout such that g(σout) = g(M
(b)), while given only g(M (b)) (and some other
information that is independent of M (b)).
This amounts to inverting the one-way function which A can only do with a negligible prob-
ability. (Formally, if the adversary wins in this game with non-negligible probability, then we
can construct an inverter for the one-way function g).
The bottom line is that the adversary outputs 0 in this case with probability 1/2+NEGL(λ).
This shows that B breaks the one-key security of the ABE scheme with a non-negligible advan-
tage 1/p(λ)−NEGL(λ).
Remark 4. If we employ an ABE scheme that is selectively secure, then the construction and proof
above still go through if we adopt a notion of “selectively-secure” verifiable computation in which
the VC adversary commits in advance to the input on which he plans to cheat.
5.3.2 Instantiations
We describe two different instantiations of our main construction.
Efficient Selectively Secure VC Scheme for Formulas. The first instantiation uses the
(selectively secure) ABE scheme of Ostrovsky, Sahai and Waters [Ostrovsky et al., 2007] for the class
of (not necessarily monotone) polynomial-size Boolean formulas (which itself is an adaptation of the
scheme of Goyal et al. [Goyal et al., 2006] which only supports monotone formulas6). This results
in a selectively secure public VC scheme for the same class of functions, by invoking Theorem 9.
6Goyal et al.’s scheme [Goyal et al., 2006] can also be made to work if we use DeMorgan’s law to transform f
and f¯ into equivalent monotone formulas in which some variables may be negated. We then double the number of
variables, so that for each variable v, we have one variable representing v and one representing its negation v¯. Given
an input x, we choose an attribute such that all of these variables are set correctly.
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Recall that selective security in the context of verifiable computation means that the adversary
has to declare the input on which she cheats at the outset, before she sees the public key and the
evaluation key.
The efficiency of the resulting VC scheme for Boolean formulas is as follows: for a boolean
formula C, KeyGen runs in time |C| · polyλ; ProbGen runs in time |x| · polyλ, where |x| is the length
of the input to the formula; Compute runs in time |C| · polyλ; and Verify runs in time O(λ). In
other words, the total work for delegation and verification is |x| · polyλ which is, in general, more
efficient than the work required to evaluate the circuit C. Thus, the scheme is efficient in the sense
of Definition 9. The drawback of this instantiation is that it is only selectively secure.
Recently, there have been constructions of fully secure ABE for formulas starting from the work
of Lewko et al. [Lewko et al., 2010] which, one might hope, leads to a fully secure VC scheme.
Unfortunately, all known constructions of fully secure ABE work for bounded classes of functions.
For example, in the construction of Lewko et al., once a bound B is fixed, one can design the
parameters of the scheme so that it works for any formula of size at most B. Furthermore, implicit
in the work of Sahai and Seyalioglu [Sahai and Seyalioglu, 2010] is a construction of an (attribute-
hiding, one-key secure) ABE scheme for bounded polynomial-size circuits (as opposed to formulas).
These constructions, unfortunately, do not give us efficient VC protocols. The reason is simply
this: the encryption algorithm in these schemes run in time polynomial (certainly, at least linear)
in B. Translated to a VC protocol using Theorem 9, this results in the worker running for time
Ω(B) which is useless, since given that much time, he could have computed any circuit of size at
most B by himself!
Essentially, the VC protocol that emerges from Theorem 9 is non-trivial if the encryption
algorithm of the ABE scheme for the function family F is (in general) more efficient than computing
functions in F .
Depth-Efficient Adaptively Secure VC Scheme for Arbitrary Functions. Although the
(attribute-hiding, one-key secure) ABE construction of Sahai and Seyalioglu [Sahai and Seyalioglu,
2010] mentioned above does not give us an efficient VC scheme, it does result in a depth-efficient
VC scheme for the class of polynomial-size circuits. Roughly speaking, the construction is based
on Yao’s Garbled Circuits, and involves an ABE encryption algorithm that constructs a garbled
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circuit for the function F in question. Even though this computation takes at least as much time
as computing the circuit for F , the key observation is that it can be done in parallel. In short,
going through the VC construction in Theorem 9, one can see that both the Compute and Verify
algorithms can be implemented in constant depth (for appropriate encryption schemes and one-way
functions, e.g., the ones that result from the AIK transformation [Applebaum et al., 2004]), which
is much faster in parallel than computing F , in general.
Interestingly, the VC protocol thus derived is very similar to the protocol of Applebaum, Ishai
and Kushilevitz [Applebaum et al., 2010]. We refer the reader to [Sahai and Seyalioglu, 2010;
Applebaum et al., 2010] for details.
We believe that this scheme also illuminates an interesting point: unlike other ABE schemes [Goyal
et al., 2006; Ostrovsky et al., 2007; Lewko et al., 2010], this ABE scheme is only one-key secure,
which suffices for verifiable computation. This relaxation may point the way towards an ABE-based
VC construction that achieves generality, efficiency, and adaptive security.
n+Mariana: Add something about new ABE from Lewko and Waters
5.4 Multi-Function Verifiable Computation from KP-ABE With
Outsourcing
The original definition of KP-ABE does not readily lend itself to multi-function verifiable compu-
tation. Specifically, it does not allow the client an easy way to verify which function was used to
compute an answer. For example, suppose the client gives out keys SKF and SKG for functions F
and G. Following the ABE to VC construction from Section 5.3 to outsource computation on input
x, the client gives out (among other things) a ciphertext EncPK(M0, x). Now, suppose F (x) = 1,
but G(x) 6= 1. The worker can use SKF to obtain M0, but claim that this output corresponds to
a computation of G. In essence, the construction from Section 5.3 gives us a way to verify that an
output corresponds to a particular input, but if we give out more than one secret key, it cannot
distinguish between functions. One remedy would be to run two parallel instances of the ABE to
VC construction, but then we need to run ProbGen for each function we wish to compute on a given
input.
A more elegant solution is to use an ABE scheme that requires an extra step to decrypt a
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ciphertext. Thus, we show how to build multi-function verifiable computation from KP-ABE with
outsourcing [Green et al., 2011] (see Section 5.2.3.1). We use the transformation key to allow the
worker to compute, and then use the secret key as a verification key for the function. This allows
us to verify both the input and specific function used to compute a particular result returned by
the worker.
Interestingly, a similar scheme can be constructed from Chase’s multi-authority ABE [Chase,
2007], by using function identifiers (e.g., a hash of the function description, or a unique ID as-
signed by the client) in place of user identifiers, and using the “user key” generated by the Central
Authority as a verification token for a particular function. However, since this approach does not
employ the multi-authority ABE scheme in a black-box fashion, in this section, we focus on the
construction from KP-ABE with outsourcing.
We specify the construction in detail below. For clarity, we only consider functions with single-
bit outputs, but the construction can be generalized just as we did in Section 5.3.
Construction 1. Let ABE = (Setup,Enc,KeyGen,TransformDec) be a KP-ABE scheme with out-
sourcing with attribute universe U . We construct a multi-function verifiable computation scheme
as follows:
• Setup(λ)→ (PKparam, SKparam) : Run ABE .Setup(λ,U) twice to obtain (PK0,MSK0) and
(PK1,MSK1).
Set PKparam = (PK
0, PK1) and SKparam = (MSK
0,MSK1).
• KeyGenPKparam,SKparam(F )→ (PKF , SKF ) : Compute (SK0F¯ , TK0F¯ )← ABE .KeyGenMSK0(F¯ )
and (SK1F , TK
1
F )← ABE .KeyGenMSK1(F ), where F¯ is the complement of F .
Output PKF = (TK
0
F¯
, TK1F ) and SKF = (SK
0
F¯
, SK1F ). In other words, the public key will
be the transformation keys, and the secret verification key will be the “true” secret keys.
• ProbGenPKparam,SKparam(x) → (σx, τx): Generate a pair of random messages (M0,M1) R←
{0, 1}λ×{0, 1}λ. Compute ciphertexts C0 ←ABE .EncPK0(M0, x) and C1 ← ABE .EncPK1(M1, x).
Output σx = (C0, C1) and τx = (M0,M1).
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• VerifySKF ,τx(σy) → y: Parse SKF as (SK0F¯ , SK1F ), τx as (M0,M1), and σy as (C ′0, C ′1). If
ABE .DecSK0
F¯
(C′0) = M0, then output y = 0. If ABE .DecSK1F(C
′
0) = M1, then output y = 1.
Otherwise, output ⊥.
The above construction will provide the efficiency property required for a VC scheme (verifica-
tion that is more efficient than the delegated computation) as long as the Transform algorithm is
computationally more expensive than the Enc and Dec algorithms of the ABE scheme. However,
this requirement is inherent in the definition of ABE with outsourcing.
Remark 5. Construction 1 is publicly delegatable, since ProbGen only makes use of PKparam; i.e.,
it only employs the public ABE keys to perform ProbGen, so anyone may do so. However, the
verification function cannot be made public while still preserving the ability to verify the specific
function used. Specifically, giving out SKF in Green et al.’s ABE scheme [Green et al., 2011]
would directly allow the worker to lie about the function used, i.e., claim that an output computed
with F was the result of applying G. Even so, the adversary would still be unable to lie about the
output’s value. Thus, if we only care about the integrity of the output value and the fact that it
was produced by some function submitted to KeyGen, then this construction can be made publicly
verifiable as well.
Proof Intuition. The proof of security looks very similar to Proof 5.3.1. The intuition for input
security is the same as before, i.e., the revelation of one of the two random messages associated
with a ProbGen invocation demonstrates that the computation was performed on that particular
input. Unlike with a regular ABE scheme, we can also verify the function used, since decrypting
with a key that does not match the transformation key used will not produce the expected message.
This is provided by the security of the ABE with outsourced decryption, which guarantees semantic
security of the encrypted messages even when the adversary sees the transformation keys used for
the outsourced portion of the decryption.
Theorem 10. Let ABE = (Setup,Enc,KeyGen,TransformDec) be a secure (according to Defini-
tion 17) KP-ABE scheme with outsourcing with attribute universe U . Let VCABE = (Setup,KeyGen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify)
be a multi-function verifiable computation scheme obtained from ABE using Construction 1. Then
VCABE is secure according to Definition 15.
CHAPTER 5. HOW TO DELEGATE AND VERIFY IN PUBLIC: VERIFIABLE
COMPUTATION FROM ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION 111
Proof. Theorem 10
Let us assume that there exists an adversary AV C that succeeds to cheat in the security game
(Definition 15) for the scheme VCABE with non-negligible probability µ. We show how to construct
an adversary AABE that wins the security game from Definition 1 with non-negligible probability.
1. AABE chooses a random bit r R← {0, 1}.
2. AABE receives a public key in the ABE security game. Call it PKrabe.
3. AABE generates a second pair of keys (PK1−rabe ,MSK1−rabe )← ABE .Setup(λ,U).
4. On a call to Setup in the VC security game AABE provides to AV C the keys (PK0abe, PK1abe).
5. On a call to KeyGen(f1) in the VC security game AABE computes the complement func-
tion f0 ← f¯1. AABE submits a query in the ABE security game for f r and receives back
the transformation key TKfr . He also generates on his own the keys (TKf1−r , SKf1−r) ←
ABE .KeyGenMSK1−rabe (f
1−r), and returns (TKf0 , TKf1) to AV C .
6. The adversary AABE guesses one of the inputs x that he receives from AV C to be the challenge
input and sets γ = x. He chooses three messages m0,m1,m2, sends m0,m1 and γ to the
challenger in the ABE security game, and receives back the challenge ciphertext cr. AABE
computes c1−r ← ABE .EncPK1−rabe (m2, γ) and sets σx ← (c
0, c1). For any other input y, AABE
chooses two messages m0,m1 and returns σx ← (ABE .EncPK0abe(m0, γ),ABE .EncPK1abe(m1, γ)).
7. AV C returns to AABE a cheating output (x, f1, σˆy = (C ′0, C ′1)) for the evaluation of a function
f1 on the input x.
8. If f1(x) = r, then AABE returns a random bit. Otherwise, he invokes his oracle SKfr ←
Corrupt(f r), uses SKfr to decrypt C
′
1−r and obtain M . If M = m0, he returns 0; if M = m1,
he returns 1, and otherwise, he returns a random bit.
To see that AABE succeeds with non-negligible probability, note that if f1(x) = 0, then to
cheat, AV C must convince the verify function that y = 1; i.e., he must return σˆy = (C ′0, C ′1) such
that ABE.DecSK1(C
′
1) = M1. If r = 0, the cheat doesn’t involve the challenge ciphertext c
0, so
AABE makes a random guess. If r = 1, then AABE calls Corrupt(f1). Since f1(x) = 0, this will
not violate the ABE security game.
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The case for f1(x) = 1 is symmetric.
Therefore, AABE succeeds in the security game with probability µ2Q , where Q is the number of
queries made to ProbGen by AV C ; since Q is polynomial in λ, this is non-negligible.






6.1 Motivation and Contributions
Early feasibility results in MPC showed that any functionality can be securely computed [Yao, 1982;
Yao, 1986; Goldreich et al., 1987; Chaum et al., 1988a]. Since then, there has been a large number
of works improving the security definitions, strengthening the adversarial model, increasing the
number of malicious parties tolerated and studying the round and communication complexity (we
refer the reader to [Goldreich, 2004] and the references therein). Most of these works, however,
implicitly assume that the computation will be executed in a homogeneous computing environment,
where all the participants play similar roles and have the same amount of resources. As such,
almost all MPC protocols have a symmetric workload in the sense that every party is required
to do the same amount of work. In practice, however, distributed computations rarely take place
in such settings and, more often than not, they are carried out by a diverse set of devices that
could include, e.g., high-performance servers, large-scale clusters, personal computers and even
weak mobile devices. And while it is certainly possible to execute standard MPC protocols in
such environments, it is undesirable from a practical point of view since the computation will be
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bounded by the resources of the weakest device.
Towards making MPC more practical, it is then natural to seek protocols with asymmetric
workloads. While such protocols can be designed—in the semi-honest model—based on fully-
homomorphic encryption (FHE), the resulting constructions are still too computationally expensive
to be of practical interest. In this work, we take a different approach and show that if some of the
parties are dishonest but do not collude, then it is possible to design protocols with asymmetric
workloads and avoid the use of FHE altogether. We believe security in the presence of non-colluding
adversaries is a useful guarantee as there are many instances in practice where collusion is unlikely
to occur. This can happen either because it is not feasible, is too costly, or because it is prevented
by other means, e.g., by physical means, by the Law or due to conflicting interests. Non-collusion
can also occur if the parties in the system are compromised by independent adversaries that simply
do not have the capacity or the opportunity to compromise the same system (e.g., independent
malware spreading through a network or hackers that are not aware of each other’s presence).
An important example of a heterogeneous environment—and the main motivation for our
work—is cloud computing, where a computationally powerful service provider offers possibly weaker
clients access to its resources “as a service”. This leads us to consider the problem of MPC in a
setting where, in addition to the parties evaluating the functionality, there is an untrusted server
that (1) does not have any input to the computation; (2) does not receive any output from the
computation; but (3) has a vast (but bounded) amount of computational resources. We refer to
this as server-aided MPC and our aim is to design protocols with workloads that are asymmetric
and that minimize the computation of the parties at the expense of the server.
6.1.1 Our Contributions
We consider MPC in the server-aided setting, where the parties have access to a single server with a
large amount of computational resources that they can use to outsource their computation. In this
setting, we are concerned with designing protocols that minimize the computation of the parties
at the expense of the server. While it is possible to treat the server as one more participant in a
multi-party computation and to use standard MPC constructions to obtain server-aided protocols, a
naive implementation of this approach would result in a symmetric workload. We observe, however,
that asymmetry can be achieved under a weaker adversarial model and, in particular, when certain
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parties do not collude. While our main motivation for considering non-colluding adversaries is to
design server-aided protocols without making use of FHE and with better efficiency than the naive
implementation discussed above, our formalization of non-collusion might be of interest in other
scenarios such as the conventional MPC settings. We make several contributions:
1. We formalize and define security for server-aided MPC. Our security definition is in the
ideal/real-world paradigm and guarantees that, in addition to the standard security properties
of MPC, the server learns no information about the client’s inputs or outputs and cannot affect
the correctness of the computation.
2. We consider a new adversarial model for MPC in which corrupted parties do not necessarily
collude. Non-collusion in heterogeneous computing environments often occurs in practice
and therefore is important to consider. To address this question, we generalize the standard
security definition for MPC to allow for a finer-grained specification of collusion between the
parties. This requires us to introduce formal characterizations of non-colluding adversaries
which may be of independent interest. Also, as we will see, by considering non-colluding
adversaries we are able to obtain highly efficient protocols.
3. We explore the connection between server-aided MPC and secure delegated computation.
Roughly speaking, a server-aided MPC protocol can be viewed as a (interactive) delegated
computation scheme for multiple parties. We show how to transform any secure delegated
computation scheme into a server-aided MPC protocol.
In addition to the theoretical contributions discussed above, we also describe two efficient
general-purpose server-aided MPC protocols based on Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao, 1982], and an
efficient special-purpose protocol for private set intersection:
4. The first protocol we consider is (a slight variant of) the FKN protocol [Feige et al., 1994]. We
show that it is secure against a malicious server and semi-honest parties that do not collude
with the server. It allows all but one of the parties to outsource their computation to the
server; making their computation only linear in the size of their inputs (which is optimal).
In addition, the protocol does not require any public-key operations (except for a one time
coin-tossing protocol).
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5. Our second protocol extends the FKN protocol to be secure even when all but one of the
parties is malicious. Our construction uses cut-and-choose techniques from [Mohassel and
Franklin, 2006; Lindell and Pinkas, 2007], but requires us to address several subtleties that do
not exist in the standard two-party setting. One main problem we need to solve is how to allow
an untrusted server to send the majority output of multiple circuits to the parties without
learning the actual output or modifying the results. We achieve this by constructing a new
oblivious cut-and-choose protocol that allows the verifier in the cut-and-choose mechanism to
outsource its computation to an untrusted server.
6. Our third protocol is a new and efficient server-aided protocol for private set intersection.
Our construction provides security against a malicious server as well as malicious partici-
pants. The bulk of computation by each participant is a number of PRF evaluations that
is linear in the size of its input set. In comparison, the most efficient two-party set in-
tersection protocol [Hazay and Nissim, 2010] with equivalent security guarantees, requires
O(m + n(log logm + p)) exponentiations where m and n are the sizes of the input sets and
p is the bit length of each input element, which is logarithmic in the input domain range.
Protocols that provide security in weaker adversarial models (e.g., the random oracle model,
the CRS model, and limited input domain) and achieve linear computational complexity in
the total size of the input sets still require a linear number of public key operations.
Our solution generalizes to the case of multi-party set intersection, preserving the same com-
putational complexity for each participant. The best existing solution for this case [Dachman-
Soled et al., 2011] has computation cost of O(Nd2 log d) in the case of N parties with input
sets of size d.
The above-mentioned protocols are significantly more efficient than the existing MPC protocols
for the same problems. In order to provide a better sense of the efficiency gain obtained by
these server-aided constructions, we initiate in Section 6.9 an informal discussion on efficiency in
the server-aided model. In particular we outline different ways of quantifying the efficiency of a
server-aided MPC protocol, each of which is suitable for a specific setting or application. We also
provide some intuition for why any noticeable improvement in the efficiency of our general-purpose
constructions is likely to yield considerably more practical secure delegated computation schemes.
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We note that a more formal study of efficiency in the server-aided model is an interesting research
direction.
6.2 Overview of Protocols
In this overview and throughout the rest of the paper, we mostly focus on server-aided two-party
computation (two parties and a server). However, as we discuss in future sections, our constructions
easily extend to the multi-party case as well.
The first two protocols are based on Yao’s garbled circuit construction. In both protocols, the
only interaction between the two parties, denoted by P1 and P2, is to generate a set of shared
random coins to be used in the rest of the protocol. This step is independent of the parties’ inputs
and the function being evaluated and can be performed oﬄine (e.g., for multiple instantiations of
the protocol at once). Moreover, the coin-tossing needs to be performed exactly once to share a
secret key. In all future runs of the protocol, P1 and P2 can use their shared secret key and a
pseudorandom function, to generate the necessary coins. After this step, the two parties interact
directly with the untrusted server until they retrieve their final result.
The FKN protocol. In the (modified) FKN protocol (described in Section 6.5), after generating
the shared random coins, each party sends a single message to the server and receives an encoding
of his own output. The parties then individually use their local coins to recover their outputs.
For P1 and P2, this protocol is significantly more efficient than using a standard secure two-party
computation protocol. First, none of the parties (including the server) have to perform any public-
key operations, except to perform the coin-tossing which as discussed above is only performed
once. This is in contrast to standard MPC where public-key operations (which are considerably
more expensive than their secret-key counterparts) are a necessary. Second, one of the parties (P2
in our case) only needs to do work that is linear in the size of his input and output, and independent
of the size of the circuit being computed.
The server and P1 will do work that is linear in the size of the circuit. If the server-aided protocol
is run multiple times for the same or different functionalities, it is possible to reduce the online
work of P1 by performing the garbling of multiple circuits (for the same or different functions) in
the oﬄine phase. The online work for P1 will then be similar to P2 and only linear to the size of
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his input and output.
We prove the protocol secure against a number of corruption and non-collusion scenarios. Par-
ticularly, the protocol can handle cases where the server, or P2 are malicious while the other players
are either honest, or semi-honest but non-colluding.
Making FKN robust. The security of the modified FKN protocol breaks down when party P1
is malicious. We address this in Section 6.6 by augmenting it with cut-and-choose techniques for
Yao’s two-party protocol (e.g., see [Mohassel and Franklin, 2006; Lindell and Pinkas, 2007]). First,
note that the cut-and-choose procedure no longer takes place between P1 and P2 since this would
require P2 to do work linear in the circuit size (significantly reducing his efficiency gain). Instead,
P2 outsources his cut-and-choose verification to the server. However, a few subtleties arise that are
specific to the server-aided setting and require modifications to the existing techniques. At a high
level, the difficulty is that, unlike the standard setting, the server only learns the garbled outputs
and therefore cannot determine the majority output on his own. One might try to resolve this by
having the server send the garbled outputs to P1 and P2 and have them compute the majority but,
unfortunately, this is also insecure.
We take the following approach. Instead of treating the garbled output values as the garbling of
the real outputs (as prescribed by the translation table), we use them as evaluation points on random
polynomials that encode (as their constant factor) the “ultimate” garbled values corresponding to
the real outputs. This encoding can be interpreted as a Reed-Solomon encoding of the ultimate
garbled values using the intermediate ones returned by the circuit evaluation. Intuitively, as long as
the majority of the garbled evaluation points are correct, the error correction of Reed-Solomon codes
guarantees correct and unambiguous decoding of the majority output by the server. Further care
is needed to ensure that the server performs the decoding obliviously, and that for each output bit
he is only able to decode one Reed-Solomon codeword without learning the corresponding output.
For this purpose, it turns out that we need the polynomials used for the Reed-Solomon encoding
to be permutations over the finite field. To achieve this goal, we sample our polynomials uniformly
at random from the family of Dickson polynomials of an appropriate degree.
Delegation-based protocol. We show how to construct a server-aided two-party computation
protocol based on any secure non-interactive delegated computation scheme. A delegated computa-
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tion scheme allows a client to securely outsource the computation of a circuit C on a private input
x to an untrusted worker. The notion of secure delegated computation is closely related to that
of verifiable computation [Goldwasser et al., 2008; Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010], with
the additional requirement that the client’s input and output remains private. Our construction is
interesting in the sense that, it formalizes the intuitive connection between the problems of server-
aided computation and verifiable computation by interpreting server-aided protocols as a means
for verifiably and privately outsourcing a secure two-party computation protocol to an untrusted
worker. The resulting protocol inherits the efficiency of the underlying delegated computation
scheme.
Set intersection protocol. We present a construction for outsourced computation for the prob-
lem of set intersection where two or more parties want to find the intersection of their input sets.
The main idea of our protocol is that to have the server compute the set intersection of the input
sets but since we want to preserve the privacy of the inputs, he is only given PRF evaluations on
the elements under a key that all parties have agreed on. Then each party will be able to map the
returned intersection PRF values to real elements. In order to protect against a malicious server,
we augment this approach by mapping each input value to several unlinkable PRF evaluations.
Now the server will be asked to compute the set intersection on the new expanded sets and will be
able to cheat without being detected only if he guesses correctly which PRF evaluations correspond
to the same input value. This approach, however, introduces a new security issue in that it allows
the parties to be malicious by creating inconsistent PRF values. We fix this by requiring each
party to prove that he has computed correctly the multiple PRF evaluations for each of his input
elements by opening them after the server has committed to the output result. In order not to lose
the privacy guarantees for the inputs, however, we apply another level of PRF evaluations.
6.3 Preliminaries and Standard Definitions
Notation. We write x← χ to represent an element x being sampled from a distribution χ, and
x
$← X to represent an element x being sampled uniformly from a set X. If f is a function, we refer
to its domain as Dom(f) and to its range as Ran(f). The output x of an algorithm A is denoted
by x ← A. If A is a probabilistic algorithm we sometimes write y ← A(x; r) to make the coins r
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of A explicit. [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. We refer to the ith element of a sequence v as either
vi or v[i]. Throughout k will refer to the security parameter. A function ν : N → N is negligible
in k if for every polynomial p(·) and sufficiently large k, ν(k) < 1/p(k). Let poly(k) and NEGL(k)
denote unspecified polynomial and negligible functions in k, respectively. We write f(k) = poly(k)
to mean that there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for all sufficiently large k, f(k) ≤ p(k), and
f(k) = NEGL(k) to mean that there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that for all sufficiently
large k, f(k) ≤ ν(k).
Private key encryption. A private-key encryption scheme is a set of three polynomial-time
algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) that work as follows. Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a
security parameter k in unary and returns a secret key K. Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that
takes a key K and an n-bit message m and returns a ciphertext c. Dec is a deterministic algorithm
that takes a key K and a ciphertext c and returns m if K was the key under which c was produced.
Informally, a private-key encryption scheme is considered secure against chosen-plaintext attacks
(CPA) if the ciphertexts it outputs do not leak any useful information about the plaintext even to
an adversary that can adaptively query an encryption oracle.
Functionalities. An n-party randomized functionality is a function f : ({0, 1}∗)n × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗, where the first input is a sequence of n strings x, the second input is a set of random
coins and the output is a sequence of n strings y. We will often omit the coins and simply write
y ← f(x). If we do wish to make the coins explicit then we write y ← f(x; r). We denote the
ith party’s output by fi(x). A functionality is deterministic if it only takes the input string x as
input and it is symmetric if all parties receive the same output. It is known that any protocol
for securely computing deterministic functionalities can be used to securely compute randomized
functionalities (cf. [Goldreich, 2004] Section 7.3) so in this work we focus on the former. A basic
functionality we will make use of is the coin tossing functionality FCT(1`, 1`) = (r, r), where |r| = `
and r is uniformly distributed.
Garbled circuits. Yao’s garbled circuit construction consists of five polynomial-time algorithms
Garb = (GarbCircuit,GarbIn,Eval,GarbOut,Translate) that work as follows. We present GarbCircuit,
GarbIn and GarbOut as deterministic algorithms that take a set of coins r as input. GarbCircuit is
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a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a circuit C that evaluates a function f , and a set of
coins r ∈ {0, 1}k and returns a garbled circuit G(C). GarbIn is a deterministic algorithm that takes
as input a player index i ∈ {1, 2}, an input x , coins r ∈ {0, 1}k, and returns a garbled input G(x).
Eval is a deterministic algorithm takes as input a garbled circuit G(C) and two garbled inputs G(x)
and G(y) and returns a garbled output G(o). GarbOut is a deterministic algorithm that takes as
input a random coins r ∈ {0, 1}k and returns a translation table T. Translate is a deterministic
algorithm that takes as input a garbled output G(o) and a translation table T and returns an
output o.
We note that it is possible to arrange the above five functions in such a way that the compu-
tational complexity of GarbIn is linear in the input size, the computational complexity of GarbOut
and Translate is linear in the output size, while the complexity of GarbCircuit and Eval are linear in
the circuit size. We use this important property when discussing efficiency of our protocols.
Informally, Garb is considered secure if (G(C),G(x),G(y)) reveals no information about x and
y. An added property possessed by the construction is verifiability which, roughly speaking, means
that, given (G(C),G(x),G(y)), no adversary can output some G(o) such that Translate(G(o),T) 6=
f(x, y). We discuss these properties more formally in Appendix D.1.
Delegated computation. A delegated/verifiable computation scheme consists of four polynomial-
time algorithms Del = (Gen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) that work as follows. Gen is a probabilistic
algorithm that takes as input a security parameter k and a function f and outputs a public and
secret key pair (pk, sk) such that the public key encodes the target function f . ProbGen is a proba-
bilistic algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk and an input x in the domain of f and outputs
a public encoding σx and a secret state τx. Compute is a deterministic algorithm that takes as
input a public key pk and a public encoding σx and outputs a public encoding σy. Verify is a
deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk, a secret state τx and a public encoding
σy and outputs either an element y of f ’s range or the failure symbol ⊥. Informally, a delegated
computation scheme is private if the public encoding σx of x reveals no useful information about x.
In addition, the scheme is verifiable if no adversary can find an encoding σy′, for some y′ 6= f(x),
such that Verifysk(τx, σy′) 6= ⊥. We say that a delegated computation scheme is secure if it is
both private and verifiable. We refer the reader to Section D.2 for a formal definition of verifiable
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computation.
6.4 Non-Collusion in Multi-Party Computation
The standard ideal/real world definition for MPC, proposed by Canetti [Canetti, 2000b] and build-
ing on [Beaver, 1992; Goldwasser and Levin, 1991; Micali and Rogaway, 1992], compares the real-
world execution of a protocol for computing an n-party functionality f to the ideal-world evaluation
of f by a trusted party. In the real-world execution, the parties run the protocol in the presence of
an adversary A that is allowed to corrupt a subset of the parties. In the ideal execution, the parties
interact with a trusted party that evaluates f in the presence of a simulator S that corrupts the
same subset of parties.
Typically, only a single adversary A is considered. This monolithic adversary captures the pos-
sibility of collusion between the dishonest parties. One distinguishes between passive corruptions,
where the adversary only learns the state of the corrupted parties; and active corruptions where
the adversary completely controls the party and, in particular, is not assumed to follow the proto-
col. Typically, adversaries that make passive corruptions are semi-honest whereas adversaries that
make active corruptions are malicious. In this work, we will make a distinction between malicious
adversaries who make active corruptions and can behave arbitrarily and deviating adversaries who
make active corruptions but whose behavior may not be arbitrarily malicious (i.e., their behavior
may be limited to a certain class of attacks). Another distinction can be made as to how the ad-
versary chooses which parties to corrupt. If it must decide this before the execution of the protocol
then we say that the adversary is static. On the other hand, if the adversary can decide during
the execution of the protocol then we say that the adversary is adaptive. We only consider static
adversaries in this work.
Roughly speaking, a protocol Π is considered secure if it emulates, in the real-world, an evalua-
tion of f in the ideal-world. This is formalized by requiring that the joint distribution composed of
the honest parties’ outputs and of A’s view in the real-world execution be indistinguishable from
the joint distribution composed of the honest parties’ outputs and the simulator S’s view in the
ideal-world execution. As mentioned above, the standard security definition for MPC models ad-
versarial behavior using a monolithic adversary. This has the advantage that it captures collusion
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and thus provides strong security guarantees. There are, however, many instances in practice where
collusion does not occur. This can happen either because it is not feasible, too costly, or because it
is prevented by other means (e.g., by physical means, by the Law or due to conflicting interests).
This is particularly true in the setting of cloud computing where one can think of many scenarios
where the server (i.e., the cloud operator) will have little incentive to collude with any of the other
parties.
This naturally leads to the two following questions: (1) how do we formalize secure computation
in the presence of non-colluding adversaries? and (2) what do we gain by weakening the security
guarantee? In particular, can we design protocols that are more efficient or that remain secure
even if all parties are corrupted? Note that while the standard definition becomes meaningless if
all parties are corrupted (since the monolithic adversary then knows all the private information in
the system), this is not so if the parties are corrupted by non-colluding adversaries.
6.4.1 Formalizing Non-Collusion With Respect to Semi-Honest Adversaries
Intuitively, we think of collusion between participants in a MPC protocol as an exchange of “useful
information”, where by useful information we mean anything that allows the colluding parties to
learn something about the honest parties’ inputs that is not prescribed by the protocol. For our
purposes, a non-colluding adversary is therefore:
“an adversary that avoids revealing any useful information to other parties.”
As we will see, formalizing this intuition is not straight-forward. In the following discussion, we
divide the messages sent by a party into two types: protocol and non-protocol messages. Assuming
the protocol starts with a “start” message and ends with an “end” message, a protocol message is
one that comes after the start message and before the end message, and a non-protocol message is
one that comes either before the start message or after the end message. To formalize our intuition
we need to make two crucial changes to the standard definition which we discuss below.
Independent adversaries. First, in addition to the monolithic adversary (which corrupts mul-
tiple parties) we include a set of non-monolithic adversaries that corrupt at most one party and
have access only to the view of that party. We also assume that all the adversaries are independent
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in the sense that they do not share any state 1. Intuitively, this essentially guarantees that these
adversaries do not send any non-protocol messages to each other and therefore that they can only
collude using protocol messages. Throughout the rest of this work all adversaries are independent.
When working with independent adversaries, we will consider three possible adversarial behav-
iors: semi-honest, malicious and non-cooperative. Semi-honest and malicious behavior refer to the
standard notions: a semi-honest adversary follows the protocol while a malicious adversary can
deviate arbitrarily. Informally, a non-cooperative adversary is one that deviates from the protocol
as long as he does not (willingly) send useful information to another party. We will discuss how to
formalize this intuition in section 6.4.2, and for now we focus on semi-honest adversaries. Note that,
intuitively, if an adversary is independent and semi-honest, then it is non-colluding in the sense
outlined above because it will send only protocol messages (by independence) and because these
messages will reveal at most what is prescribed by the protocol (due its semi-honest behavior).
Partial emulation. Our second modification is a weakening of the notion of emulation to only
require that indistinguishability hold with respect to the honest parties’ outputs and a single ad-
versary’s view. In other words, we require that for each independent adversary Ai, the joint
distribution composed of the honest parties’ outputs and Ai’s view in the real-world, be indistin-
guishable from the joint distribution composed of the honest parties’ outputs and the simulator
S ′i’s output in the ideal world. Roughly speaking, this implies that the protocol remains private
(i.e., the parties do not learn information about each other’s inputs) as long as the parties do not
share any information.
To see why partial emulation is needed in our setting, consider two independent adversaries A1
and A2 whose outputs are correlated based on some protocol message exchanged between them.
Under the standard notion of emulation, the simulators S1 and S2 would also have to output cor-
related views. The problem, however, is that because S ′1 and S ′2 are independent they cannot
exchange any messages and a-priori it is not clear how they could correlate their outputs 2.
1This idea already appears in work on collusion-free protocols [Lepinksi et al., 2005; Alwen et al., 2008; Alwen et
al., 2009].
2This could potentially be addressed using a setup assumption, but here we restrict ourselves to the plain model.
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We are now ready to introduce our security definition for non-colluding semi-honest adversaries.
Like the standard definition of security with abort, we do not seek to guarantee fairness or guaran-
teed output delivery and this is captured by allowing the adversaries to abort during the ideal-world
execution. In addition, however, we also allow the server to select which parties will and will not
receive their outputs. This weakening of the standard definition was first proposed by Goldwasser
and Lindell in [Goldwasser and Lindell, 2002] and has the advantage of removing the need for a
broadcast channel.
Real-world execution. The real-world execution of protocol Π takes place between players
(P1, . . . , Pn), server Pn+1 and adversaries (A1, . . . ,Am+1), where m ≤ n. Let H ⊆ [n + 1] denote
the honest parties, I ⊂ [n+1] denote the set of corrupted and non-colluding parties and C ⊂ [n+1]
denote the set of corrupted and colluding parties. Since we only consider static adversaries these
sets are fixed once the protocol starts.
At the beginning of the execution, each party (P1, . . . , Pn) receives its input xi, a set of random
coins ri and an auxiliary input zi while the server Pn+1 receives only its coins rn+1 and an auxiliary
input zn+1. Each adversary (A1, . . . ,Am) receives an index i ∈ I that indicates the party it corrupts,
while adversary Am+1 receives C indicating the set of parties it corrupts.
For all i ∈ H, let outi denote the output of Pi and for i ∈ I ∪ C, let outi denote the view of
party Pi during the execution of Π. The ith partial output of a real-world execution of Π between







outj : j ∈ H
} ∪ outi.
Ideal-world execution. In the ideal-world execution, all the parties interact with a trusted
party that evaluates f . As in the real-world execution, the ideal execution begins with each party
(P1, . . . , Pn) receiving its input xi, its coins ri and an auxiliary input zi, while the server Pn+1
receives only its coins rn+1 and an auxiliary input zn+1. Each party (P1, . . . , Pn) sends x
′
i to the
trusted party, where x′i = xi if Pi is semi-honest and x
′ is an arbitrary value if Pi is malicious. If
any x′i = ⊥, then the trusted party returns ⊥ to all parties. If this is not the case, then the trusted
party asks the server to specify which of the corrupted parties should receive their outputs and
which should receive ⊥. The trusted party then returns fi(x′1, . . . , x′n) to the corrupted parties Pi
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that are to receive their outputs and ⊥ to the remaining corrupted parties. The trusted party then
asks the corrupted parties that received an output whether they wish to abort. If any of them does,
then the trusted party returns ⊥ to the honest parties. If not, it returns fi(x′1, . . . , x′n) to honest
party Pi.
For all i ∈ H, let outi denote the output returned to Pi by the trusted party, and for i ∈ I ∪C
let outi be some value output by Pi. The ith partial output of an ideal-world execution between







outj : j ∈ H
} ∪ outi.
Security. Informally, a protocol Π is considered secure against non-colluding semi-honest adver-
saries if it partially emulates, in the real-world, an evaluation of f in the ideal-world.
Definition 18 (Security against semi-honest adversaries). Let f be a deterministic n-party func-
tionality and Π be an n-party protocol. Furthermore, let I ⊂ [n + 1] and C ⊂ [n + 1] be such that
I∩C = ∅ and |I| = m. We say that Π (I,C)-securely computes f if there exists a set {Simi}i∈[m+1]
of ppt transformations such that for all semi-honest ppt adversaries A = (A1, . . . ,Am+1), for all














where S = (S1, . . . ,Sm+1) and Si = Simi(Ai) and where r is chosen uniformly at random.
6.4.2 Formalizing Non-Collusion With Respect to Deviating Adversaries
While non-collusion in the semi-honest model can be formalized via independent adversaries and
partial emulation, this is not sufficient when the adversaries are allowed to deviate from the protocol.
The difficulty is that such adversaries can use protocol messages to collude since they can send
arbitrary messages. Of course, collusion can be prevented through physical means (e.g., using
ballot boxes as in [Lepinksi et al., 2005]) or trusted communication channels (e.g., the mediator
model used in [Alwen et al., 2008; Alwen et al., 2009]) but our goal here is not to obtain (or define)
protocols that prevent adversaries from colluding but to formally characterize adversaries that do
not wish to or cannot collude.
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Towards formalizing our intuition, we introduce the notions of non-cooperative and isolated
adversaries. Let (A1, . . . ,Am+1) be a set of independent adversaries. Informally, an adversary Ai
is non-cooperative with respect to another adversary Aj (for j 6= i) if it does not share any useful
information with Aj . An adversary Ai is isolated if all adversaries {Aj}j 6=i are non-cooperative
with respect to Ai. In other words, Ai is isolated if no one wants to share any useful information
with him. We formalize this intuition in the following definitions.
Definition 19 (Non-cooperative adversary). Let f be a deterministic n-party functionality and Π
be an n-party protocol. Furthermore, let H, I and C be pairwise disjoint subsets of [n+ 1] and let
A = (A1, . . . ,Am+1), where m = |I|, be a set of independent ppt adversaries. For any i, j ∈ [m+1]
such that i 6= j, we say that adversary Aj is non-cooperative with respect to Ai if there exists a ppt







∣∣ outputi = y : {out`}` ← real(i)Π,A,I,C,z(k,x; r)}
k∈N
whenever Pr [ outputi = y ] > 0. Here viewi,j denotes the messages between Ai and Aj in the real-
world execution and outputi = y is the event that party Pi receives output value y.
Note that with the notion of non-cooperation, we are restricting the behavior of the non-
cooperating adversary. In particular, we are assuming it will deviate from the protocol but in such
a way that it will not disclose any useful information to the isolated adversary Ai. Therefore,
one has to be careful in specifying the isolated party’s behavior (i.e., whether it is semi-honest or
malicious) so that the non-cooperation assumption is not so strong as to imply the security of the
protocol. In particular, requiring that the simulator Vi,j work with respect to a malicious Ai seems
too strong. Similarly, requiring that it work with respect to an honest Ai seems too weak as honest
adversaries can always be simulated. A more useful and reasonable notion seems to follow from
requiring that Vi,j work with respect to semi-honest adversaries. This can be interpreted as saying
that the non-cooperative adversary does not intentionally disclose useful information to an isolated
adversary. In particular, this means that the non-cooperative adversary will not take actions such as
sending its private input to the isolated party. It does not, however, restrict the isolated adversary
from trying to “trick” the non-cooperative adversary into revealing this information.
As described above, an isolated adversary is one with which no other adversary wants to cooper-
ate. Roughly speaking, we formalize this intuition by requiring that there exist an emulator for the
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isolated adversary Ai that, given only Ai’s output value fi(x), returns Ai’s view from a real-world
execution. Intuitively, the notion of isolation restricts the behavior of the other adversaries towards
Ai by allowing them to behave arbitrarily as long as their collective actions do not result in Ai
learning any useful information in the sense discussed above. This informal description neglects
some important subtleties that we address below.
Definition 20 (Isolated adversary). Let f be a deterministic n-party functionality and Π be an
n-party protocol. Furthermore, let H, I and C be pairwise disjoint subsets of [n + 1] and let
A = (A1, . . . ,Am+1), where m = |I|, be a set of independent ppt adversaries. For any i, j ∈ [m+1]
such that i 6= j, we say that a semi-honest adversary Ai is isolated if there there exists a ppt











∣∣ outputi = y : {out`}` ← real(i)Π,A,I,C,z(k,x; r)}
k∈N
whenever Pr [ outputi = y ] > 0. Here outputi = y is the event that party Pi receives output value y.
Towards understanding Definition 20, it is perhaps instructive to consider how we will make
use of it. Recall that to prove the security of a protocol Π against independent adversaries
(A1, . . . ,Am+1), we need, for all i ∈ [m + 1], to describe a simulator Si whose output in an ideal
execution is indistinguishable from Ai’s output in a real execution. To achieve this, we consider
a simulator Si that works by simulating Ai so that it can recover Ai’s output and return it as its
own. Now suppose that, in the real world, Π requires Ai to interact with some other adversary
Aj . It follows that Si will somehow have to simulate this interaction, i.e., Si will have to simulate
the (protocol) messages from Aj . These messages, however, could be “colluding messages” in the
sense that they could carry information that helps Ai in learning more that what is prescribed by
the protocol and it may be impossible for Si to simulate them as they could include information
known only to Ai and Aj (e.g., this information could be hardwired in Ai and Aj). This is the
main reason that simply requiring that the real and ideal adversaries be independent (together with
partial emulation) is not enough to capture non-collusion with respect to deviating adversaries.
Our approach here will be to “strengthen” the simulator Si by assuming that the adversaries
{Aj}j 6=i are non-cooperative with respect to Ai. In Lemma 11 below, we will show that this
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implies that Ai is isolated and, therefore, there exists an emulator Ei that will return a view that
is indistinguishable from Ai’s view when interacting with {Aj}j 6=i in a real-world execution.
Lemma 11. Let f be a deterministic n-party functionality and Π be an n-party protocol. Further-
more, let A = (A1, . . . ,Am+1) be a set of independent ppt adversaries. For any i, j ∈ [m + 1], if
{Aj}j 6=i are non-cooperative with respect to Ai, then Ai is isolated.
Proof. Consider the emulator Ei that, given y and zi, computes vi,j ← Vi,j(y, zi) for all j 6= i and
returns the view outi composed of {vi,j}i 6=j . Let {Aj1 , . . . ,Ajm} be the adversaries that are non-
cooperative with respect to Ai and let {Vi,j1 , . . . ,Vi,jm} be their corresponding simulators (which
are guaranteed to exist by the fact that they are non-cooperating with respect to Ai). We show
that Ei’s output is indistinguishable from the view of Ai in a real execution using the following
sequence of games. Game0 consists of running {outj}j ← real(i)Π,A,I,C,z(k,x) and outputting outi.
For all ` ∈ [m], Game` is similar to Game`−1 except that the messages between Ai and Aj` in outi
are replaced with messages generated by Vi,j`(y, zi). Note that the output of Gamem is distributed
exactly as the output of Ei.
The indistinguishability of the outputs of Game0 and Game1 follows directly from the non-
cooperation of Aj1 with respect to Ai so we show that, for all 2 ≤ ` ≤ m, if there exists a ppt
distinguisher D` that distinguishes the output of Game` from that of Game`−1, then there exists a
ppt distinguisher B` that distinguishes the messages exchanged between Ai and Aj` in a real-world
execution from the messages generated by Vi,j` . Given a set of messages vi,j` (generated either from
a real-world execution or from Vi,j`), B` works as follows. It first runs {outj}j ← realΠ,A,I,C,z(k,x)
and, for 1 ≤ t ≤ `− 1, it replaces the messages between Ai and Ajt in outi by vi,jt ← Vi,jt(y, zi). It
then replaces the messages between Ai and Aj` in outi with vi,j` and simulates D(outi). It returns
“real” if D outputs ` and “simulated” if D outputs ` + 1. Notice that if vi,j` was generated from
a real-world execution then B constructs outi exactly as in Game`−1 whereas if vi,j` is generated
from Vi,j` then B constructs outi as in Game`. It follows then that D’s advantage is equal to
B’s advantage in distinguishing between the outputs of Game`−1 and Game` which, by our initial
assumption, is non-negligible.
Since, in our setting, we will consider multiple adversaries with different adversarial behaviors
it will be convenient to specify the behavior of each adversary using the following notation. If A1
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is semi-honest we will write A1[sh] and if A1 is malicious we write A1[m]. If A1 is non-cooperative
with respect to A2 then we write A1[nc2]. Throughout, we will often need to describe classes
of adversarial behaviors. We refer to such classes as adversary structures and describe them as
follows. Consider, for example, a three party protocol between players P1, P2 and P3. A protocol






























is secure in the following two cases: (1) A1 and A2 are malicious while A3 is semi-honest; and (2)
A1 and A2 are semi-honest while A3 is non-cooperating with respect to both A1 and A2. We stress
that we require the same protocol to be secure for each of the cases in the adversarial structure.
This is a stronger guarantee than having separate protocols that address each of the cases since one
does not need to know in advance which parties are corrupted in order to choose which protocol to
use (as long as it falls in one of the cases of the adversarial structure).
We now present our security definition for non-colluding deviating adversaries. It is based on
the real- and idea-world executions defined in section 6.4.
Definition 21 (Security against deviating adversaries). Let f be a deterministic n-party function-
ality and Π be an n-party protocol. Furthermore, let I ⊂ [n + 1] and C ⊂ [n + 1] be such that
I ∩ C = ∅ and |I| = m and let Adv be an adversary structure. We say that Π (I,C,Adv)-securely
computes f if there exists a set {Simi}i∈[m+1] of ppt transformations such that for all ppt adver-
saries A = (A1, . . . ,Am+1) that satisfy Adv, for all x ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n and z ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n+1, and for all













where S = (S1, . . . ,Sm+1) and Si = Simi(Ai) and where r is chosen uniformly at random.
Notice that the standard security definitions of secure MPC in the presence of a semi-honest and
malicious adversary can be recovered from Definition 21 by setting I = ∅ and letting the adversary
in Adv be semi-honest or malicious.
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6.5 An Efficient Protocol for Non-Colluding Semi-Honest Parties
In this Section, we describe a slight variation of the protocol by Feige, Killian and Naor from [Feige
et al., 1994] (from now referred to as the FKN protocol). The protocol makes use of Yao’s garbled
circuit construction as a black-box. We provide a high level description of Yao’s construction in
Appendix D.1.
At a high level, the FKN protocol works as follows. P1 and P2 are assumed to share a set of
random coins. P1 then uses these coins to generate a garbling of the circuit, the translation table
and a garbling of its own input. P1 sends the garbled circuit, its garbled input and the translation
table to the server. P2 uses the same coins, but only computes its own garbled input and the
translation table. P2 sends its garbled inputs to the server. The server evaluates the garbled circuit
using the garbled inputs, translates the garbled output and returns the evaluation to both parties.
We slightly modify the FKN protocol to adapt it to our setting in which the server is not
allowed to learn the output and where we do not assume the parties share a set of random coins.
For this purpose, it suffices that (1) the parties execute a coin tossing protocol to generate the
random coins; and (2) that P1 not send the translation table to the server. The server can still
evaluate the garbled output which the parties can translate on their own. Intuitively, the privacy
and verifiability properties of the garbled circuit construction (see Appendix D.1) and the coin-
tossing protocol guarantee that a malicious server cannot return the wrong result or learn anything
about the inputs of P1 and P2 if he does not collude with either party.
We formally describe this variant of the FKN protocol in Figure 6.1 and in Theorem 11 below




































































Before proving the security of the FKN protocol in our model, we present a simple Lemma that
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Inputs: P1’s input is x, P2’s input is y, and S has no inputs. All parties know the circuit C which
computes the functions f .
Outputs: P1 and P2 learn the output f(x, y).
1. P1 and P2 execute a coin tossing protocol to generate coins r. As a result, both players learn
r.
2. P1 computes G(C) ← GarbCircuit(C; r), G(x) ← GarbIn(C, 1, x; r) and T ← GarbOut(r). It
sends G(C) and G(x) to S.
3. P2 computes G(y)← GarbIn(C, 2, y; r) and T← GarbOut(r). It then sends G(y) to S.
4. S computes G(o)← Eval(G(C),G(x),G(y)) and sends it to P1 and P2.
5. P1 and P2 separately compute o← Translate(G(o),T).
Figure 6.1: The (modified) FKN protocol.
we will use throughout this work and that will simplify our proofs significantly.
Lemma 12. If a multi-party protocol Π between n players P1, . . . , Pn, securely computes f =
(f1, . . . , fn), (1) in presence of semi-honest and independent parties and (2) in presence of a mali-
cious Pj and honest Pk for k ∈ [n] − {j}, then the protocol is also secure in presence of (3) a Pj
who is non-cooperative with respect to all other parties who are semi-honest.
Proof. We need to prove that protocol Π is secure when the adversary Aj corrupting Pj is non-
cooperative with respect to all other parties. Since Aj is non-cooperative, and all other parties are
semi-honest (and hence non-cooperative), based on Lemma 11, we can assume that Ak is isolated
for k ∈ [n]− {j}. Hence, we can use the definition of isolation in our simulation of such Ak’s.
We first need to provide a simulator Simj for simulating a non-cooperative Pj in the ideal world.
However, since Π is secure against a malicious Pj when all other parties are honest, we already
know that a simulator Simj′ exists that simulates Pj in that case. Simj imitates Simj′ completely.
We also need to describe a simulator Simk for k ∈ [n] − {j}. The simulator Simk runs the
adversary Ak controlling Pk in the real world, on input xk. It sends xk to the trusted party
and receives back fk(x1, . . . , xn). Since Ak is isolated, according to Definition 20, there exists an
emulator Ek that takes fk(x1, . . . , xn) as input and can be used to simulate a semi-honest Ak’s
output. Simk feeds fk(x1, . . . , xn) to Ek and plays the role of semi-honest Pk in interaction with it.
At the end of this interaction, Simk outputs what the semi-honest Pk would, and halts. According
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to the Definition 20, Simk will successfully simulate the output of Ak in this way.
2
Since we present all our proofs in the FCT-hybrid model, we need to make sure that a coin-
tossing protocol with security in all adversary structures we consider in fact exists. However, any
two-party coin-tossing protocol (between P1 and P2) with security against malicious adversaries
would be sufficient in our server-aided setting. Such a protocol can easily be proven secure when
all three parties are semi-honest and independent. It is also secure, by definition, when either P1 or
P2 are malicious. It is also secure when the server is malicious and the other two parties are honest
since the server is not involved in the protocol, in any way. Finally, Lemma 12 guarantees that the
same coin-tossing protocol is also secure in all adversary structures where one party is malicious
and the rest are semi-honest and isolated.
We are now ready to state and prove the security of the FKN protocol with respect to Adv1.
Theorem 11. The (modified) FKN protocol described in Figure 6.1 securely computes any function
f in the FCT-hybrid model for the adversary structure Adv1.
Proof. We consider each case in Adv1 separately.
Claim 2. The protocol
(AS[sh],A1[sh],A2[sh])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
We describe three independent transformations SimS , Sim1 and Sim2:
• SimS simulatesAS as follows: it computes (st,G(C),T)← GarbCircuit(C), G(x′)← GarbIn(st, C, 1, x′)
and G(y′) ← GarbIn(st, C, 2, y′) for random x′ and y′; and sends G(C), G(x′) and G(y′) to
AS . If AS outputs ⊥, then SimS tells the trusted party to abort. In either case, SimS outputs
AS ’s entire view.
The privacy property of garbled circuits (see Definition 42) guarantees that G(x) and G(y)
are indistinguishable from x′ and y′ to AS who does not know the coins r. In addition, in
both the real and ideal execution the semi-honest AS does not abort since he is given valid
garbled inputs (in the real world this is true since the other two parties are also semi-honest).
Therefore, the views of AS in the real and the ideal executions are indistinguishable.
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• Sim1 receives x as input and sends it to the trusted party in order to receive f(x, y). It then
simulates A1 as follows. It answers A1’s FCT query by returning random coins r. Sim1 then
computes (st,G(C),T)← GarbCircuit(C; r) and uses the translation table to find a garbling
G(o) of f(x, y). Finally, it returns G(o) to A1 and outputs A1’s entire view.
The view of A1 consists of the garbled circuits it creates and the garbled outputs it receives.
In both the real and the ideal execution he receives the garbled output values corresponding
to f(x, y). In the real world this is guaranteed by the fact that S and P2 are honest and the
correctness property of garbled circuits (see Definition 41). Therefore, the views of A1 in the
real and the ideal executions are indistinguishable.
• Sim2 works analogously to Sim1.
2
Claim 3. The protocol
(AS[m],A1[h],A2[h])- securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
Consider the simulator SimS that simulates AS as follows. It chooses coins r and computes
G(C) ← GarbCircuit(C; r). SimS chooses random inputs x′ for P1 and y′ for P2. Then he sends
G(C) together with garbled input labels G(x′)← GarbIn(C, 1, x′; r) and G(y′)← GarbIn(C, 2, y′; r)
to AS . SimS receives the garbled outputs that AS returns for P1 and P2. If any of the outputs does
not correspond to the correct value, the simulator instructs the trusted party to return ⊥ to that
party. The view of AS consists of the garbled circuits and the garbled input values that he receives.
The garbled values that correspond to zero and one are indistinguishable for the adversary since he
does not know the seed for the PRG (correctness property in definition 41). Therefore the garbled
labels for the real inputs x and y in the real execution and the random values x′ and y′ in the ideal
execution are indistinguishable for the AS . It follows the views of the adversary in the real and
the ideal execution are also indistinguishable. The outputs of P1 and P2 are also indistinguishable
in the real and the ideal execution. They receive the correct output, if AS computes and returns
the result honestly. Otherwise, in the ideal execution they receive ⊥ from the trusted party, and
in the real execution AS cannot produce with all but negligible probability garbled output values
for any other output but the correct evaluation of the garbled circuit by the verifiability property
of garbled circuits (see Definition 43).
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2
Claim 4. The protocol
(AS[nc1, nc2],A1[sh],A2[sh])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid
model.
The proof of this claim is automatically implied given the last two claims and Lemma 12.
2
Claim 5. The protocol
(AS[h],A1[h],A2[m])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
Sim2 simulates the view of adversary A2. The simulator answers A2’s query to FCT with
random coins r. He receives the garbled values G(y) ← GarbIn(C, 2, y; r) corresponding to the
input of A2. Using the coins r, Sim2 extracts A2’s input value y. If extraction fails he returns ⊥
to A2. Otherwise, the simulator obtains the output f(x, y) from the trusted party, computes the
corresponding garbled output values and sends them to A2. The view of A2, which consists of the
output he receives, is indistinguishable in the real and the ideal execution. If the garbled input
is contructed correctly, in both cases he gets f(x, y) (in the real world this is true since the other
two parties are honest). If he submits invalid garbled values for his input, he receives ⊥ from the
simulator in the ideal execution, and in the real world with high probability S will fail to evaluate
the circuit and will return ⊥. Similarly, the output of P1 will be indistinguishable in the real and
the ideal execution.
2
Claim 6. The protocol
(AS[sh],A1[sh],A2[ncS])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
Once again the above claim is automatically implied given the proof of previous claims and
Lemma 12.
2
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Efficiency. First note that neither P1, P2 nor the server S have to perform any public key opera-
tions (i.e. no oblivious transfers are needed) with the exception of the initial coin-tossing between
P1 and P2 which either requires the existence of a secure channel between them or public-key oper-
ations. Moreover, the coin-tossing needs to be performed exactly once to share a secret key. In all
future runs of the protocol, P1 and P2 can use their shared secret key and a pseudorandom function,
to generate the necessary seeds. This is a considerable improvement since public key operations
are significantly more expensive compared to secret-key ones. Second, P2 only needs to do work
that is linear in the size of his input and the output, and independent of the circuit size since he
only computes the GarbIn,GarbOut and Translate algorithms and the computational cost of these
algorithms do not depend on the circuit size. Finally, note that the interaction between P1 and P2
is minimal and only takes place in the context of coin tossing (Step 1 of the protocol). In addition,
since this interaction is independent of the function f and of the parties’ inputs x and y, it can be
performed off-line and for many instances of the protocol at once. The server and P1 will do work
that is linear in the size of the circuit. If the server-aided protocol is run multiple times for the
same or different functionalities, we can reduce the online work of P1 by performing the garbling
of multiple circuits (for the same or different functions) in the oﬄine phase. The online work for
P1 would then be similar to P2 and only linear to the size of his input and output.
Extending to multiple parties. Our protocol can be easily extended to multiple parties as
follows. All the parties, except for the server, begin by executing a coin-tossing protocol which
results in them sharing a set of coins. The coins are then used by one of parties to garble the
circuit and all the parties to garble their inputs. The garbled circuit and inputs are then sent to
the server who evaluates the circuit and returns the garbled outputs to the parties.
It is not difficult to show that this extended protocol is secure when either: (1) the server is
malicious and the other parties are semi-honest; or (2) the server is isolated and semi-honest, the
garbler is semi-honest and the remaining parties are malicious.
6.6 Protecting Against Deviating Circuit Garblers
The security of the FKN protocol critically relies on the circuit garbler being honest (or semi-
honest) and breaks down completely if this is not the case. To add robustness, we augment the
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protocol to handle the case where player P1 deviates from the protocol but is non-cooperative (with
respect to S).
Using the semi-honest server for verification. If we assume that the server is semi-honest,
there is a simple strategy for protecting against deviating but non-cooperative circuit garblers:
similar to the protocol of the previous section, P1 and P2 run the coin-tossing protocol and as
before P1 uses the retrieved randomness to generate a garbled circuit. This time, however, P2
also generates the garbled circuit (using the same randomness) and sends his version of the circuit
to the server. The server then verifies that the two garbled circuits he receives are the same,
and if so, proceeds with the rest of the computation. Note that as long as one of the players is
semi-honest, dishonestly garbled circuits are detected by the honest server. This approach yields
a server-aided protocol with a significantly better average efficiency gain (see Section 6.9 for an
overview of different notions of efficiency gain) compared to the standard two-party Yao protocol
with security against malicious adversaries, since it avoids the cut-and-choose steps.
Our goal, however, is to design a protocol that maintains the benefits of the previous protocol
(i.e., security against a non-cooperative server) and simultaneously provides protection in cases
where the circuit garbler P1 is non-cooperative with respect to S.
To protect against a non-cooperative P1, we use the existing cut-and-choose techniques for
Yao’s garbled circuit protocol (e.g. see [Mohassel and Franklin, 2006; Lindell and Pinkas, 2007]).
Note that here the cut-and-choose step cannot take place between P1 and P2 since that would
significantly increase the work of P2 and, to a large extent, diminish our ultimate goal of gaining
efficiency. Hence, we construct a cut-and-choose protocol between P1 and an untrusted server
instead. Note that some subtleties arise that are specific to our server-aided setting and require
modifications to the way the cut-and-choose steps are performed.
The computational cost of the resulting protocol increases by a factor of λ (the number of
circuits) for the players and the server. However, the new protocol inherits the two important
efficiency advantages of the previous one, i.e., the computation still only consists of secret-key
operations and P2’s computation is only linear in the size of his input and output and, in particular,
is independent of the circuit size.
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Standard cut-and-choose. In a standard cut-and-choose, P1 sends multiple copies of the gar-
bled circuit to S. S then asks P1 to open the secrets related to a subset of those circuits. S
verifies the correctness of the opened circuits, evaluates the remaining circuits (called evaluation
circuits) and outputs the majority result as the final output. Note that it is essential to compute
the majority output and not abort immediately after seeing an inconsistent output. As discussed
in previous work (e.g. see [Mohassel and Franklin, 2006; Lindell and Pinkas, 2007]), abort in this
situation would reveal additional information to a deviating P1 about P2’s input. Furthermore,
to enable P2 to compute the correct majority output, additional care is needed to make sure P1
provides the same input to most of the circuits evaluated by S. Avoiding this extra equality-check
would undermine both the correctness (by returning the wrong answer to P2), and the privacy (by
allowing P1 to learn a different function of the inputs) of the protocol. In [Lindell and Pinkas, 2007]
and [Mohassel and Franklin, 2006], additional consistency-checking mechanisms are added to the
cut-and-choose step in order to guarantee the equality of inputs to most of the circuits. Since the
techniques from the two papers are similar, and both would work for our server-aided construction,
we give a general description of the mechanism that includes both approaches as a special case.
More precisely, in addition to the garbled circuits a collection of input-equality widgets are also
computed by P1 and sent along with the garbled circuits to S. During the opening phase of the
cut-and-choose, a subset of these input-checking widgets are also opened and verified. This step
ensures that unless the majority of P1’s garbled inputs (to the evaluation circuits) are the same,
his deviation from the protocol will be detected with high probability during the opening phase.
6.6.1 What goes wrong in the server-aided setting?
We need to address three issues with the above cut-and-choose strategy when it is applied in the
server-aided model.
1. First, since P1 and P2 independently compute and send to S their garbled inputs for the
evaluation circuits, and since we still want to protect against a deviating P2, P1 needs to
generate the input-checking widgets for P2’s input wires as well. This modification could
potentially introduce a new security problem. Particularly, for one pair of circuits, P1 can
issue a bad equality-check for a specific bit value of P2’s input wires (e.g. 0) and a correct
equality-check for the other bit value (e.g. 1). In the case that the pair of circuits are chosen
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for evaluation (which happens with non-negligible probability), if S aborts, P1 concludes that
P2’s input is 0 and if he does not, he concludes that P2’s input bit is a 1. However, this
problem is easy to address. In fact, S need not abort if the input keys for two circuits he is
evaluating do not pass the checks. He can simply evaluate the subset of remaining circuits
that pass the checks and assign “invalid” outputs to the rest (without aborting). The final
majority output is also computed, by taking this “invalid” outputs into consideration. In the
rest of this section, whenever we talk about retrieving the majority output, we refer to this
approach.
2. Second, a more subtle issue arises when the server tries to send the majority output as the
final result to the parties. In the standard cut-and-choose, the circuit evaluator learns the
actual outputs to all the evaluation circuits and therefore can easily determine the majority.
In the server-aided setting, however, we do not allow the server to learn the actual output
values. S only learns the garbled outputs and therefore cannot determine the majority output
on his own.
First attempt. Initially, one might try to resolve this issue by sending the computed garbled
outputs to P1 and P2 and requiring them to compute the majority output on their own
(note that P1 and P2 know the translation table). Unfortunately, this solution compromises
the security of the protocol. For instance, this allows a deviating P1 to learn “too much”
information, by sending only a constant number of bad circuits (e.g. circuits that compute
a function other than the agreed one), and learning multiple functions of P2’s input with a
non-negligible probability of not getting caught.
Second attempt. An alternative solution is not to reveal to the server the mapping of output
keys to their actual bit values, but to map them to two random values k0 and k1 corresponding
to 0 and 1, respectively. While this would prevent the server from learning the output of
computation, it makes the protocol insecure in the scenario where the server is the dishonest
party. In particular, this allows a deviating server to return either k0 or k1 as the correct
output of computation even if it is not the right output.
As mentioned earlier, we are interested in a solution that allows a semi-honest server to
compute the majority output without learning the output itself (output privacy) and at the
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same time can provide a guarantee that a deviating server would not be able to modify the
result of the computation.
Our oblivious cut-and-choose method. The high level idea behind our solution is as
follows. After the opening phase, λ/2 unopened circuits remain. For each output wire, P1
and P2 generate two polynomials g0 and g1 of degree λ/4 over the finite field GF (2
λ). g0 and
g1 are chosen uniformly from the space of permutation polynomials of a special form which we
will discuss shortly. Let k0 = g0(0) and k1 = g1(1). k0 and k1 are used as keys corresponding
to 0 and 1, respectively.
P1 and P2 evaluate g0 at keys corresponding to 0 in the λ/2 evaluation circuits, and g1 at
keys corresponding to 1. These evaluations along with two ciphertexts c0 = Ek0(0
λ) and
c1 = Ek1(0
λ) are sent to S and the same process is repeated for all output wires.
These evaluations can be seen as Reed-Solomon encoding of the keys k0 and k1. S then eval-
uates the remaining λ/2 circuits and uses a Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm to recover one
of k0, or k1 (S obliviously decodes both but only one of the keys decrypts the corresponding
ci to 0
λ). Let b be the correct output for the wire we are discussing. In case of a deviating P1,
the error correcting property of the Reed-Solomon codes ensures that as long as a “sufficiently
large” fraction of the garbled outputs are correct, the decoding algorithm correctly decodes
the correct key kb (and hence this fulfils the servers’ search for the majority output). On
the other hand, in the adversarial scenario where the server is dishonest, we argue that he
does not learn anything about k1−b. This is exactly where we need g0 and g1 to be randomly
chosen permutation polynomials (Dickson polynomials) of a special form. Intuitively, if g1−b
is a permutation over the finite field, the knowledge of its evaluations at uniformly random
evaluation points does not reveal any information about the polynomial itself (and specifically
its constant coefficient) to S since all the permutation polynomials of the same form as g1−b
can be evaluated to the same values given the right evaluation points, and hence are equally
likely to have been chosen. This intuition is formalized in the proof of security for the case
when the server is deviating.
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Dickson polynomials have the nice property of acting as permutations of finite fields. More
accurately, we have the following lemma about them.
Lemma 13. The Dickson polynomial Dn(x, α) is a permutation polynomial for a finite field
of size q if n is coprime to q2 − 1.
Hence, in order for g0 and g1 to be permutation polynomials, we require that λ/4 is coprime
to 2λ+1 − 1. In addition, for g0 and g1 to have constant coefficients, λ/4 needs to be even
(due to the way Dickson polynomials are defined). Finally, we require that if α is chosen
uniformly at random in GF (2λ), the constant coefficient of Dλ/4(x, α) is a uniformly random
element of the field too. The reason for this last requirement is so that we can use the
constant coefficients as random keys k0 and k1 in the protocol. Since the constant coefficient
of Dλ/4(x, α), for an even value of λ/4, is of the form 2α
λ/8, we essentially need that αλ/8 be
a permutation over the field as well. Once again, according to Lemma 13 this is case if λ/8
is coprime to 2λ+1 − 1 since Dλ/8(x, 0) = xλ/8 is itself a Dickson polynomial.
To summarize, we sample g0 and g1 by choosing λ such that λ/4 is even and coprime to
2λ+1 − 1 (this already implies that λ/8 is coprime to 2λ+1 − 1); generating two random
elements α0, α1 ∈ GF (2λ); and letting g0 = Dλ/4(x, α0) and g1 = Dλ/4(x, α1).
Finally, we note that choosing a λ that satisfies the above properties is fairly easy. For
example, any λ = 8p where p is a prime number is coprime to 2λ+1−1 and hence can be used
in our protocol. To obtain a λ close to 80, one could let p = 11. For a λ close to 128, once
could let p = 17, and so on.
3. A third issue in our setting is that a deviating P1 can cheat by agreeing on a seed ri with P2 but
using a different seed r′i to generate the garbled circuit which he sends to S. More specifically,
consider the two garbled circuits Gi(C)← GarbCircuit(C; ri) and G′i(C)← GarbCircuit(C; r′i)
generated by the two different seeds. A dishonest P1 can potentially choose the seed r
′
i such
that for a particular input wire of P2, the key k corresponds to a 0 in Gi(C) but corresponds
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to a 1 in G′i(C). In other words, P1 can flip P2’s input bit without P2 or S detecting it. This
issue does not arise in the standard two-party variant of Yao’s protocol against malicious
adversaries, due to the existence of the OTs. In the two-party case, P1 and P2 engage in a
series of OTs (before the cut-and-choose step) as a result of which P2 learns his garbled inputs
for all circuits. In the opening phase, P2 can verify that the OTs were performed honestly for
the opened circuits, and hence gain confidence about the correctness of his garbled inputs in
the majority of the unopened circuits too. Since we no longer invoke OTs in our server-aided
protocols, we need a different mechanism for resolving this issue.
First attempt. One may try to solve this problem by making S ask both P1 and P2 to send
him the seeds for the opened circuits, and verify that the two sets of seeds are equal. However,
this creates a new vulnerability for the case when S is dishonest since he could ask for two
different subset of circuits to be opened by each of P1 and P2. This allows S to learn either
P1 or P2’s input values.
The correct solution is to have S send the set of seeds he receives from P1, to P2 who can
verify that they are equal to his own seeds and abort the protocol, otherwise (see step 5 of
the protocol).































Theorem 12. The protocol in Figure 6.2 securely computes the function f in the FCT-hybrid model
against the adversary structure Adv2.
Proof. The proof for the first adversarial model of Adv1 (where all three parties are semi-honest) is
almost identical to the proof for the same model in Theorem 11 and hence is omitted here. Next,
we prove security against the remaining adversarial scenarios in the adversary structure.
Claim 7. The protocol
(AS[m],A1[h],A2[h])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
Consider the simulator SimS that simulates AS as follows. It chooses coins r1, . . . , rλ, r′ and
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Inputs: P1’s input is x, P2’s input is y, and S has no inputs. All parties know the circuit C which
computes the functions f . They also agree on an integer λ such that λ/8 is coprime to 2λ+1 − 1.
Outputs: P1 and P2 learn the output f(x, y).
1. P1 and P2 execute a coin tossing protocol to generate λ+ 1 sets of coins r1, . . . , rλ, and r
′.
2. P1 computes λ garbled circuits (Gi(C) ← GarbCircuit(C; ri) and garbled inputs Gi(x) ←
GarbIn(C, 1, x; r) for 1 ≤ i ≤ λ. λ is chosen such He sends the computed garbled circuits and
inputs to S. He also sends the input-equality widgets corresponding to those garbled circuits to
S.
3. S randomly chooses a subset T ⊂ [1 . . . λ] of size λ/2 and asks P1 to send the coins ri for
i ∈ T , and also reveal the secrets or the equality-checkers corresponding to the opened circuits.
4. S verifies that the opened circuits and input-equality widgets were generated correctly. If the
verification fails for any circuit, S aborts.
5. S also sends the coins ri for i ∈ T to P2 who checks if the coins are what he agreed on with
P1 in the coin-tossing phase or not. If not, he aborts the protocol.
6. P1 and P2 separately send their garbled inputs for the remaining circuits to S. S uses the
remaining input-equality widgets to determine the subset of the circuits in S that pass the
input-equality checks. In what follows, the evaluation result for those circuits that fail the
checks is set to “invalid” by the server (without aborting).
7. At this point, t = λ/2 circuits remain to be evaluated. Renumber the remaining cir-
cuits as C1, . . . , Ct. Denote by `o the number of output wires in each circuit, and let
(wi1,0, w
i
1,1), · · · , (wit,0, wit,1) the keys corresponding to the output wire 1 ≤ i ≤ `o, in the t
circuits. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ `o, P1 and P2 use the coins r′ to independently generate the following
• Two uniformly random elements αi0, αi1 ∈ GF (2λ), and the corresponding Dickson poly-




1(x) = Dλ/4(x, α
i
1) over GF (2
λ). Denote their corre-
sponding constant coefficients by ki0 and k
i
1, respectively.
• P1 and P2 also compute two ciphertexts ci0 = Eki0(0λ) and ci1 = Eki1(0λ) using a symmetric-
key encryption scheme E.
Figure 6.2: A server-aided two-party protocol robust against a deviating P1
computes Gi(C) ← GarbCircuit(C; ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ λ. SimS then sends Gi(C) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ λ to
AS . AS returns a subset T of size λ/2. For each i ∈ T , SimS returns ri to AS .
SimS then chooses random inputs x
′ for P1 and y′ for P2. He then sends the garbled input labels
Gi(x
′)← GarbIn(C, 1, x′; ri) and Gi(y′)← GarbIn(C, 2, y′; ri) to AS for all i ∈ S−T . Denote by `0,
the number of output wires in each circuit. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ `o, SimS use the seed r′ to generate
two random Dickson polynomials gi0 and g
i
1 of degree λ/4, and evaluates them at the λ/2 keys for
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1,1), . . . , g
i
1(wt,1)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ `o and send ((Y i0 , ci0), (Y i1 , ci1)) to S. Each pair will be
sent in a randomly permuted order so that S does not learn which one corresponds to 0 and
which one corresponds to 1. The randomness for the permutation will also be derived from
the coins r′, and hence P1 and P2 will both do the same permutations.






1)) pairs he receives from P1 and P2 are in fact the
same. If not, he aborts. Else, S evaluates the remaining t circuits and for each output wire
1 ≤ i ≤ `o, retrieves the keys Xib = (wi1,b, . . . , wit,b) for a bit b ∈ {0, 1} where b is the actual
output value for wire i. (With high probability, only a small fraction of these keys will be
corrupted or “invalid” or else S would catch them in the opening phase).
10. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ `o, S runs the Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm on both pairs (Xib, Y i0 ) and
(Xib, Y
i




1. S uses d
i
0 to decrypt c
i
0 and uses d
i
1 to decrypt
ci1. With high probability, only the decryption with d
i
b returns the message 0
λ. S returns dib
for 1 ≤ i ≤ `o to P1 and P2.
11. P1 and P2 use their translation tables to separately recover the actual output values.
Figure 6.3: Figure 6.2 Continued






1 respectively. SimS then
sends the evaluations along with the ciphertexts ci0 = Eki0
(0λ) and ci1 = Eki1
(0λ) on behalf of P1
and P2 to AS . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ `o, SimS receives a key kib. If kib is not a valid key, the simulator
instructs the trusted party to return ⊥ to P1 and P2. SimS then outputs whatever AS does and
halts.
The view of AS consists of the garbled circuits, the opened seeds, the garbled input values,
and evaluations of the Dickson polynomials at the output keys. The garbled input values that
correspond to zero and one are indistinguishable for the adversary since he does not know the seed
for the unopened circuits (correctness property in definition 41). Therefore the garbled labels for
the real inputs x and y in the real execution and the random values x′ and y′ in the ideal execution
are indistinguishable for AS . All the other messages AS receives are the same things he would
see in the real protocol and hence it follows the views of the adversary in the real and the ideal
execution are therefore indistinguishable.
The remaining issue is to prove that the outputs of P1 and P2 are also indistinguishable in the
real and the ideal execution. Note that they receive the correct output, if AS computes and returns
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the result, honestly. Otherwise, in the ideal execution they receive ⊥ from the trusted party. In the
real execution, for AS to return an incorrect output key ki1−b for a specific output wire i, he needs
to guess the constant coefficient of the corresponding polynomial gi1−b. But, the only knowledge
AS has of this polynomial is the fact that it is a uniformly random Dickson polynomial of degree
λ/4 that evaluates to values y1, . . . , yλ/2 at λ/2 uniformly random points that are unknown to him.
The fact that these evaluation points are unknown to AS is implied by the verifiability property of
Yao’s garbled circuit (see Definition 43).
It remains for us to show that seeing y1, . . . , yλ/2 does note leak any information about the
underlying polynomial gi1−b (and particularly its constant coefficient). However, since g
i
1−b is a
permutation and the evaluation points are uniformly random values from GF (2λ, yi’s essentially
constitute λ/2 uniformly random values in GF (2λ), and hence do not contain any information
about gi1−b. Put differently, for any Dickson polynomials of degree λ/4 p(x), there exist a unique
set of evaluation points x1, . . . , xλ/2 such that p(xi) = yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ λ/2. This completes our
argument.
2
Claim 8. The protocol
(AS[h],A1[m],A2[h])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
We construct a simulator Sim1 for A1. Before describing the simulation, however, we give a
Lemma implied by the security of the cut-and-choose variants of Yao’s protocol (we refer the reader
to [Lindell and Pinkas, 2007] where the Lemma is implicitly proved). We point out, however, that in
our setting, the role of the honest verifying party is divided between an honest server and an honest
P2, and hence the Lemma goes through since their verification mechanisms combined is equivalent
to the verification mechanism performed by the single honest party in the standard two-party case
of malicious Yao. In particular, it is essential for both the server to check the correctness of the
opened circuits and the input-equality widgets in steps 3 and 4, and for the honest P2 to check the
correctness of the revealed seeds in step 5. This point is also dircetly related to the third issue we
explored in the discussion above.
Lemma 14 ( [Lindell and Pinkas, 2007]). There exists an expected polynomial time extractor Ext,
that takes P1’s input x and runs and rewinds A1. If A1 creates more than 3/4 of the evaluation
circuits honestly (a total of 3λ/8 circuits), and provides the same input x′ for all of those correct
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circuits, w.h.p., Ext extracts and outputs x′. Else, Ext will output ⊥ with all but negligible probability.
Furthermore, the probability of Ext outputting ⊥ when interacting with A1 is exactly the same as
the probability of an honest server outputting ⊥ in the real protocol.
The fraction 3/4 in the above Lemma is adjustable to any constant fraction greater than 1/2.
Changing the constant fraction affects the extractor’s probability of error in the Lemma, but that
probability still remains negligible in the security parameter. In order to ensure correct decoding,
we need a constant fraction of 3/4 or higher in our proofs.
Our transformation Sim1 works as follows:
1. it makes a query to FCT, and A1 answers back with r1, . . . , rλ, and r′.
2. it runs the extractor Ext from Lemma 14 to either obtain the input x′ that A1 has provided
for the majority of the circuits, or to receive the abort signal ⊥. For the latter, Sim1 simulates
the server aborting and outputs whatever A1 does.
3. it uses r′ to generate the permutation polynomials gi0(x) and gi1(x) with constant coefficients
ki0, k
i
1 ∈ {0, 1}λ, for 1 ≤ i ≤ `o.
4. it sends x′ to the trusted party and obtains z = f(x′, y). For bits bi of the output z, he selects
the corresponding key kibi , (for 1 ≤ i ≤ `o) and returns them to P1.
We show that A1 cannot distinguish his interaction with an honest S and P2 in the real world
from his interaction with Sim1 in the ideal world. The view of the adversary consists of the garbled
circuits he submits and the output he receives. Therefore, it is enough to show that the output that
A1 receives in the real execution is the same as what he receives in the above simulation. Based
on the existence of the extractor Ext from Lemma 14, we are assured that in case of an abort, the
view of A1 in the simulation is indistinguihsable from when he interacts with the honest server.
Furthermore, in the case that Ext extracts an input x′, we know that with high probability 3/4 of
the evaluation circuits (i.e., 3λ/8 circuits) constructed by A1 are correct and use the same input
x′. Let z = f(x′, y). We now have that for every bit bi of z, the honest server in the real execution,
receives λ/2 evaluation points for polynomial gbi of degree λ/4 and that 3λ/8 of those are correct.
In other words, the error in the Reed-Solomon codeword is less than λ/8 < (λ/2− λ/4)/2. Hence,
the Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm run by the honest server unambiguously recovers the garbled
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inputs kbi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `o. Since the server runs the decoding obliviously on both polynomials,
however, we also need to show that for polynomials g1−bi , the decoding will always fail to return a
valid key k1−bi . However, this is the case since for each polynomial g1−bi at most λ/8 = λ/2−3λ/8
of the evaluation points are correct while the degree of the polynomial is λ/4. Hence, the RS
decoding algorithm either fails or returns a key k 6= k1−bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `o. Consequently, S
will not be able to correctly decrypt ci1−b to the message 0




Claim 9. The protocol
(AS[h],A1[h],A2[m])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
The simulation for this case is very similar to the case of malicious P1. In fact, note that P2 can
only perform a subset of cheating strategies of P1, by sending bad or inconsistent garbled inputs
(but not garbled circuits). Hence, a simpler variant of the extractor Ext in Lemma 14 can be used
to simulate A2 in the ideal world. Given Ext, the remainder of Sim2’s strategy will be identical to
that of Sim1 described above, and the same analysis goes through.
2
Claim 10. The protocol
(AS[sh],A1[ncS],A2[sh])-securely computes f in the FCT-hybrid model.
The proof of this claim is automatically implied given the proofs of the above claims and
Lemma 12.
2
6.6.2 Extending to Multiple Parties
We describe, at a high level, how our protocol can be extended to the multi-party setting. All
parties engage in the coin-tossing protocol and learn the necessary seeds. Then, the circuit garbler
and the server proceed as they would in the the two-party case. All other parties (clients) who
need to send their garbled inputs to the server, engage in a MPC protocol between themselves and
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the server, wherein their inputs is the seeds they hold and their own input keys, and the server’s
output is the input key for all parties. Note that this MPC protocol needs to be secure against
non-cooperative parties (except for one semi-honest party and a semi-honest server), and hence,
the naive solution of having each party send their input key to the server would not be sufficient.
Nevertheless, due to the particular setting we work in, a very efficient construction for implementing
this MPC protocol exists, but we defer a more detailed description of this step to a more complete
version.
In addition to sending their garbled inputs, we require all the parties to send the server the
evaluations of the polynomials g0i and g
1
i at the garbled output values of the garbled circuits used
in the protocol. The server then checks that all the parties sent the same evaluations for g0i and
g1i and if so, uses those values for the interpolation of the garbled outputs. Otherwise, the server
aborts.
In addition to security against Adv1, this protocol also provides security when all but one of
the parties are non-cooperative with respect to the server and the server and a single party are
semi-honest. Furthermore, if we modify the coin tossing protocol to include the server but without
providing him with the result of the coin-toss, the protocol can also handle an adversarial structure
where all parties (except for the server) are non-cooperative with respect to the server. We note
that an adversarial structure where all parties (except the server) are non-cooperative is meaningful
since this corresponds to cases where each party can deviate from the protocol but does not share
any private information or coordinate its behavior with other parties.
6.7 Server-Aided Computation From Delegated Computation
We describe a general construction for server-aided two-party computation based on any non-
interactive delegated computation scheme and any secure two-party computation protocol. The
resulting server-aided construction inherits the efficiency of the underlying protocols.
Informally, a delegated computation scheme allows a client to outsource the computation of
a circuit C on a private input x to an untrusted worker such that: (1) the client’s work is sub-
stantially smaller than evaluating C(x) on his own; (2) the worker does not learn any information
about the client’s input or output; and (3) the worker cannot return an incorrect answer without
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being detected. The notion of secure delegated computation is closely related to that of verifiable
computation [Goldwasser et al., 2008; Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010], with the additional
requirement that the client’s input and output remain private.
Our protocol. Our protocol, described in detail in Figure 6.4, works as follows. Let Del =
(Gen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) be a secure delegated computation scheme. The parties P1 and P2
use Del to outsource the evaluation of f on their combined inputs (i.e., the concatenation of x and
y) to the server. However, since P1 and P2 do not want to reveal their inputs to each other, they use
secure two-party computation to simulate the client in a delegated computation interaction. More
precisely, they run the Gen, ProbGen and Verify algorithms of Del via secure two-party computation.
The server S performs the same functionality as that of the worker in the delegated computation
interaction. Put differently, we use Del to outsource a two-party computation protocol between P1
and P2 to the server S.
Inputs P1’s input is x and P2’s input is y. Server S does not have any input.
Output P1 and P2 want to learn the function F on their inputs. Without loss of generality we
assume that F takes x and y as one concatenated input, i.e., the parties are computing F (x||y).
1. P1 and P2 use the ideal functionality Ff2pc, where f takes as input x and y, computes (pk, sk)←
Gen(1k,F) and (σx||y, τx||y)← ProbGensk(x||y) and outputs((









where τx||y = τ1x||y ⊕ τ2x||y and sk = sk1 ⊕ sk2. In essence P1 and P2 both learn pk and σx||y
while they each only learn a random share of τx||y and sk.
2. P1 and P2 each send σx||y and pk to the server S but keep their shares of τx||y to themselves.
Server checks to see that the two values received from the parties are the same and aborts
otherwise.
3. Server S computes Computepk(σx||y)→ σz where z = F (x||y) and sends σz to P1 and P2.
4. P1 and P2 use the ideal functionality Fg2pc where g takes as input τ1x||y, τ2x||y, sk1 and sk2 and
outputs (z, z) where z = Verifysk1⊕sk2((τ
1
x||y ⊕ τ2x||y), σz). P1 and P2 output z as their final
output.
Figure 6.4: A server-aided two-party protocol from any delegated computation scheme
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Intuitively, our protocol is secure since: (1) the verifiability of Del guarantees that a malicious
server cannot change the outcome of the computation; and (2) the privacy property Del guarantees
that the server cannot learn any useful information about the parties’ inputs. Furthermore, even if
a malicious server colludes with either P1 or P2, the colluding parties will not learn any information
about the remaining party’s input since the interaction between P1 and P2 is done via a secure two-










































Theorem 13. If Del is secure, then the server-aided two-party protocol described in Figure 6.4 is
secure in the F2pc-hybrid model against the adversary structure Adv4.
Proof. We sketch the proofs for each item in Adv4 separately.
Claim 11. The protocol
(AS[sh],A1[sh],A2[sh])-securely computes F in the F2pc-hybrid model.
We describe three independent transformations SimS , Sim1 and Sim2:
• SimS runsAS . SimS then generates two arbitrary inputs x′, y′, computes (pk, sk)← Gen(1k,F)
and (σx′||y′ , τx′||y′) ← ProbGensk(x′||y′) and sends σx′||y′ to AS . The privacy property of Del
ensures that AS ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in the real-world execution with
semi-honest P1 and P2 (where they use their real inputs x and y). At some point, AS sends
the output σz. SimS then outputs whatever AS does and halts. Since, AS is semi-honest in
this case, this will be the correct output.
• Sim1 runs A1. Note that since we prove the security of the protocol in the F2pc-hybrid model,
A1 will send his input x to F2pc. Sim1 forwards x to the trusted party of the ideal execution
and gets back F (x, y). Sim1 generates an arbitrary input y
′ for P2, runs (pk, sk)← Gen(1k,F),
and runs ProbGensk(x||y′) to compute σx||y′ , τx||y′ . He then sends σx||y′ and random values
τ1x||y′ and sk
1 to A1. The privacy property of Del guarantees that in A1’s view, σx||y′ is
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indistinguishable from σx||y for any y and y′. The same is true for τ1x||y′ and sk
1 which are
simply random shares. It is worth noting that the privacy property of Del requires that σx||y′
hide all partial information about the encoded input. Therefore, the tuple (x, σx||y′) is also
indistinguishable form the tuple (x, σx||y) for any y. Hence, we safely assume that A1’s view
so far is indistinguishable from his view in the real execution with semi-honest P2 and S.
Sim1 then computes σz′ ← Computepk(σx||y′) and sends σz′ to A1 on behalf of the server.
Note that for the same reason as above and due to the privacy property of Del, A1 cannot
distinguish σz′ from σz. A1 eventually sends sk1 and τ1x||y as his input to the trusted party of
the F2pc-functionality for the second run of MPC that runs the Verify function. Since A2 is
semi-honest, Sim1 simply returns the value F (x, y) that he received from the trusted party of
the ideal-world execution to A1. Sim1 then outputs whatever A1 does and halts.
• Sim2’s strategy is identical to Sim1’s since their roles in the protocol are symmetric.
2
Claim 12. The protocol
(AS[m],A1[h],A2[h])-securely computes F in the F2pc-hybrid model.
We describe a transformation SimS for the adversary AS . Note that since S does not have
any inputs to the protocol, there is no need for input extraction during the simulation. SimS only
needs to simulate AS ’s view correctly and make sure that in the case of an abort, or other types of
cheating by AS , P1 and P2’s output in the ideal execution is an abort as well.
SimS runs AS . SimS then generates two arbitrary inputs x′, y′, computes (pk, sk)← Gen(1k,F)
and (σx′||y′ , τx′||y′)← ProbGensk(x′||y′) and sends σx′||y′ to AS . The privacy property of Del ensures
that AS ’s view is indistinguishable from his view in the real execution with honest P1 and P2 (where
they use their real inputs). At some point, AS will either abort or send the output σz′ to the two
parties. SimS computes z
′ ← Verifysk(τx′||y′ , σz′). If z′ = ⊥, SimS sends an abort message to the
trusted party and simulates P1 and P2 aborting. SimS then outputs whatever AS does and halts.
Note that the verifiability property of Del (see definition 45) ensures that if z′ 6= F (x′, y′) then
z′ = ⊥ with high probability. Also note that the probability that z′ = ⊥ in the simulation with
inputs x′ and y′ is (all but negligibly) close to the same probability for any other inputs including
inputs x and y of P1 and P2 in the real execution. If this was not the case, once again we could
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use AS to break the privacy property of Del. These two facts combined demonstrate that the joint
distribution of outputs of AS , P1 and P2 in the real execution are computationally indistinguishable
from those of SimS , Sim1 and Sim2 in the ideal execution.
2
Claim 13. The protocol
(AS[nc1, nc2],A1[sh],A2[sh])-securely computes F in the F2pc-hybrid
model.
The proof of this claim follows from the previous two claims and Lemma 12.
Efficiency. Note that in the above protocol P1 and P2 only simulate the client in the delegated
computation interaction and not the server. Using general-purpose protocols such as Yao’s protocol
[Yao, 1982], the computation performed by P1 and P2 will be linear in that of client in the delegated
computation interaction. Given the efficiency properties of delegated computation, this will be
significantly lower than P1 and P2 running their own secure two-party computation protocol to
compute F on their private inputs. The server’s computation is identical to that of the worker in
the delegated computation interaction.
We know of two non-interactive delegated computation schemes in the literature. The first is
the construction of [Gennaro et al., 2010] based on Yao’s garbled circuits and fully homomorphic
encryption. When instantiated using their protocol, P1 and P2 would need perform O(k · |C|)
computation in the preprocessing stage, where C is the circuit that computes the function F and
k is the security parameter. In the online stage however, the work of P1 and P2 is O(n+m) where
n is the size of their inputs and m the size of their outputs. Hence, the amortized complexity of
the work by the players is O(n+m). The server’s work will be O(|C|).
The second instantiation is based on the construction of [Chung et al., 2010] which uses non-
interactive proofs with soundness amplification, as well as a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
When instantiated using their protocol, the oﬄine cost of computation for P1 and P2 would be
poly(k, |C|) while the online and hence the amortized cost is poly(k, log(|C|)). The servers compu-
tation is poly(k, |C|). The main advantage of the latter instantiation is that the public key of the
scheme will be significantly smaller.
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6.8 Server-Aided Private Set Intersection
The setting for the problem of set intersection includes two parties that have private input sets
and wish to compute the intersection of the elements in their sets. This problem has numer-
ous applications in practice and has been considered in a series of works [Freedman et al., 2004;
Hazay and Lindell, 2008; Kissner and Song, 2005; Jarecki and Liu, 2009; Dachman-Soled et al., 2009;
Cristofaro et al., 2010; Hazay and Nissim, 2010; Dachman-Soled et al., 2011]. These papers offer
protocols addressing various adversarial models under different assumptions with a range of ef-
ficiency characteristics. In the semi-honest adversarial model, the protocols for set intersection
have linear complexity in the size of the inputs. The goal of many of these works is to approach
this complexity in stronger adversarial models. For instance, Cristofaro et al. [Cristofaro et al.,
2010] achieve linear complexity in the malicious case in the random oracle model. Jarecki et al.
[Jarecki and Liu, 2009] propose a protocol with linear complexity secure in the standard model in
the presence of malicious parties, based on the Decisional q-Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption
(in the CRS model), where a safe RSA modulus is generated by a trusted third party, and the
input domain is of size polynomial in the security parameter.
We consider the problem of set intersection in the setting of outsourced computation where
we would like to enable the computationally powerful server to execute the majority of the work
involved comparing the values in the two input sets. Essentially we are interested in a solution
where each of the two parties performs work that is linear in the size of his input set to preprocess
the data and sends the results to the server who will compute the final intersection result.
A simple solution for the case when all parties are semi-honest. In the case of a semi-honest
server we can obtain such a protocol as follows: the two input parties agree on a PRF key, and
submit to the server the result of the evaluation of the PRF under this key on each of the points
in their input sets. Subsequently the server computes the set intersection of the two sets of PRF
values he received, and sends the output to the two parties, who can map the PRF values back
to the real input points. As long as the server follows the protocol honestly the two parties will
receive the correct output without being able to learn anything about their private data due to the
security guarantees of the PRF.
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Protecting against a malicious server. The above protocol fails to guarantee correctness of
the output in the case of a malicious server who can deviate from the prescribed protocol since
he can return an arbitrary result without the parties being able to detect this. We adopt the
following technique in order to enable the parties to detect misbehavior on the server’s side: each
party computes t copies of each of his inputs of the form x|i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, and submits the PRF
evaluations on the resulting values in a randomly permuted order. The server then computes the
set intersection based on these PRF values and returns the answer. Now, we require that the
set intersection contains all t copies for each element in the intersection. If it does not, then the
parties will detect misbehavior on server’s side and will abort. Thus in order to cheat without being
detected, the server will need to guess what values correspond to the copies of the same element.
The probability for this is negligible except in the following two cases (1) the server returns empty
intersection (does not need to return any value) or (2) claims to each party that all elements from
his/her input set are in the intersection (returns all PRF values provided by that party). To address
these last issues we need to guarantee that the set intersection is neither empty nor contains all
submitted elements. We achieve this in the following way: the parties agree on three elements d, e1
and e2 outside the range of possible input values. Then, the first party adds d and e1 to his/her
input set and the second party adds d and e2 to his/her input set. Now the set intersection has
to be non-empty since d will be in it, and at the same time cannot consist of all submitted input
elements for either party since both e1 and e2 are not in the intersection. The protocol in Figure 6.5
presents the details of the the approach that we just outlined. We also note that for the purposes
of the simulation, we need to use a pseudorandom permutation rather than any pseudorandom
function.
Theorem 14. The protocol in Figure 6.5 securely computes the 2-party set intersection function-














We refer the reader to Appendix D.3 for proof of the theorem.
Protecting against malicious parties. While the above protocol allows the two parties to
detect a malicious server, it introduces a way for a malicious party to submit incorrectly processed
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Server-Aided Set Intersection
Let m and n be the sizes of the inputs sets for parties P1 and P2 with elements in the domain R.
Let F be a pseudo-random permutation. Let t be a security parameter.
Inputs: P1 has input set X; P2 has input set Y




1. P1 and P2 run a coin tossing protocol to choose a PRP key K.
2. P1 and P2 choose three elements d, e1, e2 /∈ R. P1 adds d and e1 to his set X. P2 adds d and
e2 to his set Y .
3. For each xi ∈ X, P1 computes ai,j = FK(xi|j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. P1 sends the set A =
{ai,j}1≤i≤m,1≤j≤t in a randomly permuted order to S.
4. For each yi ∈ Y , P2 computes bi,j = FK(yi|j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. P2 sends the set
B = {bi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤t in a randomly permuted order to S.
5. S computes the set A
⋂
B and sends it to P1 and P2.
6. P1 checks that the PRP values corresponding to d are present in A
⋂
B and those corre-
sponding to e1 are not. He also checks that if FK(xi|j) ∈ A
⋂
B for some j ∈ [1, t], then
FK(xi|j) ∈ A
⋂
B for all j ∈ [1, t]. If either of these checks fails, P1 aborts the protocol. P2
runs a similar check.
7. Using K, P1 and P2 recover the values in X ∩ Y .
Figure 6.5: Security against malicious server
input that would cause the other party to abort after receiving an invalid set intersection result,
while the misbehaving party will learns the real output. Furthermore, the fact that the honest
party aborts can itself leak additional information about his inputs. In order to enable detection
of misbehavior on the side of either party, we augment the protocol again. If we did not want to
provide privacy of the input data from the server but still wanted to guarantee the correctness of
the output result, we could solve this problem as follows: the server commits to the intersection set
that he computes from the PRF values, then the parties reveal the key for the PRF to him so that
he can verify the correctness of the submitted input sets and notify the two parties while not being
able to change the computed output because of the commitment. In order to maintain the privacy
for the input sets we can introduce an additional layer of PRF invocation where the first layer will
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account for the privacy guarantee and the second layer will allow for detection of the correctness of
the input sets submitted by each party. We provide the details of the construction in Figure 6.6.
Server-Aided Set Intersection
Let m and n be the sizes of the inputs sets for parties P1 and P2 with elements in the domain R. Let
G and F be pseudo-random permutation. Let t be a security parameter. Let com be a commitment
scheme.
Inputs: P1 has input set X; P2 has input set Y




1. P1 and P2 run a coin tossing protocol to choose two key K1 and K2.
2. P1 and P2 choose three elements d, e1, e2 /∈ R. P1 adds d and e1 to his set X. P2 adds d and
e2 to his set Y .
3. P1 computes X
′ = {GK1(x) | x ∈ X}.
4. P1 computes Y
′ = {GK1(y) | y ∈ Y }.
5. For each x′i ∈ X ′, 1 ≤ i ≤ m P1 computes ai,j = FK2(xi|j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. P1 sends the set
A = {ai,j} to S.
6. For each y′i ∈ Y ′, 1 ≤ i ≤ n P2 computes bi,j = FK2(yi|j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. P2 sends the set
B = {bi,j} to S.
7. S computes the set A
⋂
B and sends a commitment com(A
⋂
B) to both P1 and P2.
8. P1 sends the set X
′ and K2 to S and P2 sends Y ′ and K2 to S.
9. S verified that he received the same key from both parties and that the sets A and B have
been computed correctly, namely contain exactly t PRF values for each input element. If the
verification fails, S aborts the protocol.
10. S opens the the commitment com(A
⋂
B) and sends the intersection set A
⋂
B to P1 and P2.
11. Both P1 and P2 verify the open commitment. If the verification fails, they abort the protocol.
12. P1 checks that the PRP values corresponding to d are present in A
⋂
B and e1 is not. He
also checks that A
⋂
B contains t corresponding PRP values for each element of X ′ in the
intersection A
⋂
B. If either of these checks fails, P1 aborts the protocol.
13. Using K1 and K2 P1 and P2 recover the values in X ∩ Y .
Figure 6.6: Security against any one malicious party.
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Theorem 15. The protocol in Figure 6.5 securely computes the 2-party set intersection function-














AS [sh],A1[sh],A2[ncS , nc1]
)}
.
We refer the reader to Appendix D.3 for proof of the theorem.
Multiparty Set Intersection. We observe that both of our protocols can be generalized to
setting where multiple parties want to find the intersection of their input sets. In this case the
parties agree on common PRF key and then submit the PRF evaluations on their input sets to the
server who computes the final intersection. We can apply the same techniques in order to protect
against malicious server and malicious parties.
Efficiency. Our set intersection protocol requires that each party performs as many PRF evalua-
tions as the size of his input set. The only works that give two party solutions to the set intersection
problem with linear computation complexity in the total size of the input sets are [Cristofaro et al.,
2010] and [Jarecki and Liu, 2009], however, the former is in the random oracle model (ROM) and
the latter works for input sets of limited size, polynomial in the security parameter and requiring a
common random string (CRS). The computation work in both of these solutions includes a linear
number of exponentiations equivalent to public key operations. The solution of [Hazay and Nissim,
2010] has the best computational complexity while achieving security against malicious adversaries
and it requires O(m+ n(log logm+ p)) exponentiations where m and n are the sizes of the input
sets and p is the bit length of each input element, which is logarithmic in the input domain range.
In the multiparty case computation complexity for each party remains the same which improves
the computation cost of O(Nd2 log d) in the case of N parties with input sets of size d of the most
efficient existing solution [Dachman-Soled et al., 2011].
6.9 Efficiency in the Server-Aided Setting
Having introduced the server-aided model for secure computation, it is natural to ask:
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Is it possible to gain efficiency in this setting? and if so how can one quantify such
a gain in efficiency?
In this section we discuss these issues, informally. Formalizing these discussions accompanied with
feasibility and impossibility results is an interesting direction for future research.
6.9.1 Evaluating the Efficiency Gain
Our main motivation for considering MPC in the server-aided setting is to allow (possibly) het-
erogeneous parties to outsource their computation to a server (that they do not necessarily trust).
Hence, a natural way of measuring the efficiency of a server-aided protocol Πsacf between n parties
(P1, . . . , Pn) and a server Pn+1 that wish to compute a function f , is to compare the work per-
formed by these parties with the work they would have to do in the most efficient “standard” MPC
protocol Πmpcf (where the server is not present). Even if given a secure MPC protocol Π
mpc
f as a
point of reference, there are multiple ways of quantifying the gain in the server-aided model each
of which might be suitable for a particular computing environment.
Max/min efficiency. In cases where one party has significantly lower computational resources
(e.g., a mobile phone executing a protocol with high-performance servers) we would like the weakest
device to outsource as much of its computation as possible. A natural measure then is to consider
only the maximum (over the parties) efficiency achieved by Πsacf . Furthermore, when comparing to
a standard MPC protocol, one should compare the total work of the party Pi that does the least
amount of work in Πmpcf with the total work of the party Pj that does the least amount of work in
Πsacf . If the gap is significant enough, the weak device will see an improvement in efficiency if it
plays the role of Pj in Π
sac
f
3. Similarly, one could consider the minimum efficiency, i.e., the total
work of the party that does the most amount of work in Πsacf .
We note that a sizable maximum efficiency might mean a less impressive reduction in the work
of other players (or even an increase). For example, in the server-aided variant of Yao’s garbled
circuit protocol we design in Section 6.5, one player’s computation is reduced significantly (the
work is independent of the circuit size), while the second player has to do work proportional to the
circuit size (though his work is still less than than what it would be in Yao’s original protocol).
3We note that in the case of special-purpose protocols, the roles that a party can play may be restricted.
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Average efficiency. Alternatively, one might be interested in a noticeable gain in the total work
required by the players (excluding the server) regardless of the way this work is divided between
the players. In this case one should try to optimize the average efficiency over by all the parties. To
ensure some level of fairness, one can additionally enforce a limit on the variance in the efficiency
of different parties. One example of a protocol with better average efficiency compared to standard
two-party computation is briefly mentioned in Section 6.6. This protocol provides security against
a malicious circuit garbler by utilizing the honest server for verification. In the resulting protocol,
both players still have to compute a garbled circuit once, but can avoid the cut-and-choose and/or
zero-knowledge proof techniques which would add a significant overhead.
Combined efficiency. Finally, there may be cases where a combination of different efficiency
measures may be appropriate. Consider, for example, a computation that occurs between a mobile
device and a server running “in the cloud”. As discussed above, the maximum efficiency of Πsacf
is an important consideration for the weakest device (i.e., the mobile device). But the minimum
efficiency of Πsacf may be important as well since computation “in the cloud” has an economic cost
and the client may have a limited budget.
More generally, taking extra costs into account (e.g., the cost of a cloud service) for some players
it may only make sense (economically) to take part in a server-aided protocol if the gain in efficiency
is greater than a threshold while other players may be happy with more modest gains. In such
cases a combination of the maximum, minimum and average efficiency might be appropriate.
6.9.2 Comparison with Secure Delegated Computation
An alternative way of measuring efficiency is to compare the work the parties have to perform in the
server-aided protocol to their work if they were to take part in an insecure protocol for evaluating
the same function. This measure of efficiency is closely related to those considered for secure
delegated computation (see Appendix D.2). In fact, it is not hard to show that any server-aided
protocol for computing a function f that achieves reasonable efficiency compared to an insecure
protocol for the same task can easily be turned into an efficient and secure delegated computation.
For example, consider our server-aided variant of Yao’s protocol from Section 6.5. As mentioned
above, this protocol reduces P2’s work significantly, making it independent of the circuit size for f
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while P1’s work is still linear in the circuit size. Now consider a construction that would improve
our protocol by making P1’s work sublinear in the circuit size. One could then transform P1 and
P2 into a single client, and let the server be the worker in a securely delegated computation scheme.
This would yield a scheme that is more efficient than existing general-purpose secure delegation
schemes in the literature [Gennaro et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2010] since they all take advantage of
heavy machinery (e.g., fully homomorphic encryption) and only provide amortized improvements
over insecure protocols.
This connection with secure delegated computation schemes is bi-directional. In fact in Sec-
tion 6.7, we formally show how to transform any secure delegated computation scheme into an
efficient server-aided secure computation protocol.
6.9.3 Why Non-Collusion Helps
Our last note on efficiency is an intuitive explanation of why non-collusion helps. In particular,
consider a security definition for server-aided computation where a player (e.g., P1) could collude
with the server S. In that case, we could combine P1 and S into a single party P1S and our
security definitions would reduce to the standard definitions for secure two-party computation
between P1S and P2. Then, any general-purpose protocol for server-aided computation where P2’s
work is sublinear in the circuit size, would automatically yield a general-purpose secure two-party
computation where one of the parties performs sublinear work in the size of circuit. To the best
of our knowledge, the only known way of achieving this goal (even in the case of semi-honest
adversaries) is via use of a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme.
On the other hand, our non-collusion assumption between P1 and S allows us to design a
general-purpose protocol where the work of P2 is independent of the circuit size.
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Chapter 7
Privacy Enhanced Access Control for
Outsourced Data Sharing
7.1 Motivation and Contributions
The emerging trend of outsourcing of data storage at third parties – “cloud storage” – has recently
attracted tremendous amount of attention from both research and industry communities. Out-
sourced storage makes shared data and resources much more accessible as users can retrieve them
anywhere from personal computers to smart phones. This alleviates data owner from the burden
of data management and leaves this task to service providers with dedicated resources and more
advanced techniques.
Traditional access control models focus on mediating access requests and providing confidential-
ity and availability guarantees for protected data and resources, often with an implicit assumption
that the entity enforcing access control policies is also the owner of data. In this case the following
two requirements suffice to achieve the goal: a policy specification that allows to define rules both
syntactically and semantically that will govern the requests of data and resources from different
subjects; a mechanism that performs request mediation based on defined rules. However, in many
cases of distributed computing, the aforementioned assumption no longer holds, and we need to
facilitate access control at points which should not have direct access to the data content itself,
such as when outsourcing data storage to an untrusted third party. Therefore we need to store
data in encrypted form and enforce access control over the encrypted data.
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We would like to facilitate data sharing in the setting of outsourced storage at a third party such
as a cloud provider. The setting of cloud computing falls into the category of distributed access
control scenarios discussed above. The cloud servers are considered to be honest but curious.
They will follow our proposed protocol in general, but will try to find out as much information as
possible based on their inputs. Therefore data confidentiality is not the only security concern in
this scenario.1
First of all, given the fact that data storage provider (i.e., the cloud) does not own the data,
access control policies defined by the data owner that govern who can have access to that date
become also private information with respect to the cloud. For example, the fact that certain
users share some of their data with other users or that they stop the sharing can be suggestive
about their business relationships. This problem is mitigated by the use of cryptography as an
enforcement mechanism. This approach translates the access control problem into the question of
key management for the decryption keys. In this case, a user could obtain any encrypted data from
the storage provider but access requests are answered implicitly by the fact a user can decrypt only
the data that he is allowed to access (i.e, the possession of the corresponding decryption keys).
Such a setup often requires that each encrypted resource is associated with an unique identifier and
that the user knows the identifiers of the resources to which he wants access.
Another issue relevant to data sharing in outsourced storage is information leakage deduced
from careful observations on data access patterns. Even though data is stored and transferred in
an encrypted format, traffic analysis techniques can reveal privacy information about the activities
of users and the underlying data. For example, access history to multiple data objects could reveal
the access habits and privileges of a particular user; access to the same data object from multiple
users could suggest a common interest or collaborative relationship; a ranking of data objects
popularity can also be built upon access requests that the cloud receives. A trivial solution to the
access pattern problem is to return all encrypted data upon any data request. While this solution
may not cause any confidentiality problem with respect to the stored data, if the cryptographic
mechanism guarantees that a user can decrypt only data that he has access to, it brings prohibitive
costs in several directions: the data stored at a cloud provider most likely exceeds the storage
capacity of any single user, the communication for transferring the data would incur enormous
1Issues of data integrity and availability in access control models are beyond the scope of this paper.
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network usage as drastically increased latency; additionally, the user would need to spend time on
cryptographic computations to find the appropriate piece of the data he needs. All these concerns
rule out this obvious solution.
The question of hiding access pattern is a challenging task to achieve while avoiding work
proportional to the total size of all stored files. There have been several cryptographic solutions
that realize the notion of oblivious RAM and manage to achieve improved amortized complexity for
queries while hiding access patterns [Goldreich and Ostrovsky, 1996; Pinkas and Reinman, 2010;
Damgard et al., 2010; Goodrich and Mitzenmacher, 2011]. However, such solutions are highly
interactive and still require communication polylogarithmic in the size of the database, which in the
setting of large storage cloud providers, weak client devices and expensive network communication
will not be practical. Furthermore, they assume that the user submitting the query is the owner of
all data, which does not fit our scenario where access control is enforced on data shared by multiple
users, not limited to the data owner.
An equally important, but often overlooked, aspect of access control for outsourced data is
to enforce the write access. Existing solutions often made an implicit assumption that access to
shard data and resources always refer to read requests only. However, an inevitable requirement of
data sharing is to allow authorized write access, such as in a collaborative working environment,
where co-workers are allowed to contribute to the same project document. While data encryption
naturally preserves authorization of the read access through key management, it says little about the
authorization on writing to that data. That is the procession of a decryption key implies authorized
read access but not necessarily the write. Therefore, different cryptographic schemes are mandatory
to manage read and write accesses separately. On the other hand, similar to read access, access
patterns on write operations should be hidden from the cloud provider to achieve better privacy.
In addition, adding write operation into the current access control scheme complicates our problem
as we do not assume any implications between read and write access rules. Thus a user may have
both types of access (read and write) to a protected object or only one of them (only read, only
write).
We consider the scenario of a web-based data sharing service, like Dropbox, throughout the
discussion of this paper. In our scenario, users are allowed to upload data, such as documents,
pictures, video clips, etc., to a cloud storage provider. Parts of this data can be shared with
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other users of the service and regulated by access control policies specified by the data owner. For
example, a user can upload vacation pictures to be viewed only by family and friends; meanwhile
she may also want to share read and write access to a project document among collaborating
co-workers.
We claim that a privacy enhanced access control solution for data sharing in outsourced storage,
such as the cloud, needs to meet the following requirements:
1. it provides data confidentiality by implementing a cryptographic mechanism to enforce fine-
grained access control, ensuring that a user can decrypt only the data that he has access
to;
2. it provides a more practical and flexible data sharing scheme by supporting both read and
write operations in the access control model;
3. it enhances data and user privacy by limiting the information leakage to the cloud servers
from the access control rules and access patterns of users.
7.1.1 Contributions
We address the privacy requirements for the policies and users’ access patterns in the setting of
outsourced data storage and propose a mechanism to achieve a flexible level of privacy guarantee
for the client. We introduce a two-level access control model that combines fine-grained access
control, which supports the precise granularity for access rules, and coarse-grained access control,
which allows the storage provider to manage access requests while learning only limited information
from its inputs. This is achieved by arranging outsourced resources into units called access blocks
and enforcing access control at the cloud only at the granularity of blocks. The fine-grained access
control within each access block is enforced at the user’s site and remains oblivious to the cloud.
The mapping between files and access blocks is transparent to the users in the sense that they can
submit file requests without knowing in what blocks the files are contained. While most existing
solutions [De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2011; Vimercati et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010] focus on
read request, we present a solution that provides both read and write access control.
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7.2 Two-level Access Control Model – Solution Overview
We consider the following scenario: a set of users outsource their data to a remote storage (cloud)
provider. These users further would like to be able to share selectively some of their data among
themselves. This data sharing should be enabled directly at the cloud through appropriate access
control rules that allow users to retrieve all data that they are authorized to access (i.e. not
involving the actual data owner). Further, the access control rules governing the data sharing and
the data that users access are private information of the users and our goal will be to protect this
information from the cloud provider.
We distinguish the following three roles in this access control model: the data owner who creates
data to be stored at the remote storage in an encrypted format and regulates who has what access
to each part of the data; the data user who may have read and write access to the protected data;
the cloud provider that stores the encrypted data and responds to access requests. While a solution
that enforces access control solely through encryption of the data and appropriate decryption key
distribution can achieve complete privacy for the access patterns and access control rules by allowing
users to retrieve the whole encrypted database, such an approach will be completely impractical
requiring an enormous amount of communication. We suggest a hybrid solution that offers a way
to trade off privacy and efficiency guarantees. The basic idea behind it is to provide two levels
of access control: coarse-grained and fine-grained. The coarse-grained level access control will be
enforced explicitly by the cloud provider and it would also represent the granularity at which he
will learn the access pattern of users. Even though the cloud provider will learn the access pattern
over all user requests, he will not be able to distinguish requests from different users, which would
come in the form of anonymous tokens. The fine-grained access control will be enforced obliviously
to the cloud through encryption and would prevent him from differentiating requests that result in
the same coarse-grained access control decision but have different fine-grained access pattern.
We realize the above two levels of access control by introducing division of the data resources of
the same owner into units called access blocks, which would represent the coarse-level granularity
in the system. Now the cloud provider would be able to map user requests to the respective access
blocks containing the relevant data only if the user has access to the requested data and without
learning which part of the block is accessed. The provider would also not learn the reason for
no match: missing data or no access authorization. Our solution does not require users to know
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the exact access blocks that would contain the data they are searching for. Files might be moved
between different blocks, and the only information that users would need in order to request them
will be a unique file identifier rather than the id of the current block where the file is residing.
We will enable this oblivious mapping of files to blocks using techniques from predicate encryption
and some extensions to the scheme [Katz et al., 2008]. Once a user retrieves the content of the
matching block, he would be able to decrypt only the part of the block, which he is authorized to
access. We use the ideas of [Vimercati et al., 2010] to minimize the decryption keys that need to
be distributed for fine-grained access control within access blocks.
While the above suffices for read access control, handling write access control is a little more
subtle. The main issue there is that the cloud would need to allow users to submit updates for
different parts of an access block without learning which part are updated, and at the same time
prevent users authorized to write to one file in the block from writing to another file. In order to
facilitate this functionality the cloud provider would accept write updates for blocks only from users
that provide tokens granting them write access to some part of the block (not revealing which part).
These updates will be appended to the content of the block but also the cloud would obliviously
tag the updates with the id of the file for which the user has been authorized, but without learning
which this file is. We achieve this functionality again through a modification of the searchable
ciphertexts in a predicate encryption scheme.
7.3 Access Control Model
In our access control model, we consider a scenario with a set of users U that selectively perform
data sharing among themselves on a set of resources R using remote storage provided by the cloud.
To discuss different activities an entity can perform, we distinguish the following three different
roles in the model: the data owner who creates data to be stored at the remote storage in an
encrypted format and regulates who determines the access rules to each unit of the data; the data
user who may have read and write access to the protected data; the cloud provider that stores the
encrypted data and responds to access requests enforcing the specified access rules. Note that a
user can play the role of a data owner and a data user at the same time. When a data owner o ∈ U
wants to share a resource r ∈ R, the management of r is outsourced to the cloud provider. The
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authorization policy is defined by data owner o and enforced through cryptographic access control
scheme (See details in Section 7.4 and 7.5.). Also the cloud provider is considered to be honest-
but-curious, which can be trusted to perform the management protocol but will try to deduce as
much information as possible from its inputs, such as the access pattern.
An authorization policy Po is a set of tuples of form 〈u, r, p〉 (p ∈ {r, w}), which states a data
user u ∈ U is allowed access data resource r ∈ R owned by o ∈ U by performing read (r) or
write (w) operation. An access control list (ACL) of a resource r owned by o, denoted as acl(r) is
then defined as a set of data users u satisfying an authorization policy. More specifically, we use
acl read(r) and acl write(r) to represent ACL for read and write access respectively.
To provide confidentiality through data encryption while preserving privacy, we propose a two-
leveled access control model illustrated in Figure 7.1. In our scheme the data resources (files) will be
divided into units that we call access blocks. These access blocks will constitute the coarse-grained
level view of the stored data. The cloud provider will be presented with this view and he will
be able to enforce access control rules at this granularity. He will be able to match an authorized
request to the access block that contains the file that is being accessed. In the case of a read request
the cloud would provide the content of the matching block to the user. And in the case of a write
request accept the cloud provider will accept only authorized updates for the content of the access
block and would also obliviously match them to the files for which they are submitted.
At the fine-grained level, each access block bi consists of ki files owned by a single party. Each
data owner is responsible for distributing his resources into blocks. He would further have fine-
grained access policies that would specify each user’s access to the separate files stored within an
access block. The fine-grained access control will be enforced at the user’s side as opposed to the
coarse-grained access control which is enforced at the cloud provider. For this purpose we will use
encryption as implicit method for access control in the case of read requests. For write fine-grained
access control we will use again appropriate encryption keys distribution together with tokens that
would both authorize an update request to the cloud provider but would also implicitly bind the
submitted update to the exact file within the access block. In Section 7.4 and Section 7.5 we present
the exact protocols that implement these ideas.
To facilitate our discussion on the access control scheme, we present a simple yet illustrative
example as follows:
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b9	   b10	   b11	   b12	  
b5	   b6	   b7	   b8	  
	  	  b1	   b2	   b3	   b4	  
rk-­‐2	   rk-­‐1	   rk	  
(a)  Coarse-­‐grained	  access	  block	  level	   (b)	  Fine-­‐grained	  resource	  level	  
r1	   r2	   r3	  
Figure 7.1: Two-leveled access control model.
Example 1 : Consider a system with five users U = {A,B,C, D,E}. Let Ru denote the set of
resources owner by user u, and we have RA = {r1, r2, r3, r4}, RB = {r5, r6, r7} and RC = RD =
RE = ∅. Authorization policies at the fine-grained level defined by each data owner are:
• PA = {〈A, r1, r〉, 〈B, r1, r〉, 〈C, r1, r〉, 〈A, r2, r〉, 〈B, r2, r〉,
〈C, r2, r〉, 〈A, r3, r〉, 〈E, r3, r〉, 〈A, r4, r〉, 〈B, r4, r〉,
〈C, r4, r〉, 〈E, r4, r〉, 〈A, r1, w〉, 〈B, r1, w〉, 〈C, r1, w〉,
〈A, r2, w〉, 〈B, r2, w〉, 〈C, r2, w〉, 〈A, r3, w〉, 〈A, r4, w〉,
〈D, r4, w〉};
• PB = {〈A, r5, r〉, 〈B, r5, r〉, 〈B, r6, r〉, 〈C, r6, r〉, 〈D, r6, r〉,
〈A, r7, r〉, 〈B, r7, r〉, 〈C, r7, r〉, 〈D, r7, r〉, 〈E, r7, r〉,
〈A, r5, w〉, 〈B, r5, w〉, 〈C, r5, w〉, 〈B, r6, w〉, 〈D, r6, w〉,
〈E, r6, w〉, 〈A, r7, w〉, 〈B, r7, w〉, 〈C, r7, w〉, 〈D, r7, w〉,
〈E, r7, w〉}.
Therefore, we have the following set of ACLs:
• acl read(r1) = {A,B,C}, acl write(r1) = {A,B,C};
• acl read(r2) = {A,B,C}, acl write(r2) = {A,B,C};
• acl read(r3) = {A,E}, acl write(r3) = {A};
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• acl read(r4) = {A,B,C,E}, acl write(r4) = {A,D};
• acl read(r5) = {A,B}, acl write(r5) = {A,B,C};
• acl read(r6) = {B,C,D}, acl write(r6) = {B,D,E};
• acl read(r7) = {A,B,C,D,E}, acl write(r7) = {A,B,C,D,E}.
Note that for each resource r owned by user o, we have acl read(r) ∩ acl write(r) ⊇ {o}. That is
the owner of a resource automatically entails both read and write access privilege. At the coarse-
grained level, user A maintains two blocks b1 = {r1, r2} and b2 = {r3, r4}, and user B maintains a
single block b3 = {r5, r6, r7}.
7.4 Read Access Control
In this section, we present in detail the two-level access control scheme for read access only after
describing the following techniques applied in our protocol.
7.4.1 Techniques
7.4.1.1 Fine-Grained Access Control
Fine-grained access control is applied to files inside each access block to explicitly enforce access
control rules. While the cloud provider is able to determine whether a user submits a legitimate
request for some file within a block, he should remain oblivious to the access control rules defined for
that file. To guarantee this property the access control view presented to the cloud treats blocks as
entities, and the cloud grants a read access by providing the content of an entire block. Fine-grained
access control is enforced by encrypting files per block under different keys, and the access control
problem is mitigated to appropriate key distribution. Even a user receives the encrypted content
of a block, he is able to decrypt only the files that he has access to. Access revocation requires
re-encryption of the resource and re-distribution of the new key to the remaining authorized users.
Our goal is to minimize the amount of work and interaction between users and the system upon
policy updates.
The work of [Vimercati et al., 2010] proposes an encryption-based access control solution for
outsourced data. They introduce a key distribution technique that allows each user to receive only
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one credential in the form of a public-private key pair and then later be able to derive decryption
keys for all resources he has access to using a public structure, only when he needs to access these
resources. This public structure helps avoid the need to explicitly re-distribute keys to each user
when access policy change.
The key distribution structure used in the scheme of [Vimercati et al., 2010] is a tree with the
following properties:
1. Each leaf of the tree is assigned a symmetric key. The leaf keys are the private keys distributed
to the users of the system when they join.
2. Each intermediate node in the tree is associated with a symmetric key, and contains tokens
with encryptions of this key under the keys of the children nodes. The internal nodes’ keys
are encryption keys for different resources. The tokens for each node constitute the structure
that is published and used by each user to derive the decryption keys for the authorized
resources.
3. The tree graph contains directed edges from children nodes to their parent nodes that satisfy
the following property: there is a directed path from a leaf node to an internal node if and
only if the user who possesses the leaf node key has access to the resource encrypted with the
keys of the internal nodes. The edges of the graph represent the access control rules for the
system.
When a user wants to access a file, he derives the corresponding decryption key as follows:
starting from its leaf node decrypting its content with his private key credential and then using
the key obtained from the node to try to decrypt the content of the parent node. He continues
this process of decryption at nodes and deriving new keys to obtain all decryption keys for the
documents he can access.
We use the approach of [Vimercati et al., 2010] to implement fine-grained access control in our
scheme since it does not require direct interaction between data owner and users for key distribution.
This property is important since we want to enable the work of our system without making any
assumptions about the time when any other party except the cloud provider will be online. Since
the structure that contains the encrypted keys does not need to be private, it can be stored at
the cloud provider. Thus we can achieve key distribution without requiring any direct interaction
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between data owner and users beyond some initial set-up stage when the user establishes a private
key with the data owner. We include the key distribution tree for the files in a block in the contents
of the block, which the user will retrieve and then derive the appropriate decryption keys. We also
need to make some modifications to the way the tree is constructed. In out case the tree structure
itself can reveal certain sensitive information to the cloud. For example, a user having access to
one file will have access to all the files along a directed path. So the content of each node, a pointer
to next node and the token to derive next key are all protected under the current encryption key.
For the purposes of our protocols we will assume an instantiation of the scheme from [Vimer-
cati et al., 2010] that provides the following functions: Publish, Access Read, Find Chain,
Compute Key, Find Resources, the use of which we summarize in Figure 7.2. We also extend
the functionality of the underlying scheme with a protocol that allows updates in the access poli-
cies. An update in the access rules translates into a change of the edges in the graph. If there are
any internal nodes in the graph that become disconnected from any leaf node after the update,
this necessitates change of the keys associated with those nodes as well as re-encryption of the
corresponding resources. We describe how we instantiate the Update function also in Figure 7.2.
Given this structure a user can obtain the keys of the internal nodes to which it is connected with
a directed path, and by definition these are exactly the decryption keys for the files that he can
access.
7.4.1.2 Coarse-Grained Access Control
The main goal to achieve at the level of coarse-grained access control is to enable the cloud provider
to obliviously match a user’s request to an access block without learning which part of the block
the user is authorized to access. In addition we provide unlinkability among multiple requests for
the same resource even if coming from the same user, which further protects users’ access patterns
from the cloud provider. In order to achieve these goals we apply the predicate encryption scheme
of [Katz et al., 2008]. Observing that in this scheme ciphertext can be re-randomized even without
knowledge of the secret key, we define a re-randomization algorithm in Definition 22.
Definition 22. A re-randomizable predicate encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1n): produces a master secret key SK and public parameters;
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• Publish(r, o, eo, acl): adds a resource r owned by o with a secret eo and an access control list
acl = acl read(r) for read access.
• Access Read(u, r, o): returns the encryption key for a resource r owned by o, if u is an
authorized user.
• Find Chain(u, r): finds the shortest chain of tokens from the secret key of user u to derive
the decryption key for resource r.
• Compute Key(u, chain): derives the secret key for a user u given a chain of transition
tokens.
• Find Resources(u, r): finds the set of nodes that lie on any path from the user u to the
node corresponding to resource r.
• Update(r, acl): if there is another resource with the same access control list acl, i.e., there
is a node in the tree accessable exactly by a subset of users in acl, then encrypt r with the
key contained in that node. Otherwise, encrypt r with a new key, add a new node containing
this key to the tree and add appropriate edges to connect the new node to the users who have
access to r. (Note that certain subgroups of the users in acl might already have a shared key
through another node in tree, and in that case we connect to that node rather than all the
users’ nodes separately.)
Figure 7.2: Algorithms for key distribution and management for fine-grained AC.
• EncSK(x): encrypts an attribute x using key SK;
• GenKeySK(f): generate a decryption key SKf associated with a function f ;
• DecSKf (c): outputs 1 if the attribute encrypted in c = EncSK(x) satisfies f , i.e. f(x) = 1,
and output a random value, otherwise;
• Rand(c): computes a new encryption c′ of the value encrypted in c but with different random-
ness without the secret key.
We present the predicate encryption scheme of [Katz et al., 2008] and the instantiation of the
function Rand(c) for that scheme in Appendix E.1. This scheme handles a class of functions f ,
which includes polynomials of bounded degree. We use polynomial functions of the type f(x) =
(x − id1) · · · (x − idn), to implement coarse-grained access control. Figure 7.3 present a list of
algorithms to enforce access control on the block level granularity without revealing the exact files
that are being accessed insider a block. The algorithm File Access Check grants access if the
submitted access token matches any of the files in the block without revealing the file identity. The
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request token produced by File Access Request is an encryption that does not leak information
about the file id it contains.
• Block Access Setup: data owner runs Setup(1n), publishes the public parameters and
keeps the master secret key SK. For files id1, . . . , idn in each block, he computes SKf =
GenKeySK(f) for f(x) = (x− id1) · · · (x− idn) and sends SKf to the cloud provider.
• File Access Authorization: data owner provides access to a file id by sending cid =
EncSK(id) to an authorized user.
• File Access Request: user generates a token tid = Rand(cid) for file id.
• File Access Check: upon receiving a request token t, the cloud computes DecSKf (t) for each
block, and returns those blocks that compute to 1.
Figure 7.3: Algorithms for enforcing coarse-grained AC at the access block level.
7.4.2 Read Access Control
We present a read access control solution consisting of the following algorithms. Unless explicitly
stated, all the actions are performed by individual data owners.
• System Setup: At the fine-grained level, files are distributed into access blocks. Generate
a tree graph per block by running Publish(r, o, eo, acl) for each resource r owned by o with
initial ACLs, and encrypt resources using keys from the tree graph. At the coarse-grained
level, each data owner computes parameters for a predicate encryption scheme. Then he
constructs a separate tree graph over all resources he owns to distribute authorization tokens
of the form cid = EncPK(id) (i.e., now tree nodes contain authorizations tokens rather than
file decryption keys). Finally, data owner computes a key SKf = GenKeySK(f) per block
where f is the polynomial derived from the ids of the files contained in that block as described
above, and gives this key to the cloud provider, which will use it to obliviously check read
access on authorization tokens.
• Access Authorization: At the fine-grained level, add a leaf node containing the new user’s
public key to the corresponding tree graph with encryption keys. Update the graph by
adding new internal nodes and appropriate edges if necessary. Update file encryptions if new
internal nodes were added previously. At the coarse-grained level, perform similar operations
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with respect to the tree graph containing read access tokens.
• Access Request: First, at the coarse-grained level, the user u derives from the tree graph
with access tokens the authorization token cid = EncSK(id) for the requested file id. For this he
uses the functions Find Chain(u, id), Find Resources (u, id) and Compute Key(u, chain).
Once he has the access token, he submit a randomization of it tid =
$← (cid) to the cloud.
Once the user receives the content of the matching block for his request, at the fine-grained
level, he derives the decryption key for the specific resource he is looking for the tree graph
included in the block content.
• Access Check: Access control is enforced as follows. At the fine-grained level, only autho-
rized users can derive the correct decryption key for any file using the public tree structure.
At the coarse-grained level, the users can obtain only tokens for the files they are authorized
to access. Also the cloud provider executes File Access Check to identify the block that
contains the requested file and return only that blcok.
• Access Rule Update: At the fine-grained level, changes are applied immediately upon
policy updates. If the policy update involves access revocation, the data owner changes the
encryption of the corresponding files. The data owner identifies the blocks affected by those
files and updates their tree graphs with decryption keys. The changes at the coarse-grained
level happen at longer intervals of time, the length of which would depend on the resources
of the data owner. They involve updating of the tree graph with access tokens.
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   D	   E	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  [A]	  
b1	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  {r1,	  r2}	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b2	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(a)	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  block	  b1	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  by	  A	  
V231	  [ABCE]	  
(b)	  Encryp;on	  policy	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  for	  block	  b2	  owned	  by	  A	  
V121	  [ABC]	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r1	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r2	   v121	   k121	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r3	   v221	   k221	  
r4	   v231	   k231	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  [B]	   V113	  [C]	  
V212	  [E]	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  [B]	   V214	  [C]	  
V221	  [AE]	  
Example Given the example in Section 7.3, we construct one tree graph per block for file en-
cryption keys at the fine-grained level in Figure 7.4. Each block stores files owned by a single user
(shaded), and each file r is encrypted under a symmetric key. Leaf nodes, indexed as vj1n with block
CHAPTER 7. PRIVACY ENHANCED ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTSOURCED DATA
SHARING 175
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
V311	  [A]	   V313	  [C]	  
b3	  =	  {r5,	  r6,	  r7}	  
V312	  [B]	  
V322	  [BCD]	  
(c)	  Encryp<on	  policy	  graph	  for	  block	  b3	  owned	  by	  B	  
V315	  [E]	  
V331	  [ABCDE]	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r5	   v321	   k321	  
r6	   v322	   k322	  
r7	   v331	   k331	  
V314	  [D]	  
V321	  [AB]	  
Figure 7.4: Tree graphs of encryption policy for fine-grained AC on read access.
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Figure 7.5: Distribution of read access tokens EncSK(ri) for coarse-grained AC.
id j, store users’ initial public keys. Key derivation paths are denoted using thick links connecting
leaf nodes to internal ones. Each row in the table states resource ri in block bj encrypted under
key kjmn at vertex v
j
mn. The tree structure significantly reduces the number keys that each user has
to maintain, and enables encryption of different files with the same ACL under the same key. For
example, key k331 for encrypting r7 can be derived by all users, since there is a directed path from
each user’s initial secret to vertex v331; resources r1 and r2 are encrypted under the same key k
1
21
since acl read(r1) = acl read(r2) = {A,B}.
Figure 7.5 depicts a tree graph per data owner to distribute read access tokens at the coarse-
grained level. Each row in the table states resource ri is associated with access token EncSK(ri)
stored at vertex vomn. Unlike in Figure 7.4, each ri is associated with an unique read access token
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7.5 Write Access Control
Enforcing write access control presents more challenges, mainly for the fact that access control
through data encryption does not apply to cases when data can be modified. At coarse-grained
level we can enforce access control similarly as in the case of reads. We can have separate write
access tokens for the user and those will allow them to submit updates only to blocks in which there
is at least one file they can write to. Within each block write access to a file is granted through
a public key used for the encryption of the file. These keys can be distributed similarly to the
decryption keys for reading through a tree structure.
Yet, the above is still not sufficient to guarantee correct write access control enforcement. The
remaining issue is related to the fact that we want to keep the fine-grained access rules oblivious
to the server, i.e. he should not understand what file a user is updating. If we allow users to
include encrypted identifier of the file they are updating, this opens a door for a new attack where
a user without write access to a file submits an update for that file which contains garbage and
just overwrites the content of the file. In order to prevent this we device a way for the server to
obliviously tag the submitted update with the appropriate file identifier.
The authorization token for write that the user submits to gain access to the block contains
the file identifier in an encrypted form. So using this token as an identifier for the update will
provide the oblivious property. However, this solution would not be secure since any other user,
who has read access to the block, would be able to obtain this token granting write access as well.
To prevent this undesired situation, we take advantage of the predicate encryption ciphertexts
constituting access tokens, which allows us to use part of the token as update identifier, which
cannot be used as write access token.
7.5.1 Techniques
File Encryption. We use a public key rather than symmeric encryption scheme to handle all
possible combinations of read and write access to a file. Since such a scheme is computationally
expensive for large size of data, file content is still encrypted using a symmetric key (e.g., AES),
which is further encrypted under the public key. Two trees are constructed for key distribution per
block – one for the public (encryption) keys and the other for the private (decryption) keys. These
CHAPTER 7. PRIVACY ENHANCED ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTSOURCED DATA
SHARING 177
two trees share the same set of internal nodes for a one-to-one correspondence between public and
private key pair. Only files readable and writable by the same set of users can share the same
public key pair.
Access Authorization Tokens. Two trees are constructed by each data owner for the distri-
bution of read and write access tokens respectively.
File Identifiers for Write Updates. We observe that the write authorization token is a valid
encryption for a predicate encryption that provides polynomials evaluation, and the structure of
the encrypted plaintext for access to file id is a vector of the form (1, id, id2, . . . , idn), where n is
the number of files placed in a block. The structure of the ciphertext allows it to be split into parts
where one part is an encryption of the vector (1, id, id2, . . . , idk) (k < n, n > 2), which is no longer
a valid write access token for that file, but can still be used identify file updates for users with read
privilege. This can be achieved using a decryption predicate for a polynomial of degree k that has
id as a zero point. (See Appendix E.1 for details.)
7.5.2 Integrated Read and Write Access Control
We realize the above proposal for the write access control enforcement to obtain an integrated
solution for both read and write access. Next we describe the functionality associated with write
access enforcement. The read access is the same as the construction in the previous section with the
exception that once a client has retrieved a block he needs to identify both the original encryption
of the file as well as all updates for that file. The latter will be achieved using an additional key
(a new part in his authorization token) that will allow him to identify the valid updates submitted
for that file.
• Setup: At the fine-grained level, for each block construct two copies of the same key distri-
bution tree based on both the read and write access rules, i.e. two files can be encrypted with
the same key if and only if the same set of users have read and write access to them. For each
node in the tree, generate a public-private key pair (skn, pkn). Store in the nodes of one of the
above trees the secret keys and add edges based on the read access tules. In the nodes of the
other tree store the public keys and add edges according to the write access rules. Construct
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another tree with the same set of nodes to store the public key pkn, with edges determined




At the coarse-grained level, each data owner generates two sets of parameters (pk′, sk′) and
(pk”, sk”) for the predicate encryption. Then he constructs a tree graph, where each node
contains read access token Encpk′ra(id) (used by the cloud provider to check the read access)
and SKx−id = GenKeysk′′ra(f) where f(x) = x− id (used by the user to identify all updates
to the file within the retrieved block). Similarly, construct another tree to distribute write
access tokens Encpkwa(id).
• Access Authorization: At the coarse-grained level, extend the trees with read and write
access tokens with new leaves for the new user and update the edges according to his read
and write permissions. This may involve splitting of nodes and re-encrypting files with new
keys if the user has read access only to a subset of files that have been encrypted with the
same key.
• Write Access Request: At the coarse-grained level, the user derives his write access au-
thorization token for the file he wants to access from the corresponding tree structure and
submits to the cloud a re-randomized copy of the token.
Once the user has the matching block, at the fine-grained level he obtain the encryption key
pkn for the file to be updated from the write tree. Then he encrypts the new content for that
file with key pkn and submits it to the cloud server.
• Write Access Check: At the fine-grained level, a user can modify a file only if he has the
encryption key and the write authorization token. At the coarse-grained level, the cloud finds
if there is a block for which the authorization token grants write access. The write access token
is of the form (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}ni=1), and the cloud uses the first components (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}2i=1)
as an identifier for updates appended to a block.
• Write Access Rule Update: Update per-block trees for encryption keys and the tree for
distributing write access tokens accordingly.
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b1	  =	  {r1,	  r2}	  
b2	  =	  {r3,	  r4}	  
(a)	  Encryp4on	  policy	  graph	  of	  read-­‐and-­‐write	  access	  for	  block	  b1	  
b3	  =	  {r5,	  r6,	  r7}	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r1	   vR121	   sk(1,2)	  
r2	   vR121	   sk(1,2)	  
b1	  =	  {r1,	  r2}	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r1	   vW121	  pk(1,2)	  
r2	   vW121	  pk(1,2)	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r3	   vR221	   sk3	  
r4	   vR231	   sk4	  
b2	  =	  {r3,	  r4}	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r3	   vW221	   pk3	  
r4	   vW231	   pk4	  
(b)	  Encryp4on	  policy	  graph	  of	  read-­‐and-­‐write	  access	  for	  block	  b2	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r5	   vR321	   sk5	  
r6	   vR322	   sk6	  
r7	   vR331	   sk7	  
b3	  =	  {r5,	  r6,	  r7}	  
r	  	   node	   key	  
r5	   vW321	   pk5	  
r6	   vW322	   pk6	  
r7	   vW331	   pk7	  
(c)	  Encryp4on	  policy	  graph	  of	  read-­‐and-­‐write	  access	  for	  block	  b3	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
VR111	  [A]	  
VR121	  [ABC]	  
VR112	  [B]	   VR113	  [C]	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
VW111	  [A]	  
VW121	  [ABC]	  
VW112	  [B]	   VW113	  [C]	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
VR211	  [A]	   VR212	  [E]	   VR213	  [B]	   VR214	  [C]	  
VR221	  [AE]	  
VR231	  [ABCE]	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
VR311	  [A]	   VR313	  [C]	  VR312	  [B]	  
VR322	  [BCD]	  
VR315	  [E]	  VR314	  [D]	  
VR321	  [AB]	  
VR331	  [ABCDE]	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
VW311	  [A]	   VW313	  [C]	  VW312	  [B]	  
VW322	  [BDE]	  
VW315	  [E]	  VW314	  [D]	  
VW331	  [ABCDE]	  
VW321	  [ABC]	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	  
VW211	  [A]	   VW212	  [E]	   VW213	  [B]	   VW214	  [C]	  
VW221	  [A]	  
VW231	  [AD]	  
Figure 7.6: Tree graphs of encryption policy for read and write access at the fine-grained level
within each access block.
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r	   	  node	   	  token	  
r5	   	  vB21	   	  Encpkwa	  (r5)	  
r6	   	  vB22	   	  Encpkwa	  (r6)	  
r7	   	  vB31	   	  Encpkwa	  (r7)	  
(a)	  Write	  access	  token	  graph	  for	  owner	  A	   (a)	  Write	  access	  token	  graph	  for	  owner	  B	  
VA22	  [ABC]	  
Figure 7.7: Distribution of write access tokens Encpkwa(ri) for each resource ri in coarse-grained
access control.
Example Following the same example in Section 7.3, we draw tree graphs of encryption policy
for both read and write access at the fine-grained level within each access block in Figure 7.6.
Now for each access block bj , we construct two trees: one for read access and the other one for
write access. Instead of storing AES symmetric keys in the vertexes, a public key pair (skri , pkri)
is generated for each resource ri, where the private keys are stored in nodes from the read tree
(vRjmn) and the public keys are stored in nodes from the write tree (v
Wj
mn ). Every pair of read and
write trees share the same set of vertexes, although the set of edges may change. For example,
vertex vR221 is labeled as [ABCE] since acl read(r4) = {A,B,C,E}; whereas vertex vW221 is labeled
as [AD] because acl write(r4) = {A,D}. Thus different ACLs on read and write for the same
resource entail different labels of user list, but the one-to-one correspondence relationship between
read node and write node is naturally reflected by the indexing pattern. Note that in Figure 7.6(a),
both the read tree and the write tree share the same set of vertexes and edges. That is because
acl read(r1) = acl read(r2) = acl write(r1) = acl write(r2) = {A,B,C}.
Moreover, Figure 7.7 depicts a tree graph for distributing write access tokens Encpkwa(ri) for
each resource ri at the coarse-grained level. In addition, write access performed by authorized users
requires an additional update token SKx−ri for each resource ri. These set of tokens are distributed
the same way as read access tokens demonstrated in Figure 7.5.




Our two-leveled access control scheme provides the following privacy guarantees for each participant
in the system:
Privacy against the cloud provider. The cloud provider does not learn any of the content
of the files that he stores. He learns the frequency of access to particular blocks and the type of
request: read or write. The provider does not learn the exact files that have been accessed within
a block either for reading or writing. In addition he can distinguish write requests from the data
owner a block that are removing the appended updates and integrating them in the main content
of the file. We formalize these guarantees in the following way.
Definition 23. Let D be the data in the form of blocks that the cloud provider stores For any two
tuples of request,we define the equivalence relation (q01, . . . , q
0
` ) ≡D (q11, . . . , q1` ) to hold if
• q0i and q1i are the same type of requests (read or write), and if they are both write requests,
they are either both from the data owner of these files or both are from users different from
their data owner.
• q0i (D) = q1i (D) where q(D) denotes the matching block for a query, if any.
Theorem 16. Let (q01, . . . , q
0
` ) ≡D (q11, . . . , q1` ) be two sequences of queries that are equivalent
according to Definition 23.The views of the cloud provider from the execution of these two sequences
are indistinguishable.
Privacy against the users. The coarse-grained access control provides that users will be able
to receive the encrypted content only of blocks in which they are authorized to read at least one
file. The fined-grained access control mechanism guarantees that users will be able to decrypt only
the parts of the block returned to them, which they are authorized to read. Similarly, in the case
of write access users would be able to submit updates only the blocks in which they have write
access at least to one file. And their updates will be associated only with the files that they are
authorized to update. Users learn which of the files that they can read are allocated in the same
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block. This information is not revealed during writing since the user does not learn to which block
his update will be appended (unless he already the location of the file from his read access).
Privacy against data owners. The data owner of a block does not learn which users have
accessed the block neither for reading nor for writing. The file identifiers for the submitted file
updates are not associated with the users that have submitted them. However, he does learn the
whole sequence of updates that have been submitted to a file as opposed to just the most recent
version.
7.6.2 Performance Analysis
The computational overhead required by each participant in the system is described as follows:
Read Access
• Data Owner:
– Setup — computation of the authorization trees with decryption keys and access tokens.
The work is proportional to the number of files in the database and the number of users.
– File access authorization of a user — update work for the tree with decryption keys and
the tree with access tokens: in the worst case proportional to the depth of the trees.
– File access revocation of a user — update work for the tree with decryption tokens: in
the worst case proportional to the depth of the tree. The updates for the tree with the
access tokens can be executed at larger intervals of time to achieve better amortized
efficiency for updates.
• User: retrieving access tokens and decryption keys can be proportional to the number of
files that the user is authorized to access. However, this work is enough to retrieve the access
credentials for all files. Once retrieved the use can store them locally and use them directly
for his requests. New credentials will have to be retrieved only when there has been an update
of the access trees that has involved change of the credentials relevant for the particular user.
• Cloud provider: in order to map an access request to a particular block the cloud provider
will have to execute the File Access Check function for the submitted token and each block.
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This cost can be reduced if after the first retrieval of a file the user remembers the block id
that contained the file, and the next time he need to access the same file he also submits
this id. In this case the cloud provider would need to run a single check and verify that
the block pointed in the access request does really contain the file of interest. Applying this
optimization for efficiency reveals some additional information to the cloud, namely allows
him distinguish first time access requests from repeated request, however, still without him
being able to link requests to the same file. Further the user can choose whether to submit
the block identifier that he has in repeated requests to weaken the additional leakage to the
cloud.
Write Access
• Data owner: The enforcement of write access control requires duplication of the tree struc-
tures that were necessary for the read access control but this time with credential necessary
for the write access. This comes as an overhead in the setup phase when these structures are
computed by the data owner and also each update of the access rules will necessitate update
of both types of trees since the encryption and decryption (relevant for write and read access)
need to be synchronized. Also periodically the data owner would need to process the blocks
and compact the updates for each file back in its initial memory location.
• User: The size of the blocks that the reader receives will increase depending on the frequency
of the updates for a block as well as the time period at which the data owner processes the
blocks and brings the updates back in place. At read access the user would need to locate both
the initial place of the file he is looking for as well as all updates that have been submitted
for that file, and then reconstruct the most recent version of the file.
• Cloud provider: The cloud provided would need to transfer larger blocks including both
the original files as well as the updates. He would need to compute the identification tag for
each authorized write update. This, however, would require constant time.
We discuss further optimizations for the scheme that can improve the performance in certain case
in Appendix E.2.
CHAPTER 7. PRIVACY ENHANCED ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTSOURCED DATA
SHARING 184
7.6.3 Discussion
Choosing the granularity for the access blocks in the read and write access control schemes affects
the privacy guarantees for the scheme as well as its efficiency performance. The right granularity
for each specific usage scenario will depend on the privacy and efficiency requirements for it, the
expected patterns of access to the files and the expected frequency of access control rules’ updates.
Next we discuss some points that should be taken into consideration when choosing how to divide
the files into access blocks:
• Each read access to a file entails a transfer of the content of the whole block containing the
requested file from the cloud to the user. Thus the size of the blocks should be appropriate
for the response delay that would be acceptable for the system. If we expect that the users
for the system will have fairly diverse types of devices, we can create different levels of block
granularity using different types of access tokens (as we discussed in the optimization section)
and each user can choose which access block granularity fits best his privacy requirements as
well as his communication limitations.
• If the database contains files that have ”complementary” information, i.e., a user is likely to
access only one of a these files (for example, if there are two files, one of which is accessed
when a user wants to sell stocks, and the other one is accessed if the user wants to buy stocks),
such files should be allocated to the same block. Thus even if the cloud provider manages to
obtain some external information for the purpose of these two files, he still will not be able
to figure out from the access block requests, which file was actually used.
• Files that are expected to be updated often should be allocated to blocks containing fewer
files since the length of those blocks is expected to grow faster with the submitted updates.
Alternatively the data owner should compact such blocks more often removing the appended
updates and incorporating them in the main file content.
• In order to take maximal advantage of the optimization for caching read and write tokens as
well as decryption keys, files that are likely to have their access rules changed often should
be included in blocks with fewer files (these files might be with longer content, if we want
to have blocks of approximately equal size). Most of the time the accesses to those files will
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require direct derivation of the decryption keys, which would have been updated, and this
will be affected by the size of the tree for their respective access block.
• Since the view of the cloud provider of the access requests amounts to the frequency at which
each access block is matched, files that are expected to have high access rates should be
distributed across different blocks. This should prevent a certain block being accessed much
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CHAPTER 8. PRACTICAL SECURE SEARCH 187
Chapter 8
Practical Secure Search
8.1 Motivation and Contributions
Often, different parties possess data of mutual interest. They might wish to share portions of
this data for collaborative work, but consider the leak of unrelated portions to be a privacy issue
for themselves or their clients. Thus, methods that provide a well-defined and secure sharing of
the data between untrusting parties can be useful tools. One such method that we introduce, is
the ability for a client to search the information residing on another server without revealing to
the server his identity or the content of his query; at the same time, it is desirable to guarantee
that query capability is only granted to appropriate clients and that they do not learn anything
unrelated to the query. Such a tool is useful in deciding and agreeing upon information-sharing
between parties who do not initially know if they have data worth sharing with each other, and do
not want to share information until they do. In addition the very fact that a client is interested
in running certain queries is considered sensitive, and thus both his identity and the query content
must be protected from the server.
The system we are proposing has many possible applications. For example, two intelligence
agencies might like to search each other’s data to discover if they have complementary information
about the same parties. Similarly, the police may need to search the databases of different insti-
tutions, e.g., banks for information about people suspected of embezzlement. Even outside of law
enforcement, this type of search might be useful to a physician who wants to find out about other
patients with the same rare disease as a patient of his own, along with treatment methods that have
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given good results. Or institutions might wish to protect logs containing sensitive information about
the activities of their members, and yet allow restricted searches on information about suspicious
behavior that, when correlated across different domains, may help detect attacks. These scenarios
all present a common problem: a facility has data that legitimately could or should be shared with
another party, embedded within a large amount of data that should be held confidential. Further
in cases such as business acquisition research and law enforcement the identity of the querier needs
to be kept anonymous to avoid causing fluctuation in share prices or tipping off investigation.
8.1.1 Our Contributions.
We address the above concerns by defining and implementing Secure Anonymous Database Search
(SADS) system. Our solution achieves search time efficiency that is sufficient for real-time search
by considering relaxed adversarial models that still provide security guarantees that adequately
address the requirements of many practical scenarios. As in [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007], we
consider efficiency to mean sub-linear search time in the total size of the searchable data. Protocols
such as [Song et al., 2000; Boneh et al., 2004; Waters et al., 2004; cheng Chang and Mitzenmacher,
2005] achieve linear search time; to improve this complexity, we may be willing to sacrifice strict
definitions of privacy and security in a limited and measurable manner. Thus, our goal is to
guarantee practical performance and achieve the maximum privacy, security and anonymity possible
under the efficiency requirement. We design a security architecture that facilitates relaxed security
definitions and efficiency guarantees, and at the same time corresponds to viable practical setups.
We propose secure search protocols that allow to identify and retrieve matching content. In
our system we decouple the questions of search of matching document and their retrieval, and the
document retrieval protocols that we introduce can be combined with any other search protocol for
for the proposed security architecture. The main search functionality that we provide is keywords
search.
We analyze the security properties of our protocols. In order to evaluate the practical perfor-
mance of our solution we implement the system and measure its performance with realistic working
load of databases of size 50 GB. The search time that we achieve improves orders of magnitude
existing solutions with stronger security guarantees and enters the scope of practicality incurring
only about 30 % overhead compared to SQL queries and comparable to data transfer over SSL.
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8.2 Security Architecture and Definitions
The general scenario we consider includes multiple parties who possess private sensitive data, which
they are willing to share under certain very specific circumstances. Each execution of the scheme
will involve a party who owns a set of documents he wishes to make available for secure anonymous
keyword search by authorized parties. Any other party may be authorized to take the role of
the querier, whose input is some keyword that he wishes to search for in the database. We will
interchangeably refer to the first party as data owner or server, and the second party as querier or
client. The goal is for the protocol to meet the following requirements:
• Correctness: The querier’s output consists of all the matches, namely the indices of all
documents containing the keyword. A tolerated probability of expected error (false positives
or negatives) may be specified.
• Client Security: The data owner does not learn any information about the query (key-
word).
• Server Security: The querier learns nothing about the data except for the specified output
(matches) for his query.
• Server Access Control: Only parties authorized by the data owner can submit queries
and receive outputs for this data.
• Client Anonymity: The data owner learns no information about the identity of the querier
as chosen from amongst the pool of authorized parties. This also precludes information about
linkage of two queries coming from the same client.
• Practical efficiency: This is a central requirement for our system, and we design our
model and protocol accordingly. In particular, high communication complexity, or per-query
computation complexity that scales linearly with the number of words in a document will
not be acceptable. This rules out the use of existing generic cryptographic techniques from
secure multiparty computation [Yao, 1982; Yao, 1986; Goldreich et al., 1987] and PIR [Chor
et al., 1998; Gertner et al., 2000].
CHAPTER 8. PRACTICAL SECURE SEARCH 190
It is not hard to show that the security, anonymity, and efficiency requirements stipulated
above are conflicting, and cannot all be achieved simultaneously without adjusting the model. For
example, sublinear computation and constant communication conflict with client privacy, as they
allow the server to gain information on the answers to the query, and thus on the query itself.
Client anonymity seems to conflict with server access control, and obviously anonymity cannot be
achieved if the server and client are the only two parties participating in the interaction. Trying to
solve the latter problem by involving all parties in the system for each search is not practical (both
in terms of efficiency, and since it requires a fixed and known set of parties).
Instead, we will expand our model by adding two new parties that will participate in each
search, the Index Server (IS) and the Query Router (QR). These may be viewed as neutral parties
available to regulate the data sharing process without learning the participants’ private inputs.
The security and anonymity requirements with respect to these new parties will be reasonable,
but weaker than those between the client and server; in return, they allow us to achieve practical
efficiency.
Before elaborating on these requirements (which will complete our definition of SADS), we
overview the general architecture of our SADS protocol, demonstrating the roles of IS and QR and
their trust implications.

























Figure 8.1: General Setup: The data owner makes its data available for search providing IS with search
index structures, the client submits queries anonymously to IS via QR, IS sends back the search result though
QR
Figure 8.1 illustrates the search protocol. A database owner generates a search index structure
computed from (an encryption of) his data and gives it to the index server. This structure enables
IS to answer (encrypted) queries but does not reveal information about the provided database.
Outsourcing the search to IS prevents the data owner from finding out the results to encrypted
queries. The IS sees the results, but does not know what documents they correspond to. At most,
the IS will be able to tell when two submitted queries have overlapping results. This is mitigated by
preserving the anonymity of the queriers with respect to the index server. However, providing such
anonymity introduces a new problem: how to guarantee that only authorized users are submitting
queries. This is addressed by the query router, who serves as an intermediary in the communication
path between querier and IS. QR is trusted to know and protect the identities of the participants,
while enforcing correct authorization before allowing queries to reach the IS. However, he is not
trusted to see the content of the queries or results. Thus a client will submit his encrypted query to
the QR, who checks the authorization of the user, transforms the query and forwards it to the IS.
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The IS will send back search results to the QR, which will be able to forward them to the respective
user. The results are encrypted so that the QR does not learn anything.
With this architecture in mind, we make the following requirements with respect to IS and QR:
• Data Security Against IS and QR: Both IS and QR learn no information about the
data.
• Client Anonymity Against IS: IS learns no information about the identity of the querier.
This again includes unlinkability.
• Search Result Privacy Against IS: Given a sequence of queries (forwarded to IS from
QR, possibly by different clients), IS may learn which of the encrypted queries result in the
same set of matching documents. No other information about the queries (or the client(s)
who generated them) may be learned by IS.
• Query Privacy Against QR : Given a sequence of queries from a given client, QR may
learn nothing beyond which of the encrypted queries are the same.
Thus we define secure anonymous database search as follows:
Definition 24. A Secure Anonymous Database Search (SADS) system consists of protocols for
server, client, IS and QR, satisfying all the correctness, security, anonymity, and efficiency re-
quirements defined above between client and server and for IS and QR.
In order to define formally the security notions behind the above properties we start with the
standard simulation security notion of Canetti [Canetti, 2000b]. It guarantees that the queriers
receive only the matching results, while none of the other parties in the protocol learns anything.
Intuitively, what the definition captures is that a protocol is secure if the views of the participants
in the real execution (namely their inputs, random inputs, outputs, and messages they receive)
are indistinguishable from their views in an ideal execution where all parties send their inputs to
a trusted party who computes the results and sends them back to the receivers. We modify the
definition to introduce the notion of privacy leakage as follows.
Definition 25. A protocol pi is a secure encrypted search protocol with privacy leakage L , if for
every real world adversary, there exists a simulator such that the view of the adversary in the real
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world execution, where he interacts with the honest parties, is indistinguishable from his view in an
ideal world execution where he interacts with a simulator that takes as input L (and simulates the
honest parties).
Now the above privacy properties can be translated as the following types of leakage L in
Definition 25
• False Positive Database Leak : a fraction of records that do not match the search criterion.
This is leakage that the client learns and thus needs to be be provided to the client simulator
in the security proof.
• Search Pattern: the equality pattern of the submitted queries. This is leakage to the IS and
needs to be provided to the IS simulator in the security proof.
• Results’ Pattern: the equality pattern among the results. This is leakage to the IS and needs
to be provided to the IS simulator in the security proof.
• Client queries linkability : what queries were submitted by the same client. This information
will be leaked to the QR and thus needs to be provided to the QR simulator as well.
8.2.0.1 Building Blocks
In this section we introduce the building blocks that we would use for our search protocol.
8.2.1 DET-CCA Deterministic Private Key Encryption Scheme.
While the standard definitions of security (e.g., [Goldwasser and Micali, 1982]) require an encryption
scheme to be probabilistic, a deterministic scheme will allow us considerable efficiency gains, while
still providing a level of security which is acceptable in our setting (security-up-to-equality). This
tradeoff follows the idea introduced by [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007], who define deterministic
encryption in the public-key setting, and show how to convert a standard (probabilistic) PKE to a
deterministic one. We follow the same approach, adapting it to the secret key setting.
We start by defining chosen-ciphertext (CCA) security for deterministic encryption. The ad-
versary A = (A1, A2), defined as in [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007], is a pair of polynomial time
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algorithms that share neither coins nor state and has high min-entropy ω(log(k)) (this is the case
for any adversary if the underlying plaintext domain is dense).
Definition 26 (DET-CCA). Let Πdet = (Gen,Enc, Dec) be a private key encryption scheme and




s← Gen(1n) s← Gen(1n)
(x1, t1)← A1(1n) (x0, t0)← A1(1n); (x1, t1)← A1(1n)
c← Encs(x1) c← Encs(x0)









We define the adversary advantage as AdvDET−CCA
pidet,A =
Pr[DET-EXP0Πdet,A(n)=1]−Pr[DET-EXP1Πdet,A(n)=1]. We say that Πdet is DET-CCA secure
if for all adversaries A the advantage AdvDET−CCA
pidet,A is negligible.
Next we give a construction for converting any semantically secure private key encryption
scheme into a deterministic DET-CCA secure private key encryption scheme.
Construction 17 (Deterministic Private Key Enc). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be any probabilistic
private key encryption scheme and let H be a hash function, which we will model as a random oracle.
We define a deterministic private key encryption scheme Πdet = (Gen′,Enc′, Dec′) as follows:
• s = Gen′(1n) = Gen(1n)
• c = Enc′s(x) = Encs(x; H(s, x))
• x = Dec′s(c) = Decs(c), r = H(s, x); return x if Encs(x, r) = c and ⊥ otherwise.
Theorem 18. Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be any probabilistic private key encryption scheme and Πdet
be the corresponding deterministic scheme according to Construction 17. Let A = (A1, A2) be a
DET-CCA adversary with min-enthropy µ against Πdet that outputs vectors of size v and makes at
most qh queries to the hash oracle and qd queries to the decryption oracle. Let ms and mc be the
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max secret key and the max-ciphertext probabilities for Π. The there exists an IND-CPA adversary
B against Π such that
AdvDET−CCA




where B makes at most v queries to its oracle and its running time is within O(qh(T + qd)) and T
is the running time for the encryption algorithm.
This proof follows the proof of Theorem 5 in [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007], replacing the (public
key) encryptions with calls to an encryption oracle for the private key encryption scheme.
We instantiate the above deterministic private key encryption scheme following the construction
of RSA-DOAEP in [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007] but with different primitives that give more
security and the group property that we need. We use the Pohlig-Hellman (PH) permutation [Pohlig
and Hellman, 1978] and the SAEP+ (short for Simple-OAEP) padding construction introduced in
[Boneh, 2001].
Definition 27 (Pohlig-Hellman(PH) Permutation). Let p = 2q + 1 be a safe prime, and consider




Note that the Pohlig-Hellman function has a commutative property for its keys:
PHk1(PHk2(x)) = PHk1k2(x).
As we shall see, this property will carry over to the deterministic encryption we construct, and will
be used in our construction of re-routable encryption.
The Pohlig-Hellman permutation (sometimes referred to as the exponentiation cipher) was
proposed over 30 years ago [Pohlig and Hellman, 1978], and is assumed to be hard to invert, as
we formalize below. Like plain RSA and other classical ciphers, PH does not directly provide the
standard definitions of security such as semantic security (nor does it satisfy our definitions of
deterministic security). We will use this as a basis for a construction utilizing hashing, that will
achieve CCA security, based on the following assumption.
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Assumption 1 (The Pohlig-Hellman (PH) Assumption). Let A be a ppt, and H be a random
oracle, define AdvPHA (n) = Pr[k ← Zq, x ← Gq, y = PHk(H(x)) : APHk(·)(y) = x]. The PH
assumption is that for all ppt A, AdvPHA (n) is negligible.
Intuitively, this assumption captures the fact that even with chosen message attack, it is hard to
recover the preimage of PH(x) for a random x. The work of [Gjøsteen, 2008] and [Damgard et al.,
2006] show that the above assumption is equivalent to the DDH assumption. The PH assumption
will suffice for proving CCA security of our probabilistic construction. Our resulting deterministic
construction can be proven secure based on either the PH assumption, or the DDH assumption (all
of these are in the random oracle model).
The SAEP+ (short for Simple-OAEP) padding scheme was introduced by Boneh in [Boneh,
2001], as a way to make trapdoor functions into CCA secure public key encryption schemes (in the
random oracle model). The padding is defined as follows.
Definition 28 (SAEP+ Padding[Boneh, 2001]). Let M ∈ {0, 1}m be a message and r ∈ {0, 1}s1
be a random string. Let
H : {0, 1}s1 → {0, 1}m+s0 and
G : {0, 1}m+s1 → {0, 1}s0
be hash functions.We define SAEP+ as follows
SAEP+(M, r) = (( M || G(M ||r) )⊕H(r)) || r.
Boneh [Boneh, 2001] proves that when combined as an input to trapdoor permutations (such as
RSA and Rabin functions), this yields CCA secure public key encryption schemes. It is a simpler
scheme than OAEP [Bellare and Rogaway, 1995] and provides better security guarantees. We prove
an analogous theorem in the private key setting, namely that when SAEP+ is combined with a
secret key function that is hard to invert, this yields a CCA secure private key encryption. In order
to define things properly, since in this setting the private key function is even hard to evaluate
without a secret key, we provide the adversary access to an oracle evaluating the function. If the
function remains hard to invert with access to such an oracle (as in Assumption 1), we prove that
combining it with SAEP+ padding yields a CCA-secure encryption scheme. We omit the general
theorem and proof here, but include the construction and theorem for the specific PH based scheme
that we use.
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Definition 29 (PH-SAEP+ Encryption). We define PH-SAEP+ = (Gen,Enc,Dec) in the following
way
• Gen(1n) = (p, k, k′) where p is a prime that is publicly known and k is a secret key and k′ is
its inverse, which is efficiently computable.
• c = Enck(x) = PHk(SAEP+(M, r)) = PHk(((M || G(M||r)) ⊕H(r)) || r) where r is chosen at
random.
• Dec(c):
1. Compute c′ = ck′ mod p where c′ = c′′ || r.
2. Extract r and compute H(r).
3. Compute x || g = c′′ ⊕H(r).
4. Verify that g = G(x||r) and return x.
Theorem 19. Assume that no algorithm with running time t can solve the discrete log problem
with probability more than . Then PH-SAEP+ is chosen ciphertext secure scheme in the random
oracle model satisfying the following:
t′ ≤ t/2−O(qD + qG + q2H)
′ ≤ 1/2 + qD/2s0 + qD/2s1 ,
for an adversary with running time t′ and advantage ′ that issues qD decryption queries, qG queries
to G, qH queries to H where s1 is the length of the randomness used and s0 is the length of the
output of G.
Proof. In [Boneh, 2001] Boneh shows how to construct a CCA secure public key encryption from a
trapdoor permutation and the SAEP+ scheme. We modify this technique to obtain a CCA secure
private key encryption scheme.
The idea of public key scheme is captured in the functionality of a trapdoor permutation. The
definition of a trapdoor permutation is a function f which is easy to evaluate, hard to invert on
its own, but easy to invert with the knowledge of some trapdoor information. Now we consider
the Pohlig-Hellman function. The value PHk(x) is hard to invert without knowledge of k because
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of the hardness assumption of the discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, given k and
PHk(x) it is easy to compute the inverse k
−1 and find m. The only thing left to be able to view
PHk(x) as a trapdoor permutation is to provide a way to compute easily without knowing k. We
can achieve this by queries to an oracle OPHk that implements the functionality of PHk(x).
Boneh ([Boneh, 2001]) defines the set partial one-wayness problem to find a set of values that
contains the inverse of a given value produced by a trapdoor function f and connects the security
of the f -SAEP+ to the hardness of solving the onewayness problem. We translate this result to
the case of the Pohlig-Hellman function.
Definition 30 (PH Set Partial One-wayness Problem). Let PHk(x) be the Pohlig-Hellman function
that is modeled as a random oracle OPHk and k is secret. We say that an algorithm A solves the
set partial one-wayness problem (PHk(x), r) if given c = PHk(x) it produces a set S = {x1, . . . , xr}
such that c = PHk(xi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Lemma 15. Let A be a (t, qD, qH , qG) chosen ciphertext attack algorithm in the random oracle
model where A runs in time t, makes qH queries to the oracle H, qG queries to the oracle G
and qD decryption queries of PH-SAEP+ and has an advantage . Then there exists an uniform
algorithm B that solves the set partial one-wayness problem (PHk(x), qH) with the following time
and advantage:
time(B) ≤ time(A) +O(qH + qG + qD)
adv(B) ≤ adv(A)(1− qD/2s0 − qD/2s1)
The proof of the Lemma 15 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 5 in [Boneh, 2001] where
the evaluation of the trapdoor function f are substituted with calls to the random oracle OPHk
implementing the Pohlig-Hellman function.
We now have all the necessary tools for the theorem proof. Let us assume that there is a
(t, qD, qH , qG) chosen ciphertext adversary A against PH-SAEP+ with advantage . By Lemma 15
we know that there is a t′-time adversary B that solves the PH set partial one-wayness problem
(PHk, qH) with advantage 
′ for some t′ and ′. Fujisaki et al. in [Fujisaki et al., 2004] demonstrate
an algorithm that runs B twice on C∗ and αC∗ for some α and uses the resulting sets S and Sα
to compute the k-th root of C∗ in time O(q2H) and hence breaks the PH with probability 
′2. The
theorem now follows. And Corollary 20 also follows.
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Corollary 20 (PH-DSAEP+). Let PH-DSAEP+ be the deterministic private key encryption scheme
derived by applying Construction 17 to PH-SAEP+. PH-DSAEP+ is DET-CCA secure under the
discrete log assumption and in the random oracle model.
8.2.2 Re-Routable Encryption.
Re-routable encryption is a new primitive we will use in our system to protect identities, when
routing (encrypted) queries from an authorized client to IS, and also when routing the (encrypted)
results back to the client. Informally, re-routable encryption is a protocol to send an encrypted
message, or some function of the message, from a sender to receiver through a query router QR,
such that two security requirements are satisfied. We require first, security of the sender’s mes-
sage with respect to QR, and second, anonymity of the sender with respect to the receiver. The
formal definitions of these properties are presented below. We note that this primitive may be of
independent interest, e.g., in cases where the query router QR is an intermediary in a multiparty
computation protocol that also has anonymity requirements for some of the participants.
Definition 31. A re-routable encryption scheme consists of algorithms (Gen, Enc,Enc−QR,Trans,Dec−
R):
• Gen(1k,Sender,QR,Receiver) outputs three keys (sk, qrk{S,R}, rk) for the sender, the QR, and
the receiver.
• Enc(sk,m) = c encrypts m with the sender’s key.
• Trans(c,S, sti) = (R, sti+1) identifies the receiver of the message coming from S based on the
inner state sti of QR, and computes the new state of QR.
• Enc−QR(c, qrk{S,R}, sti) = (c, sti+1) transforms the ciphertext c to a message c for the receiver
R.
• Dec− R(c) = m extracts the information that was sent to the receiver from the query router.
Definition 32 (Message Security). Let S be a security definition using an adversary A and ap-
plicable to a general encryption scheme. Let R = (Gen,Enc,Enc − QR, Trans,Dec − R) be a re-
routable encryption scheme. We say that R provides S-message security with respect to QR if
(Gen,Enc,Dec− R ◦ Enc− QR) meets S when A is supplemented with qrk{S,R}.
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This definition is intentionally non-specific, and can be instantiated using different definitions
of security for encryption. For our scheme, we will instantiate this definition both with a standard
semantic security notion, and with deterministic encryption security notion.
Definition 33 (Sender Anonymity W.r.t. Receiver). Let Q0 and Q1 be two users with keys q0 and
q1 respectively. We say that the re-routable encryption scheme (Gen,Enc, Enc−QR, Trans, Dec−R)
with a security parameter k preserves the anonymity of the the sender with respect to the receiver
if for any polynomial time adversary A that given Enc − QR(Encqb(m)) for b ←R {0, 1} outputs a
guess b′, the following holds: |Pr[b = b′]− 12 | < negl(k).
A re-routable encryption scheme is secure if it meets both of the above definitions.
We will now show one method for constructing a re-routable encryption scheme from an en-
cryption scheme that possesses the following group property:
Definition 34 (Encryption Group Property). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a deterministic private
key encryption scheme. We say that Π has a group property if the keys for the encryption scheme
form a group and for any message m and any keys k1 and k2 the following holds: Enck1(Enck2(m)) =
Enck1·k2(m).
Construction 21 (Simple Re-reroutable Encryption). Let Π = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) be an encryption
scheme with the group property from Definition 34. We construct a reroutable encryption scheme
(Gen,Enc,Enc− QR,Trans, Dec− R) as follows:
• Gen(1k): If there is a single Sender and multiple Receivers, we have the following setup phase.
The Sender runs Gen′ (1k) to obtain keys sk and tk. Each Receiver runs Gen′ (1k) to create
a key rk′. Sender, Receiver, and QR then run an MPC protocol such that the Receiver learns
rk = rk′ · tk−1 and the QR gets qrk = sk·tkrk secure multiparty computation with sk, tk as
input from Sender, rk as input from Receiver, and qrk = skrk as output for QR. In the case of
single Receiver and multiple senders the setup is similar except that the Receiver chooses tk.
• Enc(sk,m): Sender computes Enc′(sk,m) = c.
• Trans: QR chooses a Sender, Receiver pair.
• Enc− QR(qrk, c): QR computes Enc′(qrk, c) = c.
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• Dec− R(rk, c): Receiver computes Dec′(rk, c) = m.
Theorem 22. Let Π = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) be an encryption scheme with a group property, satisfying
a security definition S. The reroutable encryption (Gen,Enc,Enc − QR, Trans,Dec − R) obtained
from Π using Construction 21 provides S-message security and ensures Sender anonymity w.r.t the
receiver.
Proof. First, we show that the obtained re-routable encryption provides S-message security. We
argue this in the case of a single sender and multiple receivers (the proof for multiple senders and
a single receiver is similar). Assume that (Gen, Enc,Dec−R ◦Enc−QR) does not meet the security
definition S. Therefore there exists an adversary A that can obtain information t about a message
m given Enc(m). We can construct an adversary A′ against Π = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) that learns the
same information t as follows: A′ acts as a challenger for A. A′ chooses random keys sk, tk, rk′
for the sender and the receivers and computes the corresponding keys rk for the receivers. He
computes the transformation keys and sends them to A. A′ receives encryption requests for sender
and receivers from A forwards them to his own challenger. He transforms the ciphertexts that
he receives back using tk for the sender or the corresponding rk for a receiver, and forwards the
resulting ciphertexts to A. The encryption scheme adversary receives the information t that A
learns. The above execution interacting with the simulator A′ will be indistinguishable from an
execution where A interacts with real sender and receivers. Thus A′ will have the same advantage
of breaking the S message security of the re-routable encryption as the advantage of A against the
underlying encryption scheme.
Second, we prove that the re-routable encryption ensures Sender anonymity w.r.t the receiver.







transformation keys at the third party. Let m be any message. Now using the group property of
Π we have
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Therefore the index server will always get the same ciphertext and cannot guess the user identity
with probability non-negligibly different from 1/2.
8.2.3 Bloom Filters.
The deterministic encryption scheme that we presented provides ciphertexts that are suitable to
be used in efficient search protocols according to [M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007]. Bellare et al. in
[M. Bellare and O’Neill, 2007] suggest that the search functionality over encrypted data produced
with a deterministic encryption should be realized by attaching “tags” that will be easily searchable
and easily computed by both the querying party and the server. We realize the “tagging” idea with
a Bloom filters. Bloom filters were introduced in [Bloom, 1970]. They are structures that provide
for efficient storage of sets for membership testing, which makes them ideal for term querying over
document collections. Bloom filter search has a false positive rate which depends on the parameters
of the structure; it can be made arbitrarily small by changing them. We are guaranteed there will
be no false negatives.
A Bloom filter (BF) (Figure 8.2) is an m-bit array B. Initially, all bits of the filter are set
to zero. There are n independent hash functions Hi where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The output of the hash
functions is in the range [0,m− 1].
To add an entry W to the Bloom filter, we calculate the following values:
b1 = H1(W ), b2 = H2(W ), · · · , bn = Hn(W )
We add the entry W by setting B[bi] = 1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
To check whether W is present in the filter, we compute the indexes b1, . . . , bn as above. If
B[bi] = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the entry is present; if any of the bits are 0, W is not present.
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Figure 8.2: Bloom filters: w1 and w2 are real entries of the BF and w3 is a false positive
It is clear that Bloom filter query will not return false negatives; the indices checked are the
same as those set when the term was inserted. However, false positives are possible if the term
indices happened to be set by other terms due to hash collisions. For example, if we have added
entries with BF indexes {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6}, the Bloom filter will also indicate that entries with
indexes {1, 4, 6} and {2, 3, 5} are present, even though they have not been entered.
The size of the Bloom filter m and the number of hash functions used n depend on the number
of entries that we want the filter to hold and the upper bound on the false positive rate that we
are willing to accept. Let us have T entries that we insert in the Bloom filter. We assume that the
output of a hash function has a uniform distribution and consequently the probability that a bit in
the BF is not set to one by a hash functions is 1− 1m . Using this assumption we can compute the
false positive rate of the Bloom filter as the probability of n query bits being set, which is
(1− (1− 1
m
)nT )n ≈ (1− e−nTm )n. (8.1)
For a given m and n, the false positive rate obtained in Equation 8.1 is minimized when we set the





One limitation of Bloom Filters is the inability to remove elements once they are added. We
cannot simply zero the bits that are associated with the element, since they may have also been
set by other inserted elements.
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Bloom filters have had a wide variety of applications — dictionaries, databases, distributed
hashing, P2P/overlay networks, routing ([Broder and Mitzenmacher, 2002]). They have been
used in language modeling ([Talbot and Osborne, 2007]) and set intersection for keyword searches
([Reynolds and Vahdat, 2003]). We use Bloom filters to perform encrypted search on cipertexts
produced by PH-DSAEP+.
The next two propositions formalize the information that is revealed by the Bloom filters com-
puted from the entries of the records in a database in the case when we use different hash functions
across different Bloom filters and when we use the same hash functions.
Proposition 1. Let A be a distinguishing algorithm and we define his distinguishing advantage
through the following experiment:
1. A chooses two data sets D0 and D1 such that
(a) D0 and D1 have the same number of records N.
(b) There is a permutation pi if N elements such that record i i D0 has the same number
of entries as record pi(i) in D1 and the same distribution of number of entries in the
records.
2. A key K and a bit b are chosen at random, and A is given the BFs computed from the PH-
DSAEP+K encryptions of the entries in the documents of Db using independent set of hash
functions for each document.
3. A outputs a bit b′.
The distinguishing advantage AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | is negligible.
Proof. Since the hash functions used for each Bloom filter are chosen independently, the BF indices
produces for any entry in one Bloom filter are indistinguishable from the BF indices of any entry in
any other Bloom filter. Hence the Bloom filters that are generated from the same number of entries
are indistinguishable. Since the records in the two database have the same distribution entries the
Bloom filters corresponding to the two database are indistinguishable.
Proposition 2. Let A be a distinguishing algorithm and we define his distinguishing advantage
through the following experiment:
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1. A chooses two data sets D0 and D1 such that
(a) D0 and D1 have the same number of records N.






R1pi(j) for all 1 ≤
i, j ≤ N where R0i , R0j ∈ D0 and R1pi(i), R1pi(j) ∈ D1.
2. A key K and a bit b are chosen at random, and A is given the BFs computed from the PH-
DSAEP+K encryptions of the entries in the documents of Db using the the same set of hash
functions for each Bloom filter.
The distinguishing advantage AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | is negligible.
Proof. From Corollary 20 we have that the PH-DSAEP+K(w0) and PH-DSAEP+K(w1) are in-
distinguishable when w0 6= w1. Therefore the BF indices computed from PH-DSAEP+K(w0) and
PH-DSAEP+K(w1) when w0 6= w1 will be also indistinguishable. It follows that the Bloom fil-
ters of two records with the same number of entries computed under the same hash functions are
indistinguishable.
Let us assume that there is a distinguisher A that can distinguish the whether he is given the
Bloom filters of D0 or D1. We construct D0 = {R0i }Ni=1 and D1 = {R1i }Ni=1 as follows: we set R0i
and R1i to have the same entries for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 and R0N and R1N to differ in only one entry w
such that w ∈ R0N and w /∈ R0i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1. Since the Bloom filters for the files R0i and R1i ,
1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1 are the same and A can distinguish the BFs of D0 and D1, it follows that A can
distinguish the BFs of R0N and R
1
N , which is a contradiction with the conclusion above.
8.3 Secure Anonymous Database Search Protocol
We proceed to describe our main protocol for secure anonymous database search. First we give
the intuition for the primitives of the search scheme, followed by a formal definition. The search
operations are also depicted in Figure 8.3.
• Key Generation: The data owner chooses an encryption key. IS chooses an encryption
key. The client generates two keys for query submission and return result. To authorize the
client to search the data owner, QR and the client run a key exchange protocol to allow QR












Owner's key {i1, ..., ik} = ExtractBFIndices(c')
BF_Search(i1, ..., ik)={r1, ..., rn} = res_v
res' = PH-SAEP+
(res_v,IS key)





Figure 8.3: System Architecture and Data Flow.
to obtain a ratio key between the S’s encryption key and C’s query submission key. Also IS,
the client and QR run a key exchange protocol so that QR obtains a ratio key between IS’s
encryption key and C’s return result key.
• Preprocessing: The data owner generates for each of its documents a Bloom filter from the
encryptions of its words under PH-DSAEP+ under his key. He sends the resulting Bloom
filters to IS.
• Query Submission: We instantiate the re-routable encryption protocol for query submission
as follows: the client encrypts his query with PH-DSAEP+ with his key and sends it to QR,
QR re-encrypts the ciphertext with its transformation key from the client’s to the owner’s
key.
• Search: IS extracts Bloom filter indexes from the encryption it receives from the QR and
the obtained indexes to execute BF search to get the result res.
• Query Return: The query result is returned with a different instantiation of the re-routable
encryption protocol: IS encrypts res with PH-SAEP+, sends it to QR, QR re-encrypts the
ciphertext with the return result transformation key from the IS’s key to the client’s key and
sends it to the client.
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Construction 23 (Secure Anonymous Database Search). Let us have a data owner (S), a client
(C), a query router (QR) and an index server (IS). Let FP be the upper bound on the false
positive rate that we allow for search. Let h and m be parameters computed based on the sizes of
the documents in the database of S such that a Bloom filter of size 2m bits using h hash functions
with as many entries as the largest document in the database allows at most false positive rate of
FP .
Let us have the following schemes:
• (Genresult, Encresult,Transresult,Enc − QRresult,Dec − Rresult) — an instantiation of Simple re-
routable encryption (Definition 21) with the encryption scheme PH-SAEP+.
• (Genquery, Encquery,Transquery, Enc − QRquery,Dec − Rquery) — an instantiation of Simple re-
routable encryption (Construction 21) with the encryption scheme PH-DSAEP+, where Transquery
identifies the IS and and Dec− Rquery computes the BF indices corresponding from the query
ciphertext for all documents.
Figure 8.4 presents the scheme for secure anonymous database search that enables the client to
search the database of the database owner with the help of the index server and the query router.
We can insatiate the above protocol for secure anonymous search in two ways depending on
the way we construct the Bloom filters search indices for different documents. The first option is
to use different hash functions for the the different BF, we call this instantiation SADSm. The
second possibility, which we call SADS, is to use the same hash functions across the Bloom filter
of multiple documents. These two instantiations provide different privacy guarantees as we discuss
in Section 8.5 and they also allow for different types of optimizations for the implementation and
hence the efficiency guarantees as we show in Section 8.6.
8.4 Document Retrieval
There exist many systems for searching databases to privately identify items of interest. An ex-
tension of obvious use is a system to then retrieve those items privately. One way to do this is
with private information retrieval techniques, however these are very expensive, and can be even
more expensive when fetching large numbers of records, or records of individually great size. We
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Preprocessing.
• For each of its documents S generates a set of hash functions that he uses the com-
pute a Bloom filter from the PH-DSAEP+ encryptions of the entries (words) in the
document.
• S sends the resulting Bloom filters to IS.
Key Generation. To authorize C for search
• S, QR and C run Genquery to obtain keys (skC , qrk{C,S}, rkS) for query submission,
where rkS is the key S used in the previous step.
• IS, C and QR run Genresult to get (skIS , qrk{IS,C}, rkC) that will be used later for the
result return.
Query Submission. To submit an encrypted query for an entry (word) W :
• C computes c1 = Encquery(skC,W) and sends it to QR.
• QR computes Transquery(c1,C, st′i) = (IS, st′i+1) and sends c1 to IS.
Search.
• IS obtains the Bloom filter search indices from Dec− Rquery(c1) that extracts the BF
indices for the query for each
• IS does a BF search across the database Bloom filters. Let R be the set of matching
documents.
Query Return
• IS encrypts and sends c2 = Encresult(skIS,R) to QR.
• QR transforms Transresult(c2, IS, st′′i ) = (C, st′′i+1) and sends c = Enc −
QRresult(c2, rqk{IS,C}, st′′i ) to C.
• C decrypts Dec− Rresult(rkC, c) to obtain the result R.
Figure 8.4: Secure Anonymous Database Search Scheme
























Figure 8.5: SADS with Document Retrieval.
present a system that is much more efficient, at the cost of requiring a trusted third party, and can
be modularly implemented to extend any private search system that returns handles representing
matches.
Systems both with and without document retrieval have practical use. For example, a user
may simply wish to establish that a server does have documents of interest to him, or may wish
to determine how many are of interest, or learn about certain qualities concerning the data held
there (subject to the search permissions granted by the server). Furthermore, even in systems that
include document retrieval, separating this functionality from query is worthwhile. For example,
the server may be running a paid service, and allow the user to operate in an initial stage wherein he
determines what he wants, and a bargaining stage wherein they negotiate pricing, before purchasing
the actual content.
Document retrieval poses its own challenge, especially when the data is not owned by the party
retrieving it. In this scenario, returning additional data is a privacy leak for the data owner; at the
same time, revealing the matching documents to the owner is a privacy leak for the retriever. Thus,
the strongest security we would want to aim for would require us to touch the contents of the entire
database [Chor et al., 1997]. This is a prohibitively expensive cost for applications that aim to work
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in “real time” over a large data set. One way to avoid this cost is to relax our security definition
and allow leakage of the matching documents ids. In the case of data outsourcing, this amount of
privacy leakage easily suffices, since the untrusted server just searches for and returns the encrypted
files that he stores to the owner who has the corresponding decryption keys [Boneh et al., 2004;
Curtmola et al., 2006; cheng Chang and Mitzenmacher, 2005]. This approach, however, is not
applicable to the case of data sharing, where leaking the matching documents to the owner reveals
more than the result pattern: he also knows the content of the documents, from which he can infer
information about the query.
This problem is similar to that addressed by private information retrieval protocols (PIR) [Chor
et al., 1998; Gertner et al., 2000; Olumofin and Goldberg, 2011], wherein a server holds a set of
items from which a user wishes to retrieve one without revealing which item he is requesting. It
differs slightly in that we wish to retrieve multiple items (corresponding to the search results). It
also differs in that we require that the selected set be certified and that the user does not learn
content of documents outside of it. There are PIR schemes that address this [Gertner et al., 2000],
but at additional cost. Thus, our problem could be addressed by simply running an appropriate
PIR scheme once for each document result. However, PIR is already quite expensive for a single
document, and running them multiply would only aggravate this.
We address this by constructing a document retrieval scheme that can be used on top of any
other scheme that returns document IDs. Our scheme maintains efficiency by introducing an
intermediary party who stores the encrypted files of the database and provides the matching ones
to the querying party. This party is given limited trust to perform the search, but he should not
be able to decrypt the stored files. In this case we need to provide the querier with the decryption
keys for the result documents; these are known to the data owner, who must be able to provide
the correct keys obliviously without learning the search results. In Figure 16 we present a protocol
that realizes the document retrieval functionality between a data owner (S) and a client (C) with
the help of an intermediary party (P). For the purposed of this protocol we assume that there is a
search functionality EncSearch that returns the IDs of the documents matching a query from the
client. For a query Q we denote EncSearch(Q) the returned set of document IDs. The database
of the server that is used for the protocol consists of documents D1, . . . , Dn. Our protocol also uses
1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT) functionality that allows two parties, one of which has input an
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array and the other has input an index in the array, to execute a protocol such that the latter party
learns the array element at the position of his index and the former learns nothing. There are many
existing instantiations of OT protocols, we use the protocol of [Gentry and Ramzan, 2005], which
allows best efficiency. The last tool for our constructions is an encryption scheme with the group
property from Definition 34.
Intuitively, the security of this protocol is based on the secrecy of the permutation pi, known
only to P . Because it is not known to S, S cannot correlate the keys k′pii that are requested by
C with the original indices of the matching documents. He learns only the search pattern of the
querying party. We can take two approaches to mitigate this leakage. The querying party may
aggregate requests for decryption keys to the server for the search results of several queries. Another
solution is to extend the scheme to include additional keys pertaining to no real documents, which
P can add to the sets of requested keys so that S cannot tell how many of the keys he returns
correspond to query results. Step 2 of the re-encryption can be implemented using protocols for
oblivious transfer [Naor and Pinkas, 2001; Aiello et al., 2001; Crescenzo et al., 2000].
Lemma 16. The re-encryption protocol in secure in the semi-honest model.
The lemma follows from the properties of the oblivious transfer protocol.
8.5 Security Proof of the Protocol
In this section we provide proofs for the security properties of our system
8.5.1 Security Against Adversarial Client
The two instantiations SADSm and SADS provide two different security notions against a semi-
honest client. The reason for this is the fact that when we use the same hash functions across
different Bloom filters the false positive rates for those are no longer independent. In the case of
SADSm we do not have this. Since in both cases the client learns some false positives along with
the real results, we model this leakage formally through the definition of the ideal functionality for
the proof, which given a false positive rate δ will return the correct search results and it will also
return any other record with probability δ. A given protocol is defined to be (t, )-secure with false
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Storage Reencryption (preprocessing phase)
Inputs:
S : D1, . . . , Dn, keys k1, . . . , kn and k
′
1, . . . , k
′
n;
P : permutation pi of length n ;
S, P : (GEN,ENC,DEC) satisfying Definition 34
Outputs:
S : ⊥; P : ENCk′
pi(i)
(Di) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Protocol:
1. S sends to P ci = ENCki(Di) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n S and P execute 1-out-of-n OT protocol that allows P to obtain k′′i =
k−1i · k′pi(i).
3. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n P computes ENCk′′i (ci) = ENCk−1i ·k′pi(i)(ENCki(Di)) = ENCk′pi(i)(Di).
Document Retrieval
Inputs:
S : keys k′1, . . . k
′
n;
P : permutation pi of len n, ENCk′
pi(i)
(Di), 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
C : query Q;
S, P,C : search scheme EncSearch that returns IDs of matched documents to P,C.
Outputs:
S : cardinality of the output set EncSearch(Q);
P : IDs of docs matching query Q from EncSearch;
C : the content of the docs matching Q from EncSearch.
Protocol:
1. S, P,C run EncSearch for query Q. Let i1, . . . , iL be the IDs of the matching documents.
2. P sends Sign(pi(i1), . . . , pi(iL)) to C together with the encrypted documents ENCk′
pi(i1)
(Di1),
. . . , ENCk′
pi(iL)
(DiL).
3. C sends Sign(pi(i1), . . . , pi(iL)) to S.
4. S verifies Sign(pi(i1), . . . , pi(iL)) and returns k
′
pi(i1)
, . . . , k′pi(iL).
5. C decrypts ENCk′
pi(i1)
(Di1), . . . , ENCk′pi(iL)
(DiL) to obtain the result documents.
Figure 8.6: Protocol for Document Retrieval
positive (FP) rate δ if there is a simulator in the ideal world with FP rate δ, such that no adversary
running in time t can distinguish the real view from the simulated view, except with probability .
Theorem 24. For every polynomial t there exists a negligible , such that for every δ: our SADSm
scheme instantiated with BF parameter δ, provides (t, ) security with false-positive rate δ against
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a semi-honest client. (the ideal world trusted party provides each non-matching record with inde-
pendent probability δ).
The proof follows immediately since the only thing the simulator needs to do is submit the
clients queries to the trusted party and return to the client the output he gets from the TP. In
the case of a malicious client we need to enable to simulator to extract the client’s key in the key
generation protocol so that he can decrypt the client’s queries. The key generation protocol that
we provide in Appendix F.1 has this property.
In the case of SADS the records returned as false positives should have the same set of indices
corresponding to the query set to one in their Bloom filters. Thus documents that are similar and
have greater overlap in their BFs are more likely to be returned together as false positives. This is
additional leakage to the client.
We point out that when using SADS (with a single hash function), although the false positive
rates across Bloom filters are not independent, the Server (who creates the BF) can calculate the
exact false positives for any search word, to make sure they are acceptable. The advantage of this
approach is that we can apply our slicing optimization from [Raykova et al., 2009], which facilitates
parallel search across multiple Bloom filters and improves the efficiency of the search protocol.
8.5.2 Security Against Adversarial Server
In our security definition we will use the equivalence relation (q1, . . . , q`) ≡D (q′1, . . . , q′`) defined as
follows:
Definition 35. For any two tuples of queries,we define the equivalence relation (q01, . . . , q
0
` ) ≡D
(q11, . . . , q
1
` ) to hold if and only if | ∪i q0i (D)| = | ∪i q1i (D)| where q(D) denotes the results returned
for a query q on database D.
Our basic search part (handle retrieval) trivially does not reveal any information whatsoever to
the server, as the server is not involved (thus, for this part we may take any two sequences to be
equivalent). Taking our full scheme (together with the document retrieval part), our scheme hides
everything but total number of matches for all queries. This is formalized as follows.
Definition 36. Let A be a distinguisher algorithm that runs the following experiment:
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1. A outputs a database D and two tuples of queries q01, . . . , q0` and q11, . . . , q1` such that (q01, . . . , q0` ) ≡D
(q11, . . . , q
1
` ).
2. A random bit b is chosen and A is given the viewS(qb1, . . . , qb` ;D).
3. A outputs bit b′.
The distinguishing advantage AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | for a polynomial time adversary A is negli-
gible.
Theorem 25. In the SADSm scheme the index server and the query router have negligible distin-
guishing advantage according to Definition 36.
The proof follows from the fact that the server sees only the requests for decryption keys and
by Lemma 16 he cannot link those to the real documents that were retrieved.
The above proof holds for any value of l as long as the document retrieval for all queries happens
at the same time. If we want to allow that the results for each query are retrieved before the next
query is issued we need to define the equivalence relation ≡D to hold for tuples of queries that have
the same search pattern, namely |q0i (D)
⋂
q0j (D)| = |q1i (D)
⋂
q1j (D)| for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ `.
8.5.3 Security Against Honest-but-Curious Index Server and Query Router
8.5.3.1 Privacy of the Database
The SADSm instantiation of our scheme reveals nothing about the documents to either IS or QR.
The SADS instantiation reveals some structural properties of the database to IB, namely document
similarity. This follows from Proposition 1 for the SADSm implementation (as each record has the
same number of attributes), and from Proposition 2 for SADS.
8.5.3.2 Privacy of the Client’s Queries from QR and IS
The privacy definition here is again defined through an equivalence relation ≡D on sequences of
queries. It states that the scheme hides everything except “equality patterns” among matches to
different queries (e.g., whether one record returned in response to a query is the same or different
from a record returned in response to another query). The content of the records should remain
protected.
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Definition 37. Fix a database D. Then (q01, . . . , q
0
` ) ≡D (q11, . . . , q1` ) if and only if there exists a
permutation pi on the records in D such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l it holds that pi(qi(D)) = q′i(D).
We define the security for the search queries with respect to the index server and the query
router as follows:
Definition 38. Let A be a distinguisher algorithm that runs the following experiment:
1. A outputs a database D and two query sequences q01, . . . , q0` and q11, . . . , q1` such that (q01, . . . , q0` ) ≡D
(q11, . . . , q
1
` ) (for the minimal equivalence relation ≡D).
2. A random bit b is chosen and A is given the viewIB(qb1, . . . , qb` ;D).
3. A outputs bit b′.
The distinguishing advantage AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | for a polynomial time adversary A is negli-
gible.
Theorem 26. In the SASDm scheme both the index server and the query router have negligible
distinguishing advantage according to Definition 38.
Proof. The index server learns the matching records for each submitted query. The definition of
≡D provides that the record identifiers for the matching results for q01, . . . , q0` and q11, . . . , q1` are
indistinguishable for the IS since they have the same search pattern.
Theorem 20 guarantees that the QR can learn only the equality pattern of the sequence of
submitted queries and he cannot distinguish PH-DSAEP+ encryptions of the two equivalent se-
quences of queries. This holds in the random oracle model, and assuming either DDH or PH
assumption.
8.6 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the practicality of our proposed system we implemented it (roughly 4 Klocs of C++
code in total) and we performed a number of measurements using realistic datasets: (i) the email
dataset that was made public after the Enron scandal [Shetty and Adibi, 2004] and (ii) a synthetic
dataset with personal information for 100K persons. The Enron dataset consists of about half a
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million emails with an average size of 900 bytes after stemming . During the preprocessing phase of
SADS, a distinct Bloom filter for each email was created. Then, each of the email files was tokenized
and the tokens where stored in the corresponding Bloom filter, after they were properly encrypted.
The format of the second dataset is more close to a database than a collection of documents. Its
schema consists of a single table with 51 attributes of three types: strings (first name, last name,
etc.), numbers (height, SSN, etc.) and file links (fingerprint, private key, security image, etc.) and
it is stored in a flat CSV (Comma Separated Value) file. The total size of that dataset, along with
the files pointed in the records, is 51GB and the average size for a record is 512KB. During the
preprocessing phase we created a distinct Bloom filter for each record and each of the attribute
values was inserted after it was prefixed with the attribute name (“name value”) and properly
encrypted. In both cases, we configured the BF parameters so as the false positive rate would be
less than 10−6.
The experimental evaluation setup was comprised by two servers and a client laptop. The
servers had two four-quad Intel Xeon 2.5GHz CPUs, 16 GB of RAM, two 500 GB hard disk drives,
and a 1 Gbit ethernet interface. The laptop was equipped with an Intel Core2 Duo 2.20GHz CPU,
4 GB of RAM, a 220 GB hard disk drive, and a 100 Mbit ethernet interface. All of them were
connected through a Gigabit switch; they all ran a 64-bit flavor of the Ubuntu operating system.
QR and IS were running on each of the servers, the queries were performed from the laptop. When
Document Retrieval was enabled, the File Server was running on the same host with the IS.
8.6.1 Memory Consumption
Along with the timing measurements, we also monitored the memory consumption of the extended
SADS system to determine scaling limits. We found out that the only significant factor was the
type of Bloom filter storage. Bloom filters are stored either sequentially in a flat file or transposed
using the slicing optimization. In the sequential storage case memory usage was constant; it grew
consistently with the dataset size in the slicing case, because the structures are kept in memory
and written to files at the end. During the search phase, both the client and the QR used a small,
constant amount of memory (∼2MB). On the other hand, the IS’s memory usage grew with the
dataset size. In the sequential storage case, the file was mmap’ed; the amount of memory used was
the Bloom filter size in bytes times the number of BFs (e.g. 1KB * 50K = 50MB). When the slicing
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optimization was enabled, we saw higher memory usage, ∼109MB for the same dataset. That was
most likely due to the extensive use of C++ vectors, which we can further optimize in the case of
much larger databases where the available RAM may become an issue.
8.6.2 Implementation Optimizations
We performed experiments using variable-sized subsets of both datasets while changing the size
of the cache. As for the Enron dataset, we show that a good cache size is 5K keywords. This
gives us a ∼90% hit ratio, while reducing the preprocessing time for 50K emails from 2h to 10m.
Performing the same experiments for the synthetic dataset yielded slightly worse results, as some
attribute values are unique. However, using a 10K keywords cache the hit ratio was 50% on the
full dataset, which still is a significant gain.
We measured the speedup of the preprocessing phase on the full datasets, while increasing the
number of threads. As we expected, the speedup grew linearly until the number of threads reached
the number of cores in our servers – that is eight. When the number of threads was more than
the CPU cores, the speedup slightly declined, most probably due to thread scheduling overhead.
Performance results for the parallelized search phase are presented in the next section.
8.6.2.1 Slicing optimizations
In the SADS instantiation of the scheme where we use the same hash functions are used across the
Bloom filters for different documents we can apply a different type of optimization, which we call
bit slicing.
To minimize the number of bits that need to be read to satisfy queries across a large number
of Bloom filters, we store them in transposed order. First, they are divided into blocks of filters;
within each block, all bits from a single index across the filters are stored sequentially. Thus,
each document is represented by a bit within multiple slices, one for each index of its Bloom filter
representation (Fig. 8.7). To run a query, we need only fetch those slices which correspond to the
indices of the query term, which is a large savings since normally we would have to read the full
contents of every Bloom filter for every document for any query. This technique is referred to as
bitslicing and has been studied as a method for storing signature files in database indexes [Zobel
and Moffat, 1998].
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Record 2 BF 
Record 3 BF 
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Record n-1 BF 







Figure 8.7: Multiple Bloom Filters Memory Storage
By storing the Bloom filters in blocked slices, we gain the ability to avoid reading a large
portion of the bits in the Bloom filter set when we run queries. We need only check those slices
which correspond to an index which is present in the query term(s). Since this is very sparse, this is
a large improvement over non-transposed storage; it would require us to read the entirety of every
Bloom filter in order to run a query.
To run a query, we construct a result vector, which is a bit vector equal in size to the number
of Bloom filters in the set. This is then “and”ed to each slice corresponding to a query index. Over
time, several block-sized portions of the result vector will become zeroed out. Once this happens,
as a further optimization we cease to read those portions of later indices. Our block size is chosen
as the disk page size, and our end goal is thus to read the minimum number of pages necessary to
answer a query. If multiple queries are being run, we keep a cache of recently viewed bitslices with
a LRU replacement policy.
Because we are storing the Bloom filters in transposed order, and each filter is represented by
a single bit across various slices, deletion of filters would be expensive. Thus, we implement this
simply by zeroing out the indices of a filter so that it will not match future queries. As a future
addition, we may support a system of periodically cleaning the slicebase by identifying ”deleted”
filters and compacting the remaining ones.




















Figure 8.8: Average query time under different SADS configurations using the Enron dataset.
8.6.3 Search Performance
In this section we explore in detail the effects the performance of the two instantiations of the
scheme SADS and SADSm and also how parallel search could help amortize some of the performance
penalty.
Figure 8.8 shows the comparison for four different configurations of SADS: (i) same hash func-
tions across BFs, (ii) same hash functions across BFs with the slicing optimization enabled, (iii)
using multiple hash functions and (iv) using multiple hash functions and parallel searching to-
gether. The search time reported in this figure is the total time elapsed from the point when the
client issues the query to the QR until it receives the set of matching document IDs if any — no
document retrieval. As expected, the average query time grows linearly using the original SADS
configuration, as the actual search is done linearly over all the Bloom filters. Next, we can see
that the slicing optimization greatly reduces search time to a point that it seems almost constant
across different dataset sizes. Using the multiple hash functions feature we do get better privacy
guarantees, but at the cost of increased search time by another factor that is proportional to the




















Figure 8.9: Average OR-query time under different SADS configurations using the Enron dataset.
Each cluster is for a different dataset size and each bar is for a different term count (from 2 to 5).
dataset size. That is because for each document we have to recalculate the hash functions and
recompute the Bloom filter indices. Finally, we see that taking advantage of the commonly used
multicore architectures does increase the performance of the search in the multiple hashing scheme.
More precisely, the speedup when we used 8 threads on our 8-core servers was from 1.3 to almost
4 for the dataset sizes shown in the Figure 8.8. Thus, although the multiple hash functions feature
increases the computation factor, we can amortize a great part of it by executing it in parallel. It
is also worth noting that the multiple hash functions plus parallel searching configuration provides
better performance that the configuration with the same hash functions, while on the same time it
improves the privacy guarantees.
Next, we evaluate the performance overhead of the multiple hash functions in boolean queries,
and more precisely OR queries. To optimize the normal case – i.e., when the slicing optimization
is not enabled – we skip BFs that already contain one of the search terms. That way we avoid
searching over and over on Bloom Filters that already match the OR query thus reducing the overall
searching time, especially when the search terms are frequent. Figure 8.9 shows the search time





















Figure 8.10: Average time for retrieving documents anonymously, compared to retrieving them
non-anonymously using ssh file transfer. Average size of files being transferred was 27.8 Mb
for OR queries under different SADS configurations. Each cluster of bars is for a different dataset
size; each bar is for a different term count in the boolean OR query. The first bar is for two terms,
the second for three, and the last two for four and five, respectively. The fact that the search time
in each cluster grows sub-linearly to the number of terms clearly shows the performance gain.
8.6.4 Document Retrieval
We implemented document retrieval using PH-SAEP and standard RSA signatures to sign query
results. Using PH-SAEP puts a (likely over-restrictive) limit on the length of plaintext values. To
handle this, we encrypt larger files using AES private key encryption, and store the key encrypted
with PH-SAEP as a header in the encrypted file. The files can thus be read by decrypting the
header with the appropriate PH-SAEP key and using the result to decrypt the content of the file.
We preprocess the files in a way that provides an intermediate party with AES encrypted files
under different AES keys and encryptions of these AES keys under some permutation of the keys
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k1”, . . . kn”. The client will receive as results from the intermediary party the encrypted files, the
encrypted AES keys, and the indices of the keys k” used for their encryptions. When he receives
the decryption keys k” from the server, the client will first decrypt the AES keys and then use
them to decrypt the remainder of the files.
Figure 8.10 shows the average time to retrieve documents using our scheme versus the number
of documents being retrieved. This is shown in comparison to a non-privacy-preserving SSH-based
file transfer. As we can see, our scheme adds very little overhead compared to the minimum baseline
for encrypted transfer. The time also shows linear growth, suggesting that it is dominated by file
encryption and transfer, rather than for the encryption and verification of the results vector itself.
As a point of comparison, Olumofin and Goldberg [Olumofin and Goldberg, 2011] present some
of the best implementation performance results currently published for multi-selection single-server
PIR. In their performance results, we see response times per retrieval ranging from 100 to 1000
seconds for retrievals of 5-10 documents on database sizes ranging from 1 to 28 GB. Our scheme
scales strictly with number and size of documents retrieved, and not with the total database size.
They do not state the sizes of the blocks retrieved in their scenario, but if we were to give a
very high estimate of 1 MB per block, and assume they fetched 10 blocks every time, one could
expect in our system that each query would take .7 seconds, still orders of magnitude short of
the 100s fastest time they report for a 1GB database, and it would not scale up with increasing
database size as theirs does, thus significantly beating the 1000s time they report for a 28GB
database. Note that their system is not designed to protect privacy of the database, only of the
request. The work of [De Cristofaro et al., 2009] presents a protocol for privacy-preserving policy-
based information transfer, which achieves privacy guarantees weaker than SPIR and similar to
ours. Direct comparison between our and their performance results is hard — they present timings
only for the computation time without communication, which grows linearly with the size of their
database. The maximum size of their database is 900 records with 2000 ms computation per record
retrieval, while for our scheme the entire record retrieval time (computation plus communication)
for a database with 25000 records is about 40ms (Figure 8.11, described in the next section).
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Figure 8.11: Comparison between the extended SADS and MySQL.
8.6.5 Overall Performance
Finally, we compare the performance of the extended SADS system with a real world DBMS,
MySQL. In order to do that, we implemented a SQL front-end for SADS that could parse simple
conjunctive and disjunctive queries. Then, we loaded the synthetic dataset to both systems and we
executed a number of queries of variable result set size. SADS was configured to use multiple hash
functions and document retrieval was enabled. Parallel searching was also disabled, which means
that we compared using the less efficient version of the extended SADS. Figure 8.11 shows the total
duration of both the query and the retrieval of the data for our system and MySQL. Our scheme
performs just 30% slower on average than MySQL, which is the price for the privacy guarantees it
provides.
8.6.6 Case Study: Sharing of Health Records
We next examine, from a very high level, the suitability of our scheme for a hospital’s admissions
records database. (A database for full medical record storage is vastly more complex and is not
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addressed here.) A patient’s health record is very sensitive information, usually kept by the patient’s
medical institution. There are cases, though, where such information needs to be shared among
different institutions. For example, a patient may need to visit a different institution due to an
emergency, or to get a second opinion. This sharing may need to be done privately for several
reasons. In an emergency, a doctor may need to query all the institutions that share records with
his without revealing the patient’s identity, especially to the institutes that do not have information
about him. If the querying is not private in that case, some institutions would learn information
about a patient that has never visited them. Or, a patient may not want his institution to know
which institution he visits for specialized needs, such as drug rehabilitation, so again the query for
his record has to be performed privately.
A database of health records is similar to the synthetic dataset we used in our evaluation. It
contains some searchable fields like name, date of birth, height, etc.; each record may be linked
with several medical exam results like x-rays, electrocardiographs, magnetic tomographies, etc. In
1988, there were about ten routine tests during the hospital’s admission process alone [Hubbell et
al., 1988]; today, about thirty individual tests are done.1 Taking into account that some of the
results can be a few tens of Mbs — for example, a head CAT scan is about 32 MB — each health
record could be a couple of hundred megabytes. One major hospital complex admits about 117K
inpatients per year2; to a first approximation, their database would thus have several hundred
thousands rows and 30–40 columns.
We have already seen, though, that the extended SADS scheme we propose can successfully
handle a database of this size. Our evaluation demonstrated that document retrieval adds only
a small overhead compared to simple transfer, thus easily scaling with the size of the document
retrieved. Also, searching over 100K records with 51 searchable attributes each takes less than half
a second, thus meeting real-world requirements. Finally, the support for updates in health records
is a requirement covered by our extended SADS scheme. We conclude that our scheme is able to
handle the requirements of this hospital, while preserving patient privacy.
1Private communication with a physician.
2http://nyp.org/about/facts-statistics.html
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
Every day people use various services that take some of their private data as input. The computation
underlying such services most often depends on the private data of multiple parties. Although the
results of such computation do reveal some information about the private inputs of the parties, the
benefits of such services outweigh the potential risk of the privacy leakage from the result. While
revealing the output may be acceptable, the actual inputs needed for the computation are much
more sensitive and need to be protected. In such case the desirable privacy guarantees can be
formulated as follows: the computation should not reveal anything more about the inputs than
what is inherently leaked by the final result.
Constructing protocols with the above properties has been the subject of secure multiparty
computation. While there have been many results in the area showing how to construct secure
computation protocols for any functionality, these constructions come with efficiency overhead that
is prohibitive for most practical applications. In this thesis we claim that one of the reasons for
the big gap between the efficiency required for practical purposes and the one provided by existing
protocols is the fact that the underlying assumptions of such protocols often do not reflect closely the
actual requirements of real scenarios. Existing MPC techniques assume homogeneous environments
where all participants have the same computation and communication resources available. Further,
the adversarial models that they use assume that all corrupted parties will exhibit the same type of
misbehavior and would collude and share their private information. On the other hand, practical
setups that could benefit from MPC solution techniques often present quite heterogeneous systems,
where parties have different resources and different incentives to misbehave in the execution. And
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if we are aiming for efficient solutions, we need to take these facts into consideration.
We explored several avenues that allow us to develop secure computation techniques more
closely tailored to the requirements of different heterogeneous systems. These approaches achieve
improved efficiency for the participants in a way that enables secure computation in scenarios
where existing protocols would not be usable. In particular our contributions are in three main
directions: we consider new computational models as representation of the evaluated function
in a secure computation, which allow us to overcome inherent inefficiencies in MPC approaches
relying on Boolean and arithmetic circuits. Further, we focus on the setting of outsourcing where
we have one powerful party with large computational and storage resources, which it provides
as a service to computationally weak and memory bounded clients. In this setting we propose
solutions for verifiable delegation, server-aided computation with non-colluding adversaries and
privacy enhanced sharing of outsourced data. The third perspective that we adopt has a different
flavor. We start with particular efficiency requirements that we would like to achieve for a protocol
for encrypted search and data sharing, and explore how strong security guarantees we can achieve
while meeting these efficiency constraints.
Contributions. Computation involving large databases often needs to access only a small part
of the data which is stored and the only acceptable solutions from efficiency point of view are those
that use algorithms with sublinear complexity. Using generic solutions that represent the evaluated
functionality as a circuit inherently incurs computational overhead linear in the size of the database.
We construct a two party computation protocol that uses RAM representation for the evaluated
function and achieves only polylogarithmic amortized overhead to the running time of the insecure
version of the computation. We provide both a generic construction that relies on any oblivious
RAM scheme and any two party computation protocol as well as an optimized construction that
uses specific instantiations of both schemes.
Multivariate polynomials can be used to express the functionality of a large number of prob-
lems from linear algebra, statistics, logic and set operations. At the same time they provide a
more succinct representation for these functionalities than circuits. We use this representation to
construct an MPC protocol for evaluation of multivariate polynomials that improves the commu-
nication complexity of existing solutions and requires only a single round interaction among all the
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parties. An instantiation of our general protocol provides currently the most efficient solution for
the multiparty set intersection problem in the fully malicious case.
In the setting of outsourcing we have a powerful party that provides services to weak clients.
Two main types of services that can be provided are data storage and computation. When we
consider computation outsourcing there are two properties that we may want to provide: privacy
and verifiability. We address these questions in a construction for server-aided computation that
allows oﬄoading the works of most of the participants in an MPC protocol to a computationally
powerful party (server), which does not have inputs for the protocol and just assists the execution of
the computation. We also introduce a new adversarial model where parties might be misbehaving
but not necessarily colluding and sharing their private information. This adversarial setting, though
weaker than the case of a monolithic malicious adversary, suffices to model accurately the actual
incentives for deviating behavior of the participants in many practical scenarios. At the same it
allows to construct quite efficient protocols that use entirely symmetric key primitive with the only
exception of a few public key operations for coin tossing.
If we restrict our requirements for delegated computation only to the verifiability property, this
provides room for further efficiency improvements. At the same time such protocols are still useful
for settings where the service provider is trusted to store the data in plaintext form (e.g., it is
bound by legal contract not to reveal the information), but is not trusted to do honestly all the
necessary work for the computation. Such techniques will be also relevant in the case where we
want to be able to detect execution errors of the computation. Verifiable computation schemes
aim to provide an efficient way to check the correctness of the result of a large computation. We
introduce a new paradigm for constructing verifiable computation from attribute-based encryption.
This construction avoids the use of expensive primitives such as FHE and PCPs underlying other
VC solutions and additionally enjoys two new useful properties: public delegation and public
verification.
In the case of data outsourcing users store and access their data at a service provider. In
addition to that they may wish to share data among themselves. While one way to do this is to
first retrieve their own data from the provider and then send it to each other, such an approach
incurs a substantial communication overhead. A much more efficient solution would allow each
user to retrieve directly from the server all data (both his own as well as others’), which he is
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authorized to access. However, in this case access control rules that determine what data is shared
among users’ become private information for the users that they may not want to reveal to the
provider, who at the same time needs to serve as a point of access enforcement. We propose a
two level-access control solution for both reads and writes that offers tunable trade-offs between
efficiency overhead and hiding properties for the access control rules and data access patterns from
the storage provider.
Often when we implement a real system we are facing efficiency requirements for practical uses
and the goal is to maximize the security properties of the solution while meeting these requirements.
We explore such a setting in the case of encrypted search for secure data sharing. We construct
a protocol that allows one party to search the database of another and retrieve matching records
while providing privacy guarantees for the query and the non-matching content of the database. We
design and implement a system that handles query searches on databases of size 50 GB achieving
only 30% overhead compared to insecure search provided by mySQL. We achieve this efficiency
performance under a relaxed security model taking advantage of two intermediary parties, which
act as semi-honest intermediaries for the protocol but do not learn any of the private information of
the participants (e.g., database and queries). The only allowable leakage beyond what is inherent
to the results is the query pattern of the client, which is revealed to the intermediaries and the data
owner.
Future Work. In this thesis we have presented several avenues to approach the problem of find-
ing a meeting point between techniques for multiparty computation, which provide strong security
guarantees, and efficiency requirements for practical application. Either of these directions brings
potential for further research. With the advent of cloud computing the question of outsourcing of
computation becomes of bigger and bigger importance. We proposed a solution that improves the
efficiency for most of the participants in an MPC protocol using a server-aided model of computa-
tion. Solutions based on fully homomorphic encryption improve the efficiency for all participants,
but such a primitive is still quite expensive and introduces overhead for the computation party
prohibitive for most practical purposes. Thus any construction that improves the efficiency for
all parties with smaller overhead in the outsourced computation would be of great interest. The
other desirable property for outsourced computation is verifiability. Our solution can handle the
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same class of functions as the class of functions that an attribute-based encryption with efficient
encryption algorithm (linear in the size of the input) can admit as policies. Currently this class
includes Boolean formulas. While solutions for verifiable computation for general functions exist,
they employ expensive cryptographic techniques such as FHE and PCPs. Obtaining more efficient
solutions for larger classes of functions as well as handling computation that depends on the inputs
of multiple parties present interesting open questions. While constructions achieving privacy and
verifiability separately have obvious applications in the outsourced setting, an efficient solution that
provides both guarantees at the same time will be of interest for many scenarios.
The MPC construction that we propose to obtain MPC with amortized efficiency sublinear in
the size of the input opens the door for applying MPC techniques to settings where the inputs for
the computation are parts of large databases and only algorithms with sublinear complexity are
of interest from a practical point of view. The main disadvantage of the current instantiations of
our construction is that they involve multiple interactions for each memory access, which is due to
the fact that all existing ORAM schemes require multiple rounds of interaction. Achieving a single
round ORAM construction would greatly benefit the performance of the resulting MPC schemes.
Efforts to identify scenarios where MPC techniques will be applicable, to determine the real-
istic workloads for these settings as well as the acceptable efficiency overhead, provide a reference
framework for the efficiency that usable implementations need to achieve. Trying to construct and
implement protocols that manage to meet these requirements even at the price of relaxed security
notions is the first step to bring MPC solutions to practical uses. The setting of encrypted search
that we explore in this work presents a good example of this direction. Extending this scenario
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Appendix A
Secure Computation with Sublinear
Amortized Work
A.1 Supporting Subprotocols
In this section we describe the Yao garbled circuits that we use for the implementation of our
protocol from Section 3.5.3. We use the following notation:
• vC and vS are shares from the virtual address vC ⊕ vS being sought;
• virC and virS are shares of virC ⊕ virS , which is either the real or the dummy address searched
in some level;
• doneC and doneS are shares of doneC ⊕ doneS , which indicates whether the virtual address
has already been found;
• dC and dS are shares of dC ⊕dS , which stores the retrieved data when the the virtual address
has been found;
• F (r) denotes PRF value used for encryption.
• (cV , cD) are the ciphertexts (encryptions of the virtual address and the data) stored in a
physical position in the ORAM structure;
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CheckData
Here we check whether a ciphertext (c1, c2) matches the input value v = vC ⊕ vS . If it does, then we
share the corresponding data between the client and the server as dC ⊕ dS . If the virtual address
was already found, i.e. doneC ⊕ doneS = 1, we ignore the check. If the virtual address is just
matched, we appropriately set the check bit done′C ⊕ done′S = 1, re-encrypt the ciphertext as (c′1, c′2)
to be stored at the server.
Inputs: Client: vC , rwC , dC , doneC , FK(r1), FK(r2), FK(r3), FK(r4)
Server: vS , rwS , dS , doneS , (c1, c2)
Protocol:
1. Decrypt the ciphertext (c1, c2) to recover the values v = c1 ⊕ FK(r1) and d = c2 ⊕ FK(r2).
2. Check whether the data value needs to be retrieved:
• If doneC ⊕ doneS = 1, compute two shares done′S and done′C of 1, and two new shares d′S
and d′C of the data dS ⊕ dC .
• Else if doneC ⊕ doneS = 0 and v = vC ⊕ vS , compute two shares done′S and done′C of 1. If
rwC ⊕ rwS = read, compute two shares d′S and d′C of the retrieved data d.
• Else compute shares done′S and done′C of 0, and another set of shares of 0: d′S and d′C .
3. Compute encryptions to be written back:
• If doneC ⊕doneS = 0 and v = vC ⊕vS , set c′ = (”dummy”⊕FK(r3), ”dummy”⊕FK(r4)).
• Else c′ = (v ⊕ FK(r3), d⊕ FK(r4)).
Outputs: Client: done′C , d
′
C




Figure A.1: A functionality that enables the players to obliviously check whether a data item
matches the target.
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GetHashInput
We compute the virtual address that will next be looked-up in a level: the real virtual address, if
there was no match so far, or a dummy address depending on the counter t, if the item was already
found.
Inputs: Client: doneC , virC , t
Server: doneS , virS
Protocol:
1. If doneC ⊕ doneS = 0, create a random secret sharing vS ⊕ vC = virC ⊕ virS .
2. If doneC ⊕ doneS 6= 0, create a random secret sharing vS ⊕ vC = (”dummy” ◦ t).
Outputs: Client: vC
Server: vS
Figure A.2: A functionality that determines whether a real or a dummy look-up should be per-
formed
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DataWrite
We check whether the matched item stored in virC ⊕ virS and dC ⊕ dS should be used to over-write
the current position in the top level, which currently stores ciphertext (c1, c2). We overwrite if these
are empty encryptions, or an older encryption of the same virtual address.
Inputs: Client: doneC , virC , dC , doneC , FK(r1), FK(r2), FK(r3), FK(r4)
Server: doneS , virS , dS , doneS , (c1, c2)
Protocol:
1. Decrypt the ciphertext (c1, c2) to recover the values v = c1 ⊕ FK(r1) and d = c2 ⊕ FK(r2).
2. Compute v′ = virC ⊕ virS and d′ = dC ⊕ dS .
3. Check whether this is the right place to write an encryption of (v′, d′):
• If doneC⊕doneS = 1, compute two random shares done′S and done′C of 1, and set (c′1, c′2) =
(v ⊕ FK(r3), d⊕ FK(r4)).




′ ⊕ FK(r3), d′ ⊕ FK(r4)).
• Else, compute two random shares done′S and done′C of 0, and set (c′1, c′2) = (v⊕FK(r3), d⊕
FK(r4)).
Outputs: Client: doneC





Figure A.3: A functionality for determining whether a value should be written to a given position
in the top level.
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Distributed Universal Hash Function
We compute a universal hash of a value shared between the client and the server as uC · uS , and
send the encrypted output c to the server. Let G be a prime order group. Let a and b be parameters
defining the universal hash function from [Mansour et al., 1993].
Inputs: Client: uC ∈ G, F (r) ∈ {0, 1}m
Server: uS ∈ G, a ∈ {0, 1}n+m−1, b ∈ {0, 1}m
Protocol:
1. Set u = ucuS , and “cast” u as an integer.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m compute the i-th bit of the hash as yi = (⊕nj=1(uj AND ai+j−1))⊕ bi.
3. Let y = y1||y2|| . . . ||ym and c = y ⊕ F (r).
Outputs: Client: no output
Server: c
Figure A.4: A functionality for the distributed computation of a universal hash function.
Oblivious Swap
We re-order two encrypted values (v1, d1) and (v2, d2) by their virtual address by decrypting, com-
paring (according to some criteria, described in Section ??, swapping if necessary, and re-encrypting.









Server: (v1 ⊕ FK(r1), d1 ⊕ FK(r2)), (v2 ⊕ FK(r3), d2 ⊕ FK(r4))
Computation:
1. Decrypt the input ciphertexts to recover the values v1 = (v1 ⊕ FK(r1)) ⊕ FK(r1) and v2 =
(v2 ⊕ FK(r3))⊕ FK(r3).
2. Compare the values v1 and v2 :
















Figure A.5: A Functionality that enables the players to obliviously compare and swap two elements.
This is used repeatedly for an oblivious sort.
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Remove Excess Empties
Let count be an array of n counter variables ranging from 1 to m. Let index be a bucket index
from 1 to n. Let real be a boolean flag indicating whether index is associated with a real item or an
empty item.
Inputs: Server: index⊕ FK(r1), count⊕ FK(r2), real
Client: FK(r1), FK(r2), FK(r3), FK(r4)
Computation:
1. Recover the values of count and index by computing (index⊕ FK(r1))⊕ FK(r1) and (count⊕
FK(r2))⊕ FK(r2).
2. If (count[index] < m)
• count[index] ++;
• let (c1, c2) = (index⊕ FK(r3), count⊕ FK(r4))
3. Else if (count[index] == m and real == false)
• let (c1, c2) = (⊥⊕ FK(r3), count⊕ FK(r4))
4. Else if (count[index] == m and real == true)
• let (c1, c2) = (abort!, abort!)
Outputs: The output (c1, c2) is sent to the server.
Figure A.6: A functionality for counting m items in each bucket and removing excess empty items.
APPENDIX B. SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION FOR MULTIVARIATE
POLYNOMIALS 237
Appendix B
Secure Multiparty Computation for
Multivariate Polynomials
B.1 Proof of HEPKPV Protocol
Lemma 8 Assume that E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a CPA-secure Vector Homomorphic encryption
scheme. Then protocol ΠPOK is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge for L.
Proof. Completeness: Assume the Prover knows (x1, . . . , xu), (r1, . . . , ru) such that c1 = Encpk(x1; r1),
. . . , cu = Encpk(xu; ru) and that (c1, . . . , cu) ∈ L. Then the Prover can always provide correct re-
sponses to the verification challenges requested by the Verifier. Therefore, the Verifier will always
accept.
Soundness: If the Prover does not know some xi, ri for some ci or (x1, . . . , xu) /∈ L, the probability
that the Verifier will accept is at most 1/2k.
Zero Knowledge: Let AV be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time real adversary that
controls the Verifier. We construct a non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomial time simula-
tor SV . The idea behind how SV works is that it chooses b1 . . . bk ahead of time. If bi = 0, the
simulator chooses eij , rij for 1 ≤ j ≤ u and computes cij = Enc(eij; rij) such that (ci1, . . . , ciu) ∈ L.
The simulator then sends these values on the broadcast channel. Otherwise, if bi = 1, the simulator
chooses sij and rsij for 1 ≤ j ≤ u and computes c′ij = Enc(sij; rsij) such that c′i1, . . . , c′iu) ∈ L. The
simulator then sends cij = cj/c
′
ij for 1 ≤ j ≤ u over the broadcast channel.
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SV uses rewinding to Step 4 to ensure that the bits chosen by the coin-tossing protocol are equal
to b1 . . . bm. Thus, the Simulator is able to answer all challenges correctly without knowing the wit-
ness w. The input used by AV is distributed identically with respect to both a random b1 . . . bm and
the b1 . . . bm chosen ahead of time. Therefore, the probability that the verifying parties P2, . . . , Ps
open their commitments correctly is identical both before and after rewinding. Therefore, the ex-
pected number of times the simulator needs to rewind is 1 and so it runs in expected polynomial
time.
Extraction: The idea behind how the Extractor works is that it plays the part of the verifying
parties P2, . . . Ps and runs the protocol honestly until after the Prover P1 opens the challenges
corresponding to b1 . . . bm. Thus it learns either (xj + eij , rj · rij) or (eij , rij) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and each 1 ≤ j ≤ u. Now the Extractor rewinds and sends commitments for P2, . . . , Ps to different
random sequences of bits, the Prover P1 sends a different sequence of bits v
′′
1 . . . v
′′
k and this results
in a different set of challenge bits: v1 . . . vk. With probability at least 1− 1/2k, there is some index
a such that va 6= ba. In this case, the Extractor has now seen both (xj + eaj , rj · raj) and (eaj , raj)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Therefore he can now calculate (xj , rj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ u, which is the witness for
the language L.
B.2 Proof of Multiparty Coin Tossing
Lemma 9 If E = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme, Πcoin is a
secure multiparty protocol with no honest majority among the participating parties.
Proof. Assume there is a fixed set B, |B| ≤ m, chosen at the outset of the protocol and that
a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time real adversary AB controls the parties Tj such that
j ∈ B. We construct a non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomial-time ideal model adversary
simulator SB.
Assume party Ti is honest, i. e. Ti /∈ B. For each honest party Tj , SB chooses random Rj , rj
and sends Cj = Enc(Rj, rj) as commitment for the input of Tj . SB uses the extractor for the
multiparty HEPKPV protocol to obtain the inputs of all malicious parties and sends them to the
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trusted party. SB uses the value returned from the trusted party to reconstruct R
∗
i . If i = s then
SB continues to the last step of the protocol and uses the simulator for the multiparty HEPKPV
protocol to prove that the final value R was computed correctly. If i 6= s then SB rewinds the
protocol to the step where all the commitments have already been sent but the parties have not yet
opened the commitments and proved consistency. Now, SB uses the simulator for the multiparty
HEPKPV protocol to prove that the value R∗i is consistent with the commitment sent by party Ti.
We now show that the view of AB is indistinguishable in the Ideal Model when interacting with
SB and its view in the Real model when interacting with the honest parties. The first difference
between the view of AB in a real run of the protocol and in a simulated one is that SB uses
a simulated proof to prove that the commitment is consistent. However, the simulator for the
multiparty HEPKPV guarantees indistinguishability for the two cases. The second difference is
that the simulator uses a dummy commitment as the commitment of party Ti. Due to the hiding
property of the commitment scheme, these two cases are also indistinguishable.
B.3 Proofs of Input Preprocessing and Verification
Claim 1 Assume R was chosen randomly after T committed to its inputs through the Efficient
Preprocessing protocol. If the parties run the Preprocessing Verification protocol and do not abort,
then with all but negligible probability, the committed input shares of T are valid encryptions of
k + 1-sharing polynomials of the inputs x`, x
2
` , . . . , x
2blogd`c
` .
Proof. Fix x`. We prove by induction that if the verification does not abort then with probability
1− i/2k − .9k · i the sharing of x2i` is valid.
For the basis case, we have that the sharings of x` ∈ XT are valid with probability 1 since the
LIPEV protocol guarantees this.
Now, assume that the sharing of x2
i
` is valid with probability 1− i/2k − .9k · i . We show that
the sharing of x2
i+1
` is valid with probability 1− (i+ 1)/2k + .9k(i+ 1).
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The probability that the sharing of x2
i+1
` is invalid can be upper bounded by the following:
Pr[sharing of x2
i+1
` invalid ] ≤ Pr[ sharing of x2
i
` invalid ] +
Pr[ sharing of x2
i+1
` invalid | sharing of x2
i
` valid ]
≤ i/2k + .9k · i+
Pr[ sharing of x2
i+1
` invalid | sharing of x2
i
` valid ]
To upper bound Pr[ sharing of x2
i+1
` invalid | sharing of x2
i
` valid ], we note that if at least a
.9-fraction of the shares of the intermediate polynomial (x2
i





` are in L=, then it must be the case that the shares of x
2i+1
` were all computed
correctly.
Therefore, we can upper bound Pr[ sharing of x2
i+1
` invalid | sharing of x2
i
` valid ] by the prob-
abilities that Cut-and-choose passes on the shares of (x2
i
)2` but a .1-fraction were computed incor-
rectly or HEPKPV passes on 0-shares of x2
i+1
` , (x
2i)2` even though they are not in L=.
By the soundness of HEPKPV and Lemma 9 above, this can be upper bounded by 1/2k + .9k.
Therefore, we have that Pr[the sharing of x2
i+1
` is invalid ] ≤ (i+ 1)/2k + .9k(i+ 1).
By a union bound, we get that the probability that any of the sharings are invalid is at most:
|X| · (blogLc)2 · (1/2k + .9k), which is negligible.
Lemma 10 For all sets X1, X2 where |X1| = |X2| = poly(k), we have that the output dis-
tributions of the Verifier in consecutive executions of the Efficient Preprocessing protocol and
Preprocessing Verification protocol with inputs X1 and X2 (respectively) are computationally in-
distinguishable.
Proof. Intuitively, we need to show that the verifying party does not learn anything about Px`(0)
for x` ∈ X when the Efficient Preprocessing and Preprocessing Verification protocol are executed.
Now, for the technical proof: assume there is a distinguisher A that distinguishes the output
distribution of the verifier when using input X1 versus X2 for the fixed sets X1, X2. Thus, A
distinguishes between the output of the (malicious) Verifier in the following two experiments: Expt1
and Expt2 in which the Input preprocessing verification protocol is executed with commitments
from the Efficient preprocessing protocol obtained from X1 and X2 respectively and a verification
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set R ∈ [|J |]. We now show that the view of the verifiers in Expt1 and Expt2 are computationally
indistinguishable.
Assume there is a polynomial-time adversarial verifier A that distinguishes between the verifier’s
output distribution in Expt1 and Expt2. Then we show that there is a polynomial-time adversary
ACPA that can break the semantic security of the encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec). Since the
CPA security of (Gen,Enc,Dec) implies that (Gen,Enc,Dec) is also many-message CPA secure
when poly(k) ciphertexts are concatenated, it is sufficient to show that there is a polynomial-time



















ACPA then receives the encryptions of the values in either V1 or V2 encrypted under public key pk
and with independent randomness.
LetR1 andR2 are domains for plaintext and randomness for the encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec)
. Let S ∈ |J | such that JR ∩ JS = ∅. ACPA constructs the following encryptions:
• For each 1 ≤ j ≤ s, 1 ≤ ` ≤ αj , i ∈ JR ACPA chooses uniformly at random x`,i,j $← R1 and
r`,i,j
$← R2 and computes the pair (i,Encpk(x`,i,j; r`,i,j)).
• For each 1 ≤ j ≤ s, 1 ≤ ` ≤ αj − 1, i ∈ JR choose uniformly at random r′`,i,j
$← R2 and
compute the pair (i,Encpk((x`,i,j)
2; r′`,i,j)).
• For each 1 ≤ j ≤ s, 1 ≤ ` ≤ αj − 1, i ∈ JS choose uniformly at random x′`,i,j
$← R1 and
r′`,i,j
$← R2 and computes the pair (i,Encpk(x′`,i,j; r′`,i,j)).
Now ACPA uses Lagrange interpolation over encrypted values with the corresponding pairs com-
puted above to fill in the rest of the values in the following vectors that represent encryptions of
shares of the challenge ciphertexts that ACPA receives.
• Input shares: Encpk(Px2`+1j (i), rj,`,i)
∆ = Encpk(∆ · Px2`+1j (i), r
∆
j,`,i) and
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ACPA outputs these values as the commitments in the Efficient Preprocessing protocol and
then uses them as inputs to the Preprocessing Verification protocol. Note that ACPA is able to
answer the challenge in the Verification protocol since ACPA knows the plaintext and randomness
in the encryptions indexed by R. ACPA outputs whatever A outputs given the (malicious) verifier’s
output. Now we have that if the challenge ciphertext was an encryption of X1 then the output of
A is distributed identically to its output in Expt1. On the other hand, if the challenge ciphertext
was an encryption of X2 then the output of A is distributed identically to its output in Expt2.
Thus ACPA breaks the CPA security of the encryption scheme with the same probability that A
distinguishes between the verifier’s output in Expt1 and Expt2.
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Appendix C
How to Delegate and Verify in Public:
Verifiable Computation from
Attribute-based Encryption
C.1 Note on Terminology: Attribute-based Encryption versus Pred-
icate Encryption
We consider attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes to be ones in which each secret key ABE.SKF
is associated with a function F , and can decrypt ciphertexts that encrypt a message m under an “at-
tribute” x if and only if F (x) = 1. This formulation is implicit in the early definitions of ABE intro-
duced by Goyal, Pandey, Sahai and Waters [Sahai and Waters, 2005; Goyal et al., 2006]. However,
their work refers to F as an access structure, and existing ABE instantiations are restricted to func-
tions (or access structures) that can be represented as polynomial-size span programs (a generaliza-
tion of Boolean formulas) [Goyal et al., 2006; Ostrovsky et al., 2007; Lewko et al., 2010]. While such
restrictions are not inherent in the definition of ABE, the fully general formulation we use above was
first explicitly introduced by Katz, Sahai, and Waters, who dubbed it predicate encryption [Katz et
al., 2008]. Note that we do not require attribute-hiding or policy/function-hiding, properties often
associated with predicate encryption schemes (there appears to be some confusion in the literature
as to whether attribute-hiding is inherent in the definition of predicate encryption [Katz et al., 2008;
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Lewko et al., 2010; Boneh et al., 2011], but the original formulation [Katz et al., 2008] does not
seem to require it).
Thus, in a nutshell, our work can be seen as using ABE schemes for general functions, or
equivalently, predicate encryption schemes that do not hide the attributes or policy, in order to
construct verifiable computation protocols.
C.2 Attribute-based Encryption from Verifiable Computation
Given that we have shown how to construct a verifiable computation (VC) protocol from an
attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme, it is natural to ask whether the reverse implication
holds. In other words, can we construct an ABE scheme, given a VC scheme? At first sight, the
key property of a VC scheme – namely, efficient verification – does not seem to have anything to
do with attribute-based encryption.
Despite this apparent mismatch of functionality, we show how to transform a (very) restricted
class of (publicly) verifiable computation protocols – that we call weak “multi-function verifiable
computation” – into an attribute-based encryption scheme for the same set of functions. Informally,
a weak multi-function VC protocol has the following features:
• The output of ProbGen on an input x can be used to compute many different functions on x.
Thus, in some sense, ProbGen is agnostic of the function that will be computed on the input.
In particular, we now have a setup algorithm that generates a pair of public and secret
parameters, a key generation algorithm KeyGen (as before) that generates a secret key SKF
for a function F given the secret parameters, and a ProbGen algorithm that (as before) given
an input x and the public parameters generates an encoding of x together with a verification
key. Thus, ProbGen does not know about F and KeyGen does not know about x. Indeed, this
is the crucial property that gives us ABE.
• The verification key for an input x consists of a pair (V K0x, V K1x), and the verification algo-
rithm consists of simply applying a collision-resistant hash function H to the server’s response
σy and checking if it equals V K
0
x or V K
1
x.
Indeed, the VC schemes we constructed from ABE can both be tweaked to have these properties.
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The high level idea for the construction of an ABE scheme from a multi-function VC scheme is
as follows: in order to encrypt a message under a particular attribute (in the ABE scheme), we first
generate a key that can be computed only if the output of the server in the VC protocol verifies
correctly. Now, decryption of the ciphertext will succeed only if the decryptor correctly performs
the evaluation of the key’s function on the attribute associated with the ciphertext, and the output
value of the computation satisfies the decryption condition, in which case he will have the correct
decryption key for the ciphertext.
Put another way, the security of a VC scheme implies it should be difficult for an adversary
to produce an output that does not correspond to a legitimate computation of a function on a
particular input. If we make decryption of a ciphertext dependent on having a particular output,
then the computation possible given a key for the function and an attribute/input either legitimately
produces the expected output, allowing decryption of the ciphertext, or produces some other output,
and it is infeasible to produce the output necessary to decrypt the ciphertext.
We define the notion of a weak multi-function VC protocol below. The “weakness” in the
definition comes from the fact that we only need a multi-function VC scheme that verifies that
a particular output is legitimate for some outsourced function (i.e., a function given as input to
KeyGen), rather than for a specific function.
Below, we combine these requirements in a single definition, demonstrate that both the con-
structions from Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 satisfy this definition, and finally show how to use such
a definition to construct an ABE scheme.
Definition 39 (Weak Multi-Function Public Verifiable Computation). A VC scheme VC = (Setup,
KeyGen, ProbGen, Compute, Verify) is a weak multi-function public verifiable computation scheme
if it has the following properties:
• Setup(λ) → (PKparam, SKparam): Produces the public and private parameters that do not
depend on the functions to be evaluated.
• KeyGenPKparam,SKparam(F ) → PKF : Produces a public key for evaluating a specific function
F .
• ProbGenPKparam(x) → (σx, V Kx = (V K0x, V K1x)): The algorithm requires only the public
parameters, which are independent of the function that will be computed. It generates both
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the encoding σx for the input, and the public verification keys for each possible bit of the
output, in this case, simply V K0x and V K
1
x.
• ComputePKparam,PKF (σx)→ σy: The computation algorithm uses both parts of the public key
to produce an encoding of the output y = F (x).
• VerifyV Kx(σy)→ y ∪ ⊥: Using the public input-specific value V Kx, the verification algorithm
outputs 0 if V K0x = H(σy), outputs 1 if V K
1
x = H(σy), and outputs ⊥ otherwise, to indicate
that σy does not represent a valid output of some function F , for which KeyGen(F ) has been
invoked, on x
Definition 40 (Weak Multi-Function Public Verifiable Computation Security). Let VC = (Setup,KeyGen,
ProbGen,Compute,Verify) be a weak multi-function public verifiable computation scheme. We define
security via the following experiment.




(σx, V Kx)← ProbGenPKparam(x);
σˆy ← AOKeyGen(·)(PKparam, σx, V Kx);
yˆ ← VerifyV Kx(σˆy)
If yˆ 6=⊥ and ∀F ∈ R : yˆ 6= F (x), output ‘1’, else ‘0’;
We define the adversary’s advantage and the scheme’s security in the same fashion as Definition 8.
In the experiment, the adversary has oracle access to OKeyGen(F ), which calls
KeyGenPKparam,SKparam(F ), returns PKF , and stores F in the list R. Eventually, the adversary
returns an encoding σˆy which purports to be an output of some outsourced function applied to x.
The challenger runs Verify with the corresponding values of V Kx, and the adversary wins if this
check passes, but the output does not correspond to the output of one of the functions in list R.
Note that both the constructions from Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 satisfy this definition. The
ABE to VC construction (Section 5.3) does not include any function verification to begin with, but
it still verifies that the output, i.e., the message obtained after performing a decryption, could not
have been obtained without performing a legitimate computation (decryption) with one of the keys
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generated by KeyGen. In contrast, Construction 1 is too strong, since it verifies the specific function
used. To weaken it, we can simply add the private decryption key SKF to the computation key,
which was previously TKF . This removes the ability to verify which function was used, and hence
fits within the definition above.
Below, we describe our construction from VC to ABE in more detail.
Construction 2. Let VC = (Setup,KeyGen, ProbGen,Compute,Verify) be a weak multi-function
public verifiable computation scheme, and H be an injective one way function. We construct the
following key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme ABEV C .
• Setup(λ,U) → (PK,MSK): Run VC.Setup(λ) → (PKparam, SKparam) and output PK =
PKparam and MSK = SKparam.
• EncPK(M, γ)→ C where M ∈ {0, 1}:





– Let σans be such that H(σans) = V K
1
x. Choose a random value r and compute K =
〈σans, r〉 where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product of two bit-strings (mod 2).
Output ciphertext C = (σx, r,K ⊕M).
• KeyGenMSK(F ) → SKF : Run PKF ← VC.KeyGenPKparam,SKparam(F ). Output SKF =
PKF .
• DecSKF(C)→ M ∪ ⊥: Parse C as (σx, r,D).
– Run σans ← VC.ComputePKparams,PKF (σx).
– Compute K ← 〈σans, r〉. Output K ⊕D.
Correctness follows from the fact that if F (x) = 1, then the answer σans produced by the server
(upon running VC.Compute) is such that H(σans) = V K1x. Since H is an injective one-way function,
〈σans, r〉 ⊕D = M .
We now proceed to showing the security of the ABE scheme. First, we state the Goldreich-Levin
lemma [Goldreich and Levin, 1989].
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Lemma 17 (Goldreich-Levin [Goldreich and Levin, 1989]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a bijection
computable by a circuit of size t and suppose there is a circuit C of size s such that
Prx,r[C(f(x), r) = 〈x, r〉] = 1
2
+ .
Then there is a circuit C′ of size O((s+ t) · poly(n, 1/)) such that
Prx[C′(f(x)) = x] = 
4
.
Theorem 27. If VC = (Setup,KeyGen, ProbGen,Compute,Verify) is a secure weak multi-function
public VC scheme (see Definitions 40), then ABEV C , the ABE scheme obtained with Construction 2,
is IND-CPA secure (Definition 13).
Proof Sketch. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an adversary AABE that
wins with non-negligible probability µ the security game from Definition 13. We use this to break
the soundness of the VC protocol in two steps, conceptually.
First, using Lemma 17, the existence of AABE means that there is an adversary that, given
a ciphertext of the form (σx, r,D), predicts an inverse of V K
1
x under the function H. Note that
this transformation creates an adversary A′ABE that asks polynomially many more ABE secret key
queries than AABE .
Since this adversary essentially predicts the message of the server, this can then be used to
construct an adversary AV C that breaks the soundness of the VC protocol (from Definition 40)
with non-negligible probability. For completeness, we describe both these transformations as one
algorithm AV C that uses AABE :
1. AV C receives PKparam, the output from VC.Setup(λ) from his challenger. He forwards
PKparam to AABE .
2. On calls to OABE.KeyGen(F ), AV C queries his own OV C.KeyGen(F ) oracle and returns the
resulting PKF .
3. Given the challenge messages (M0,M1) and attributes γ, AV C requests as his challenge
(σγ , V Kγ = (V K
0
γ , V K
1
γ))← ProbGenPKparam(γ).
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4. AV C runs the adversary Agl to obtain the next value r submitted to the oracle Ox(·). AV C
chooses a random bit d
R← {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext C = (r, σγ , d) to AABE .
5. Eventually, AABE will return his guess bit bˆ. AV C computes d ⊕Mbˆ and returns this value
as an answer to Agl.
6. When Agl makes a new oracle query, AV C rewinds the execution of AABE to Step 4.
7. When AV C receives an answer σ˜0 from Agl, he returns it as his output for the computation
on input (σγ , V Kγ = (V K
0
γ , V K
1
γ)).
The probability that AV C succeeds in cheating is the same as the probability that Agl succeeds
in inverting V K0γ = H(σ0). By assumption AABE wins the security game from Definition 13
with non-negligible probability µ. Therefore AV C returns the correct value for σ0 · r to Agl with
probability µ. Then by Lemma 17 it follows that Agl will compute the correct output σ0 with
probability 4 , which is non-negligible. Hence AV C wins the security game from Definition 40
with non-negligible probability. Also AV C runs in polynomial time since Agl is a polynomial-time
algorithm.







Informally, Garb is considered secure if (G(C),G(x),G(y)) reveals no information about x and y.
An added property possessed by the construction is verifiability which, roughly speaking, means
that, given (G(C),G(x),G(y)), no adversary can output some G(o) such that Translate(G(o),T) 6=
f(x, y). Next we discuss these properties more formally.
We recall the properties of Yao’s garbled circuit construction which we make use of. These
include correctness, privacy and verifiability.
Definition 41 (Correctness). We say that Garb = (GarbCircuit,GarbIn,Compute,GarbOut,Translate)
is correct if for all functions f , for all circuits C computing f , for all coins r ∈ {0, 1}λ, and for all










Informally, Garb is considered private if the garbled circuit and the garbled inputs reveal no
useful information about x and y.
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Definition 42 (Privacy). We say that Garb = (GarbCircuit,GarbIn,Compute,GarbOut,Translate) is
private if for all functions f , for all circuits C computing f , for all inputs x, y, x′ and y′ in the
























C, 2, y′; r′
)}
,
where r and r′ are chosen uniformly at random.
Finally, we consider verifiability which, roughly speaking, means that, given a garbled circuit
and two garbled inputs, no adversary can find a garbled output that will result in the translation
algorithm returning an incorrect output.
Definition 43 (Verifiability). We say that Garb = (GarbCircuit,GarbIn,Compute,GarbOut,Translate)
is verifiable if for all functions f , for all circuits C computing f , for all inputs x and y in the do-
main of f , for a uniformly random seed r ∈ {0, 1}λ, and for all ppt adversaries A, the following






) 6= f(x, y) : o′ ← A(GarbCircuit(C; r),GarbIn(C, 1, x; r),GarbIn(C, 2, y; r))]
where the probability is over the coins of A.
D.2 Secure Delegated Computation
A delegated computation scheme consists of four polynomial-time algorithms Del = (Gen, ProbGen,
Compute, Verify) that work as follows. Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter k and a function f and outputs a public and secret key pair (pk, sk) such that the public
key encodes the target function f . ProbGen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a secret
key sk and an input x in the domain of f and outputs a public encoding σx and a secret state τx.
Compute is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk and a public encoding σx
and outputs a public encoding σy. Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret
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key sk, a secret state τx and a public encoding σy and outputs either an element y of f ’s range or
the failure symbol ⊥.
We recall the formal definitions of correctness, verifiability and privacy for a delegated compu-
tation scheme.
Definition 44 (Correctness). A delegated computation scheme Del = (Gen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify)
is correct if for all functions f , for all pk and sk output output by Gen(1k, f), for all x in the
domain of f , for all σx and τx output by ProbGensk(x), for all σy output by Computepk(σx),
Verifysk(τx, σy) = f(x).
A delegated computation scheme is verifiable if a malicious worker cannot convince the client to
accept an incorrect output. In other words, for a given function f and input x, a malicious worker
should not be able to find some σ′ such that the verification algorithm outputs y′ 6= f(x). This
intuition is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 45 (Verifiability). Let Del = (Gen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) be a delegated computation
scheme, A be an adversary and consider the following probabilistic experiment VerDel,A(k):
1. the challenger computes (pk, sk)← Gen(1k, f),
2. let O(sk, ·) be a probabilistic oracle that takes as input an element x in the domain of f ,
computes (σ, τ)← ProbGensk(x) and outputs σ,
3. given pk and oracle access to O(sk, ·), A outputs an input x,
4. the challenger computes (σx, τx)← ProbGensk(x),
5. given σx, the adversary A outputs an encoding σ′,
6. if Verifysk(τ, σ
′) 6∈ {⊥, f(x)} then output 1 else output 0.
We say that Del is verifiable if for all ppt adversaries A,
Pr [ VerDel,A(k) = 1 ] ≤ NEGL(k)
where the probability is over the coins of Gen, O, A and ProbGen.
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Informally, a delegated computation scheme is private if its public encodings reveal no useful
information about the input x.
Definition 46 (Privacy). Let Del = (Gen,ProbGen,Compute,Verify) be a delegated computation
scheme, A be a stateful adversary and consider the following probabilistic experiment PrivDel,A(k):
1. the challenger computes (pk, sk)← Gen(1k, f),
2. let O(sk, ·) be a probabilistic oracle that takes as input an element x in the domain of f ,
computes (σ, τ)← ProbGensk(x) and outputs σ,
3. given pk and oracle access to O(sk, ·), A outputs two inputs x0 and x1,
4. the challenger samples a bit b at random and computes (σb, τb)← ProbGensk(xb),
5. given σb, the adversary A outputs a bit b′,
6. if b′ = b output 1 else output 0.
We say that Del is private if for all ppt adversaries A,
Pr [ PrivDel,A(k) = 1 ] ≤ NEGL(k)
where the probability is over the coins of Gen, O, A and ProbGen.
D.3 Proof for Set Intersection Protocols
Theorem 14 The protocol in Figure 6.5 securely computes the 2-party set intersection functionality














Proof. We consider the different adversarial models in the following claims.
Claim 14. The protocol
(AS [sh],A1[sh],A2[sh])-securely computes the 2-party set intersection
functionality in the FCT-hybrid model.
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We describe three independent transformations SimS , Sim1 and Sim2. The simulator Sim1
simulates A1 as follows:
1. Sim1 queries FCT to receive the common random string r used to derive K1, K2 and d, e1, e2
and answers A1’s queries to FCT correspondingly.
2. Sim1 calls the trusted party submitting the input it has for the semi-honest A1 and obtains
the output for A1
3. The simulator computes the corresponding PRP values for the output and sends those to A1.
We construct a simulator Sim2 that simulates A2 analogously to Sim1. The simulator SimS that
simulates AS as follows:
1. SimS generates two random sets X and Y of size m and n.
2. SimS chooses K1, K2 and d, e1, e2, computes honestly the PRP values for X and Y and
submits them to AS .
The indistinguishability of the simulated and the real execution views follows easily from the
pseudorandom properties of the PRP.
2
Claim 15. The protocol
(AS [m],A1[h],A2[h])-securely computes the 2-party set intersection func-
tionality in the FCT-hybrid model.
We construct a simulator SimS that simulates the adversary AS as follows:
1. SimS generates two random sets X and Y of size m and n.
2. SimS chooses s1, s2 and d, e1, e2, computes honestly the PRP values for X and Y and submits
them to AS .
3. SimS receives the output computed by AS . If the returned set is not the correct set of
intersection PRP vales, the simulator sends an abort message to the trusted party and to AS .
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The views of the adversary AS in the real and the ideal execution are indistinguishable because
of the properties of the PRP function and the fact that P1 and P2 are honest. In the ideal execution
P1 and P2 receive as output the set intersection of their inputs if and only if AS has computed it
correctly (i.e., SimS has not submitted abort to the trusted party). Thus we need to show that in
the real execution the probability that the parties will not abort, when the set returned by AS is
not the correct result, is negligible. A misbehavior of AS will not be detected, if the intersection
set that he returns contains all PRP values for the element d, does not contain any of the PRP
values for e1 and e2, and for every PRP value in the returned set all the other t−1 PRP values that
correspond to the respective element are also in the claimed intersection set. Let r be size of the
set intersection. The probability that AS removes k ≤ r values from the set intersection without
being detected is (i.e., guesses the PRP values that correspond to the element d and then guesses











The probability that AS adds s ≤ m− r (s ≤ n− r) values from the set intersection returned
to P1 (P2) without being detected is (i.e., guesses the t PRP values corresponding to e1 (e2) and
then guesses st PRP values corresponding to s elements):
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< 1, it follows that the probability that AS removes any values from the set
intersection without being detected is negligible. Similarly we get that the probability of that AS
adds any values from the set intersection without being detected is also negligible. Therefore, the
probability that the set intersection that a party accepts as answer is not the correct result is
negligible.
2
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Claim 16. The protocol
(AS [nc1, nc2],A1[sh],A2[sh])-securely computes the 2-party set intersec-
tion functionality in the FCT-hybrid model.
The proof of the claim follows from the above two claims and Lemma 12.
2
Theorem 15 The protocol in Figure 6.5 securely computes the 2-party set intersection function-














AS [sh],A1[sh],A2[ncS , nc1]
)}
.
Proof. We consider only the cases in the adversarial structure that were not covered in the proof
of Theorem 14.
Claim 17. The protocol
(AS [h],A1[m],A2[h])-securely computes the 2-party set intersection func-
tionality in the FCT-hybrid model.
We construct a simulator Sim1 that simulates the adversary A1 as follows:
1. Sim1 queries FCT to receive the common random string r used to derive K1, K2 and d, e1, e2
and answers A1’s queries to FCT correspondingly.
2. Sim1 receives from A1 the PRP values that he submits, and uses K1 and K2 to extract the
inputs. If he fails to extract these values, Sim1 submits abort to the TP. Otherwise, Sim1
submits the extracted values to the trusted party and receives back the set intersection.
3. The simulator verifies that A1 has submitted exactly t PRP values for each of his inputs. If
the verification fails, he instructs the TP to send abort to the P2.
4. Sim1 sends toA1 a commitment of the PRP values from the input set sent byA1 corresponding
to the elements in the set intersection.
APPENDIX D. OUTSOURCING MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION WITH NON-COLLUDING
ADVERSARIES 257
5. Sim1 and A1 execute the verification where A1 proves he has submitted exactly t PRP values
for each of his inputs. If the verification fails, the simulator aborts the protocol.
6. The simulator opens his commitment and sends the corresponding PRP values to A1.
The view of A1 in the simulated and the real executions are identical. In both the real and the
simulated execution P2 receives the correct output if the set submitted by A1 was formed correctly
and otherwise aborts.
2
Claim 18. The protocol
(AS [sh],A1[ncS ],A2[sh])-securely computes the 2-party set intersection
functionality in the FCT-hybrid model.
The proof of this claim follows from the previous claim and Lemma 12.
2
The proofs for the two remaining case when P2 is malicious have analogous proofs.
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Appendix E
Privacy Enhanced Access Control for
Outsourced Data Sharing
E.1 Predicate Encryption and Extensions
In this section we present the construction of predicate encryption of [Katz et al., 2008] and our
extension that allows re-randomization of ciphertexts. The scheme ({, }Enc,GenKey,Dec) is defined
through the following algorithms:
• {(} 1n):
1. Choose primes p, q and r and a groups Gp, Gq and Gr with generator gp, gq and gr
repectively. Let G = Gp ×Gq ×Gr.
2. Choose R1,i, R2,i ∈ Gr, h1,i, h2,i ∈ Gp uniformly at random for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and R0 ∈ Gr.
3. The public parameters for the scheme are (N = pqr,G,GT , e). The public key is defined
as:
PK = (gp, gr, Q = gq ·R0, {H1,i = h1,i ·R1,i, H2,i = h2,i ·R2,i}ni=1).
The master secret keys is
SK = (p, q, r, gq, {h1,i, h2,i}ni=1).
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• EncSK(x1, . . . , xn):
1. Choose random s, α, β ∈ ZN , R3,i, R4,i ∈ Gr for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.











• GenKeySK(v1, . . . , vn):
1. Choose random r1,i, r2,i ∈ Zp for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a random R5 ∈ Gr, f1, f2 ∈ Zq and
Q6 ∈ Gq.
2. Output SKv that consists of
(





1,i · h−r2,i2,i ,
{K1,i = gr1,ip · gf1·viq ,K2,i = gr2,ip · gf2·viq }ni=1
)




e(C1,i,K1,i) · e(C2,i,K2,i) = 1.
We further define an algorithm that re-randomizes any ciphertext produced by the predicate
encryption as follows:
• $← (C): The ciphertext is of the form (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}ni=1). Choose a random s′ ∈ ZN and
output





The resulting ciphertext is the same a freshly generated ciphertext for the encrypted value
using random value s+ s′, if s was the value used in C.
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Now we look closely at the instantiation of the predicate encryption scheme that handles poly-
nomial evaluation as its predicate. In this case the predicate (v1, . . . , vn) consists of the coefficients
of the polynomial that is being evaluated and the attribute vector that is used for an evaluation
point x is of the form (1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1). The ciphertext for the encryption of (1, x, x2, . . . , xn−1)
has components (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}ni=1), where C1,i, C2,i correspond to the vector point xi−1. Thus we
can view the first few components of the ciphertext (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}2i=1) as an encryption of the
vector (1, x) that can be used for evaluation of predicates that are linear functions.
We use the above observation in the instantiation of the tags that the cloud derives for each of
the accepted write updates. He uses the token that the client has used to prove his write access to
a particular block, which a predicate encryption ciphertext (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}ni=1), to derive identifier
for the files with which the submitted update will be associated by taking the first part of the
ciphertext (C0, {C1,i, C2,i}2i=1). This identifier cannot be used as a write access token since it is
missing substantial part of the ciphertext, and no party without the master secret key can extend
an identifier to a valid write token. Also any party that has read access to the file associated with
the update will be given a key that would allow it to recognize the updates for that file. This key
will be the predicate corresponding to the linear function that evaluates to zero at the file id.
E.2 Optimizations
We discuss several techniques to improve the performance of the two schemes that we presented in
the case of multiple accesses to the same files, or as a trade-off for privacy guarantees.
Multiple File Accesses When a user is accessing a file for the first time, he needs to obtain
first the access token for the file, which would allow him to obtain from the cloud the access block
that contains the file. Once he gets the block, he further needs to obtain the decryption key for
the file he is accessing. We can save the derivation time for the tokens and the decryption keys for
subsequent accesses to the same file, if the user stores these credential. The credentials will be valid
for the next request as long as no user has been revoked access to the file in the meantime (in which
case the access credentials would have been changed). If this has happened, the user will be denied
access, and he would try to derive again the credential from the tree in order to obtain the updated
tokens and decryption keys if he is still authorized to access the file. This optimization applies to
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the read and the write access tokens as well as the decryption key for read. The only exception is
the encryption key for write access — the user should always derive the current public encryption
key for the file, which he wants to update. Unlike the case of the decryption keys for read access,
where the client would detect that he does not have a valid key by virtue of the fact that he will
not be able to decrypt any of the files in the block, here the user has no way to recognize whether
a cached encryption key is still valid.
During a file access request the cloud provider tests each of the access blocks that he is storing
against the access token that the user provides in order to find the one that contains the requested
files, if the user is authorized. The reason for this is that initially the user does not know in which
access block the file is located. However, when the user receives back a block during his first request
for a file, he can also get a unique identifier for the block. Thus the next time he needs to access
the same file, he can directly point the cloud provider to the relevant block and he will just need
to verify that the token is valid for this access block. If this verification fails, the cloud will also
check all the other blocks in case the data owner has updated the mapping of the files into blocks.
Communication vs. Access Privacy The schemes that we proposed provide access pattern
privacy for the users within each access block (in addition to the anonymity of the credentials).
This comes at the cost of transmitting the content of the whole matched block to the user making
a read request. However, there might be cases where the user’s bandwidth is limited and he cannot
afford to receive all the block content, or simply he is not concerned with revealing which part of
the block he is accessing. In this case the client can request directly the part of the block he needs.
For this we need to enable the cloud to find the requested file in the access block. However, we want
to emphasize that this should happen, only if the user specifies that he is ready to reveal his exact
access in the block. We should not enable the cloud provider to do this for every request since this
way we will lose the whole point of the access blocks. We can do this through an additional set of
read request tokens that are constructed in the same way as predicate encryption ciphertexts with
attribute the file id, however, under a different key. Now each file ciphertext would also contain
a decryption key that can decrypt only ciphertexts with attribute the identifier for the file. The
cloud provider can use these decryption keys to identify the exact file in the block that matches
the request. With this extension of the scheme the users will have two sets of credential: access
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pattern hiding, just identifying a relevant block, and access pattern revealing that point directly to
the requested file within the block.
APPENDIX F. PRACTICAL SECURE SEARCH 263
Appendix F
Practical Secure Search
F.1 Key Generation for Our SADS Protocol
The key generation algorithm is not our main focus since general multiparty computation techniques
[Yao, 1982; Yao, 1986; Goldreich et al., 1987] can be applied to distribute the appropriate keys.
However, we give here an efficient algorithm that allows the sender (S), the receiver (R) and the
query router (QR) to obtain their keys. The sender and the receiver choose their keys kS and kR
respectively. The sender chooses a random number rS and the receiver chooses a random number
rR; the following messages are exchanged between the three parties using a public key encryption
scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) in which pkQR and pkS are public encryption keys for the third party and
the sender.
S → QR : kS · rS
R→ QR : kR · rR
R→ S : rR
S → QR : rS · r−1R
At the end of the above message exchange the query router can compute: kQR = (kR · rR) · (kS ·
rS)
−1 · rS · r−1R = (kR) · (kS)−1.
In the above protocol a misbehaving party can cause at most invalid third party key but it cannot
learn any secret. Our adversarial model assumes no colluding parties during key generation. If the
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query router colludes with the sender or the receiver, they can compute from their keys the key of
the non-colluding party. Collusion between sender and receiver is not possible since these parties
want to protect their data from each other.
More formally we can construct a simulator AR which interacts with the receiver as follows: it
receives the values kR · rR and rR that receiver sends. From those AR recovers kR and submits it
to the trusted party. This execution is indistinguishable for the receiver from the real execution.
Similarly, we construct a simulator AS , which interacts with the sender in the following way:
it receives the value kS · rS , chooses and sends a random rR to S, and then receives rS · r−1R . Now
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